The International Space Station Ionizing Radiation Environment: Electronic Systems, Materials, and Shielding Mass Effects

No abstract availabl

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science: Spacecraft, Aircraft, Ground-Based Computation and Control Systems, Exploration, and Human Health and Safety

In this presentation a review of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) effects on microelectronic systems and human health and safety is given. The methods used to evaluate and mitigate unwanted cosmic ray effects in ground-based, atmospheric flight, and space flight environments are also reviewed. However not all GCR effects are undesirable. We will also briefly review how observation and analysis of GCR interactions with planetary atmospheres and surfaces and reveal important compositional and geophysical data on earth and elsewhere. About 1000 GCR particles enter every square meter of Earths upper atmosphere every second, roughly the same number striking every square meter of the International Space Station (ISS) and every other low- Earth orbit spacecraft. GCR particles are high energy ionized atomic nuclei (90% protons, 9% alpha particles, 1% heavier nuclei) traveling very close to the speed of light. The GCR particle flux is even higher in interplanetary space because the geomagnetic field provides some limited magnetic shielding. Collisions of GCR particles with atomic nuclei in planetary atmospheres and/or regolith as well as spacecraft materials produce nuclear reactions and energetic/highly penetrating secondary particle showers. Three twentieth century technology developments have driven an ongoing evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical engineering tools needed to design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex technological systems and assess effects on human health and safety effects. The key technology developments are: 1) high altitude commercial and military aircraft; 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft; and 3) increasingly complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems. Space and geophysical exploration needs drove the development of the instruments and analytical tools needed to recover compositional and structural data from GCR induced nuclear reactions and secondary particle showers. Finally, the possible role of GCR secondary particle showers in addressing an important homeland security problem, finding nuclear contraband and weapons, will be briefly reviewed

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science: Spacecraft, Aircraft, Ground-Based Computation and Control Systems, and Human Health and Safety

Three twentieth century technological developments, 1) high altitude commercial and military aircraft; 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft; and 3) increasingly complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems, have driven an ongoing evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical engineering tools needed to design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex technological systems. The effects of primary cosmic ray particles and secondary particle showers produced by nuclear reactions with the atmosphere, can determine the design and verification processes (as well as the total dollar cost) for manned and unmanned spacecraft avionics systems. Similar considerations apply to commercial and military aircraft operating at high latitudes and altitudes near the atmospheric Pfotzer maximum. Even ground based computational and controls systems can be negatively affected by secondary particle showers at the Earth s surface, especially if the net target area of the sensitive electronic system components is large. Finally, accumulation of both primary cosmic ray and secondary cosmic ray induced particle shower radiation dose is an important health and safety consideration for commercial or military air crews operating at high altitude/latitude and is also one of the most important factors presently limiting manned space flight operations beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). In this paper we review the discovery of cosmic ray effects on the performance and reliability of microelectronic systems as well as human health and the development of the engineering and health science tools used to evaluate and mitigate cosmic ray effects in ground-based atmospheric flight, and space flight environments. Ground test methods applied to microelectronic components and systems are used in combinations with radiation transport and reaction codes to predict the performance of microelectronic systems in their operating environments. Similar radiation transport codes are used to evaluate possible human health effects of cosmic ray exposure, however, the health effects are based on worst-case analysis and extrapolation of a very limited human exposure data base combined with some limited experimental animal data. Finally, the limitations on human space operations beyond low-Earth orbit imposed by long term exposure to galactic cosmic rays are discussed

Impact of Solar Array Position on ISS Vehicle Charging

The International Space Station (ISS), because of its large structure and high voltage solar arrays, has a complex plasma interaction with the ionosphere in low Earth orbit (LEO). This interaction of the ISS US Segment photovoltaic (PV) power system with the LEO ionospheric plasma produces floating potentials on conducting elements of the ISS structure relative to the local plasma environment. To control the ISS floating potentials, two Plasma Contactor Units (PCUs) are installed on the Z1 truss. Each PCU discharges accumulated electrons from the Space Station structure, thus reducing the potential difference between the ISS structure and the surrounding charged plasma environment. Operations of the PCUs were intended to keep the ISS floating potential to 40 Volts (Reference 1). Exposed dielectric surfaces overlying conducting structure on the Space Station will collect an opposite charge from the ionosphere as the ISS charges. In theory, when an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) crewmember is tethered to structure via the crew safety tether or when metallic surfaces of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) come in contact with conducting metallic surfaces of the ISS, the EMU conducting components, including the perspiration-soaked crewmember inside, can become charged to the Space Station floating potential. The concern is the potential dielectric breakdown of anodized aluminum surfaces on the EMU producing an arc from the EMU to the ambient plasma, or nearby ISS structure. If the EMU arcs, an electrical current of an unknown magnitude and duration may conduct through the EVA crewmember, producing an unacceptable condition. This electrical current may be sufficient to startle or fatally shock the EVA crewmember (Reference 2). Hence, as currently defined by the EVA community, the ISS floating potential for all nominal and contingency EVA worksites and translation paths must have a magnitude less than 40 volts relative to the local ionosphere at all times during EVA. Arcing from the EMU is classified as a catastrophic hazard, which requires two-failure tolerant controls, i.e., three hazard controls. Each PCU is capable of maintaining the ISS floating potential below the requirement during EVA. The two PCUs provide a single failure tolerant control of ISS floating potential. In the event of the failure of one or two PCUs, a combination of solar array shunting and turning the solar arrays into their own wakes will be used to supply control of the plasma hazard (Reference 3). The purpose of this paper is to present on-orbit information that shows that ISS solar array placement with respect to the ISS velocity vector can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an operational control for the plasma hazard. Also, this paper will present on-orbit information that shows that shunting of the ISS solar arrays can control solar array plasma charging, and hence, provide an additional operational control for the plasma hazard

