Katyn massacre : basic facts

Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish nation. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic facts of Katyn massacre - the execution of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin (Tver) and also other Polish prisoners (soldiers and civilians), which took place in the spring of 1940 in different places of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus republics based on the decision of the Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. This article refers not only to the massacre itself, but also its origin, historical processes and the lies accompanying Katyn massacre

Katyn Massacre – Basic Facts

Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish nation. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic facts of Katyn massacre – the execution of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin (Tver) and also other Polish prisoners (soldiers and civilians), which took place in the spring of 1940 in different places of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus republics based on the decision of the Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. This article refers not only to the massacre itself, but also its origin, historical processes and the lies accompanying Katyn massacre.Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish nation. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic facts of Katyn massacre – the execution of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin (Tver) and also other Polish prisoners (soldiers and civilians), which took place in the spring of 1940 in different places of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus republics based on the decision of the Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. This article refers not only to the massacre itself, but also its origin, historical processes and the lies accompanying Katyn massacre

Conformational Rearrangements Regulating the DNA Repair Protein APE1

Apurinic apyrimidinic endonuclease 1 (APE1) is a key enzyme of the Base Excision Repair (BER) pathway, which primarily manages oxidative lesions of DNA. Once the damaged base is removed, APE1 recognises the resulting abasic site and cleaves the phosphodiester backbone to allow for the correction by subsequent enzymes of the BER machinery. In spite of a wealth of information on APE1 structure and activity, its regulation mechanism still remains to be understood. Human APE1 consists of a globular catalytic domain preceded by a flexible N-terminal extension, which might be involved in the interaction with DNA. Moreover, the binding of the nuclear chaperone nucleophosmin (NPM1) to this region has been reported to impact APE1 catalysis. To evaluate intra- and inter-molecular conformational rearrangements upon DNA binding, incision, and interaction with NPM1, we used Förster resonance energy transfer (FRET), a fluorescence spectroscopy technique sensitive to molecular distances. Our results suggest that the N-terminus approaches the DNA at the downstream side of the abasic site and enables the building of a predictive model of the full-length APE1/DNA complex. Furthermore, the spatial configuration of the N-terminal tail is sensitive to NPM1, which could be related to the regulation of APE1.This research was funded by the University of the Basque Country (grant number GIU18/172). The APC was funded by the Basque Government (grant number IT1454-22)

Fruiting bodies of Hericium erinaceus (Bull.) Pers. – a new source of water-insoluble (1→3)-α-d-glucan

A water-insoluble polysaccharide (WIP) was isolated from the fruiting bodies of Hericium erinaceus HE01 by an alkaline solution with the yield of 5%. Structural and compositional analyses by total acid hydrolysis, methylation analysis, FT-IR, FT-Raman, and 1H NMR spectroscopy as well as other instrumental techniques showed predominantly glucose linked by α-glycosidic bonds and small amounts of mannose, xylose, rhamnose, galactose, and ribose. The methylation analysis showed that (1→3)-linked Glcp is the major constituent (70.8%) of the polymer, while the 3,4 substituted d-Glcp represents the main branching residue of the glucan. The presence of (1→3)-α-d-glucan in the hyphae of H. erinaceus was additionally confirmed by the use of specific fluorophore-labeled antibodies

The Activities of Regional Censorship Offices under Martial Law in Poland

W artykule przedstawiono działalność Wojewódzkich Urzędów Cenzury w okresie stanu wojennego. Powstały one na bazie kadr Wydziałów „W” i Wydziałów „T” KWMO/WUSW i funkcjonowały przez ponad rok (od 13 grudnia 1981 do 31 grudnia 1982 r.). Głównym zadaniem WUC było prowadzenie cenzury pocztowej i telekomunikacyjnej oraz kontrola rozmów telefonicznych. Podstawę źródłową artykułu stanowi dokumentacja SB w zakresie cenzury pocztowej oraz sprawozdania z cenzury telekomunikacyjnej poszczególnych Wojewódzkich Urzędów Cenzury. Działalność WUC przebadano w dwóch grupach województw, które wyodrębniła reforma administracyjna z 1975 r.: do pierwszej należało 17 dotychczas funkcjonujących „historycznych” województw, do drugiej 32 nowe, utworzone w wyniku reformy. Analiza porównawcza pracy poszczególnych WUC wykazała, że w cenzurze telekomunikacyjnej i kontroli rozmów telefonicznych brali udział funkcjonariusze Wydziału (sekcji) „T” do końca grudnia 1981 r., a następnie sprawowali nad nią nadzór. Ciężar cenzurowania telegramów i teleksów, a także kontrolowania rozmów spoczywał na pracownikach urzędów telekomunikacyjnych. Wg naczelników Wydziałów i Sekcji „T” nie przekładało się to na jakość i skuteczność cenzury, a wprost przeciwnie – oznaczało spadek wyników. W ocenie kierownictwa Głównego Urzędu Cenzury cenzura odegrała zakładaną przez władzę rolę jako rygor, który dotknął najszersze kręgi społeczeństwa i był najbardziej dotkliwy. Cenzura listów dostarczała informacji o opiniach i nastrojach społecznych w różnych środowiskach (wśród studentów, ludzi nauki i kultury) na temat stanu wojennego, polityki partii i rządu. Przyczyniła się również do ograniczenia działań opozycji przez konfiskatę wydawnictw opozycyjnych i emigracyjnych, a także w sposób psychologiczny oddziaływała na społeczeństwo (chociażby przez świadomość, że „rozmowa jest kontrolowana”)The article presents the activities of regional censorship offices operating at voivodeship level during the Martial Law in the 1981–1982. Those were created out of personnel from Sections W and Sections T of the Voivodeship Citizen’s Milicia Headquarters and Voivodeship Offices of Internal Affairs (KWMO/WUSW) and operated for over a year (13 December 1981 to 31 December 1982). The main task of those regional censorship offices was to censor mail correspondence and telecommunications messages, and to provide surveillance of telephone calls. The article is based on the Security Service sources relating to postal censorship and reports on the telecommunications censorship activities of individual regional censorship offices. The article looks at the activities of the censorship offices in two sets of voivodeships created by the administrative reforms of 1975: the first set comprises the 17 previously existing (“historical”) voivodeships, the second one comprises the 32 extra voivodeships created as a result of the reform. A comparative analysis of the activities of different offices shows that the censorship of telecommunications messages and phone call surveillance were first handled (until the end of December 1981), and then only supervised, by Section T operatives. The burden of censoring telegrams and telex messages and conducting phone call surveillance fell to regular telecommunications workers. According to the heads of the relevant censorship sections this resulted in a drop in the quality and effectiveness of the censorship and produced inferior outcomes. The leadership of the Main Censorship Office believed that censorship fulfilled its intended role as a major constraint imposed across a broad spectrum of society. By censoring mail correspondence it was possible to gauge the public mood and opinions in different social groups (students, academics, culture) on the state of martial law as well as on government and party policies. The censorship also helped to curb the activities of the dissident opposition through seizure of clandestine publications published in Poland and abroad, and exerted a psychological impact on society, who kept hearing the recorded message, "this phone call is being monitored"

