What has been the tax competition experience of the past 20 years?

This paper describes tax reforms in OECD countries over the last 20 years and how they are related to tax competition. Both individual countries? reforms and multilateralinitiatives and developments are covered. This is followed by an overview of theempirical evidence on tax competition. Our conclusion is that the evidence for someinterdependence in tax setting behaviour is strong, although the exact process driving thisremains unclear. While the most basic tax competition models fail to explain thedevelopment in OECD countries, there is more than one possible explanation for thereforms undertaken if more advanced models are considered. The multilateral initiativesthat were implemented however do not seem to be related to resource-based taxcompetition, instead they are about taxing rights. This paper describes tax reforms in OECD countries over the last 20 years and how they are related to tax competition. Both individual countries? reforms and multilateralinitiatives and developments are covered. This is followed by an overview of theempirical evidence on tax competition. Our conclusion is that the evidence for someinterdependence in tax setting behaviour is strong, although the exact process driving thisremains unclear. While the most basic tax competition models fail to explain thedevelopment in OECD countries, there is more than one possible explanation for thereforms undertaken if more advanced models are considered. The multilateral initiativesthat were implemented however do not seem to be related to resource-based taxcompetition, instead they are about taxing rights

What has been the tax competition experience of the past 20 years?

This paper describes tax reforms in OECD countries over the last 20 years and how they are related to tax competition. Both individual countries' reforms and multilateral initiatives and developments are covered. This is followed by an overview of the empirical evidence on tax competition. Our conclusion is that the evidence for some interdependence in tax setting behaviour is strong, although the exact process driving this remains unclear. While the most basic tax competition models fail to explain the development in OECD countries, there is more than one possible explanation for the reforms undertaken if more advanced models are considered. The multilateral initiatives that were implemented however do not seem to be related to resource-based tax competition, instead they are about taxing rights.Corporation tax

Issues in the design and implentation of an R&D tax credit for the UK

R&D tax credits have become a popular policy tool for encouraging research and development (R&D) spending by business, with many countries offering subsidies of this form. The divergence between private and social rates of return to R&D expenditure by private firms provides one of the main justifications for government subsidies to R&D.2 In order to achieve the optimal level of R&D investment, government policy aims to bring private incentives in line with the social rate of return. An R&D tax credit does this by reducing the cost to the firm of doing R&D. Recent empirical evidence suggests that R&D tax credits are an effective instrument in stimulating additional R&D. However, in order to be desirable, a policy needs to be cost-effective and implementable. This Briefing Note reviews some of the major issues in the design and implementation of R&D tax credits. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the existing tax treatment of R&D in the UK. In particular, we outline the new Research and Development Allowance - which is an allowance for expenditure on plant, machinery and buildings for use in scientific research and which is available to firms of all sizes - and the tax credit for R&D that is available to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We then discuss, in Section 3, some of the main design features of tax credits that have been implemented in other countries. The discussion mainly concerns the question of how to target new or incremental R&D so as to keep down the total exchequer cost. We discuss problems that arise in defining incremental R&D and how these can be tackled. In Section 4, we provide estimates of the amount of new R&D and the exchequer cost that would be likely to result from implementing different designs of R&D tax credit in the UK. Section 5 concludes. Some technical details are dealt with in the Appendix

How has the UK corporation tax raised so much revenue?

We analyse a puzzle in the UK corporation tax: by both historic and international standards corporation tax revenues have been high while the statutory rate has been low. Possible explanations include the following: changes in tax law that may have increased effective tax rates; other factors such as higher profitability or different macro-economic conditions may have led to higher effective tax rates; and finally the size of the corporate sector may have increased. We find evidence for all three explanations, although none would be sufficient in itself. To the extent that higher profits, particularly financial sector profits may have led to high revenues, there are doubts as to whether revenues will continue to be so strong

How has the UK corporation tax raised so much revenue?

We analyse a puzzle in the UK corporation tax: by both historic and international standards corporation tax revenues have been high while the statutory rate has been low. Possible explanations include the following: changes in tax law that may have increased effective tax rates; other factors such as higher profitability or different macro-economic conditions may have led to higher effective tax rates; and finally the size of the corporate sector may have increased. We find evidence for all three explanations, although none would be sufficient in itself. To the extent that higher profits, particularly financial sector profits may have led to high revenues, there are doubts as to whether revenues will continue to be so strong.Corporation tax, revenue

F-theory and linear sigma models

We present an explicit method for translating between the linear sigma model and the spectral cover description of SU(r) stable bundles over an elliptically fibered Calabi-Yau manifold. We use this to investigate the 4-dimensional duality between (0,2) heterotic and F-theory compactifications. We indirectly find that much interesting heterotic information must be contained in the `spectral bundle' and in its dual description as a gauge theory on multiple F-theory 7-branes. A by-product of these efforts is a method for analyzing semistability and the splitting type of vector bundles over an elliptic curve given as the sheaf cohomology of a monad.Comment: 40 pages, no figures; minor cosmetic reorganization of section 4; reference [6] update

Comment on the Generation Number in Orbifold Compactifications

There has been some confusion concerning the number of $(1,1)$-forms in orbifold compactifications of the heterotic string in numerous publications. In this note we point out the relevance of the underlying torus lattice on this number. We answer the question when different lattices mimic the same physics and when this is not the case. As a byproduct we classify all symmetric $Z_N$-orbifolds with $(2,2)$ world sheet supersymmetry obtaining also some new ones.Comment: 28 pages, 9 figures not included, available in postscript at reques