Spacecraft Charging: Hazard Causes, Hazard Effects, Hazard Controls

Spacecraft flight environments are characterized both by a wide range of space plasma conditions and by ionizing radiation (IR), solar ultraviolet and X-rays, magnetic fields, micrometeoroids, orbital debris, and other environmental factors, all of which can affect spacecraft performance. Dr. Steven Koontz's lecture will provide a solid foundation in the basic engineering physics of spacecraft charging and charging effects that can be applied to solving practical spacecraft and spacesuit engineering design, verification, and operations problems, with an emphasis on spacecraft operations in low-Earth orbit, Earth's magnetosphere, and cis-Lunar space

Space Flight Ionizing Radiation Environments

The space-flight ionizing radiation (IR) environment is dominated by very high-kinetic energy-charged particles with relatively smaller contributions from X-rays and gamma rays. The Earth's surface IR environment is not dominated by the natural radioisotope decay processes. Dr. Steven Koontz's lecture will provide a solid foundation in the basic engineering physics of space radiation environments, beginning with the space radiation environment on the International Space Station and moving outward through the Van Allen belts to cislunar space. The benefits and limitations of radiation shielding materials will also be summarized

Practical Applications of Cosmic Ray Science

No abstract availabl

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on long-duration deep space missions for human exploration which offers no options for a quick emergency return to Earth. The combination of long mission duration with no quick emergency return option leads to unprecedented spacecraft system safety and reliability requirements. It is important that spacecraft avionics systems for human deep space missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effect (SEE) failures caused by space radiation (primarily the continuous galactic cosmic ray background and the occasional solar particle event) interactions with electronic components and systems. SEE effects are typically managed during the design, development, and test (DD&T) phase of spacecraft development by using heritage hardware (if possible) and through extensive component level testing, followed by system level failure analysis tasks that are both time consuming and costly. The ultimate product of the SEE DD&T program is a prediction of spacecraft avionics reliability in the flight environment produced using various nuclear reaction and transport codes in combination with the component and subsystem level radiation test data. Previous work by Koontz, et al.1 utilized FLUKA, a Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code, to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data for a variety of spacecraft and space flight environments. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days). CREME962, an easy to use deterministic code offering short run times, was also compared with FLUKA predictions and in-flight data. CREME96, though fast and easy to use, has not been updated in several years and underestimates secondary particle shower effects in spacecraft structural shielding mass. Thus, this paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 20103, a fast and easy to use deterministic transport code, similar to CREME96, that was developed at NASA Langley Research Center primarily for flight crew ionizing radiation dose assessments. HZETRN 2010 includes updates to address secondary particle shower effects more accurately, and might be used as another tool to verify spacecraft avionics system reliability in space flight SEE environments

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on deep space for human exploration that do not provide a simple emergency return to Earth. In addition, the deep space environment contains a constant background Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) radiation exposure, as well as periodic Solar Particle Events (SPEs) that can produce intense amounts of radiation in a short amount of time. Given these conditions, it is important that the avionics systems for deep space human missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effects (SEE) that can occur from radiation interactions with electronic components. The typical process to minimizing SEE effects is through using heritage hardware and extensive testing programs that are very costly. Previous work by Koontz, et al. [1] utilized an analysis-based method for investigating electronic component susceptibility. In their paper, FLUKA, a Monte Carlo transport code, was used to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data. In addition, CREME-96, a deterministic code, was also compared with FLUKA and in-flight data. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days), and CREME-96 has not been updated in several years. This paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 2010, a deterministic transport code developed at NASA Langley Research Center, as another tool that can be used to analyze SEE and SEU rates. The benefits to using HZETRN over FLUKA and CREME-96 are that it has a very fast run time (on the order of minutes) and has been shown to be of similar accuracy as other deterministic and Monte Carlo codes when considering dose [2, 3, 4]. The 2010 version of HZETRN has updated its treatment of secondary neutrons and thus has improved its accuracy over previous versions. In this paper, the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) spectra are of interest rather than the total ionizing dose. Therefore, the LET spectra output from HZETRN 2010 will be compared with the FLUKA and in-flight data to validate HZETRN 2010 as a computational tool for SEE qualification by analysis. Furthermore, extrapolation of these data to interplanetary environments at 1 AU will be investigated to determine whether HZETRN 2010 can be used successfully and confidently for deep space mission analyses

International Space Station Spacecraft Charging Hazards: Hazard Identification, Management, and Control Methodologies, with Possible Applications to Human Spaceflight Beyond LEO

No abstract availabl