Cooperation between Bureau “B” of the Ministry of the Interior with its counterparts in the security services of the Soviet bloc (namely, those of: the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Working methods and “exchange of operational experience”

Artykuł dotyczy relacji między pionami obserwacji resortów bezpieczeństwa PRL i jej głównych partnerów: Związku Sowieckiego, NRD, Czechosłowacji i Węgier. Ta tematyka nie była dotąd przedmiotem osobnych studiów – ani w kontekście relacji bilateralnych między poszczególnymi służbami, ani w ramach badań nad służbą obserwacyjną PRL. Ze względu na zachowaną dokumentację w artykule w sposób szczególny skupiono się na latach osiemdziesiątych. Bazę źródłową tekstu stanowią materiały Biura „B” MSW: sprawozdania pionu „B”, raporty i sprawozdania kierownictwa Biura „B” do ministra spraw wewnętrznych z wizyt przedstawicieli bratnich służb w MSW lub delegacji kierownictwa biura w krajach demokracji ludowej. W końcu lat osiemdziesiątych Biuru „B” MSW udało się przekształcić wzajemne kontakty we współpracę. Dotyczyła ona głównie dwóch zagadnień: szkolenia oraz sprzętu. W kwestii szkoleń najwięcej do zaoferowania miał KGB. Jeśli chodzi o sprzęt, to najbardziej pożądane były urządzenia produkcji zachodniej, następnie ZSRS i NRD. Na tym etapie badań można stwierdzić, że Biuro „B” MSW chętnie korzystało z doświadczeń służb sowieckich i wschodnioniemieckich, samo natomiast było wzorem do naśladowania dla służb czechosłowackich i węgierskich.The article deals with the relations between the surveillance departments of the security ministries of the People’s Republic of Poland and its main partners: the Soviet Union, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This topic has not been a separate subject of study so far – neither in the context of bilateral relations between individual services, nor within the framework of research on the surveillance service of the People’s Republic of Poland. The article discusses contacts with individual countries and the most relevant aspects of these relationships. Due to the preserved documentation, special attention was paid to the 1980s. The source base for the text are materials from Bureau “B” of the Ministry of the Interior, namely: reports by Bureau “B”, reports by the management of Bureau “B” to the Minister of the Interior on visits of representatives of related services to the Ministry of the Interior, and reports of delegations of the bureau’s management to other countries of the Eastern bloc. In the late 1980s, Bureau “B” of the Ministry of the Interior succeeded in transforming mutual contacts into cooperation. It focused on two issues: training and equipment. In terms of training, the KGB had the most to offer. In terms of equipment, Western-made equipment was most in demand, followed by equipment from the USSR and East Germany. At this stage of research, it can be concluded that Bureau “B” of the Ministry of the Interior was keen to draw on the experience of the Soviet and East German services, while it itself was a role model for the Czechoslovak and Hungarian services

Straight and branched (ω-1)-hydroxylated very long chain fatty acids are components of Bradyrhizobium lipid A

Lipopolysaccharides of seven Bradyrhizobium strains and three whole-cell fatty acid preparations from bacteria isolated from nodules of Sarothamnus scoparius (Common Broom) were studied for the presence of very long chain (ω-1)-hydroxy fatty acids. Several such fatty acids were identified. Among them, straight-chain as well as mono- and dimethyl branched acids with chains in the range from 26 to 34 carbon atoms were found. Pyrrolidides and 4,4-dimethyloxazoline derivatives were used to determine the branching position. Carbons at the (ω-10) and/or (ω-11) positions in alkyl chains were points of attachment of methyl groups. These data complete the structure of bradyrhizobial lipid A with important details. The obtained results can be applied in the chemotaxonomy of Bradyrhizobium