Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”.Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network

Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models

The final publication is available at link.springer.com.Aproduction and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a newagent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within-group and between-group decisiveness. Productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role. The collective action problem is more severe for the RS model. As group size increases, the ratio of within-group to between-group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the P&C model, while it increases convexly for the RS model. Adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result. The severe between-group fighting in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be preferable for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups. Applications are considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, divestitures, mergers and acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier firms and U form versus M form of economic organization

Additive Multi-Effort Contests

Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interior solutions give players higher expected utilities and lower rent dissipation, which contrasts with earlier findings for multiplicative efforts. Players cut back on the effort with contest intensity equal to one, and exert alternative efforts instead. Accounting for solutions which have to be determined numerically, a Nash equilibrium selection method is provided. For illustration, an example with maximum two efforts for each player is provided. Equilibria are shown where both players choose both efforts, or one player withdraws from its most costly effort. Both players may collectively prefer to exclude one of their efforts, though in equilibrium, they may prefer both efforts. When all contest intensities are equal to one or larger than one, only the one most cost-effective effort is exerted, due to the logic of linear or convex production. Rent dissipation increases in the contest intensity, and is maximum when the players are equally advantaged determined by unit effort cost divided by impact.publishedVersio

The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States

The article proposes Erection, Adjustment, and Death mechanisms for governmental units, giving autonomy to each citizen as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing on a narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been common in the literature, the article takes citizens seriously acknowledging that they are best equipped to find their own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how citizens discover and implement their subjective preferences. Governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government.Territorial units, individual liberty, individual decision making, individual welfare, competitive markets, public choice, constitutional economics, political economy

Two-Period Colonel Blotto Contest With Cumulative Investments Over Variable Assets With Resource Constraints

Two resource constrained players compete by investing in two assets which may increase or decrease in value over two periods. A player’s investment in period 1 carries over to period 2. If an asset is cheap in period 1, a player invests more in it in period 1, less in period 2, and does the opposite for the other asset. If an asset is cheap in period 2, a player invests more in it in period 2, less in period 1, and does the opposite for the other asset. If an asset increases in value, both players invest more in it in both periods, and less into the less valuable asset. An advantaged player may invest more into the less valuable asset than the least advantaged player. If an asset increases in value, both players invest more in it in period 2, until the advantaged player eventually ceases investment into the asset with low growth, to focus on the high-growth asset. Various intuitive and less intuitive efects are illustrated for how players strike balances across space (two assets) and time (two periods).publishedVersio

An Enabling Mechanism for the Creation, Adjustment, and Dissolution of States and Governmental Units

The article proposes an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental units, giving autonomy to each resident as in a direct democracy. Rather than focusing on a narrow model with restrictive and specialized assumptions, and subsequent solutions, as has been common in the literature, the article takes individuals seriously acknowledging that they are best equipped to find their own solutions. The emphasis is on the practical approach of how individuals discover and implement their subjective preferences and how this discovery and implementation process can be facilitated and corresponding costs lowered. Governmental units are subjected to some of the same market forces as ordinary firms, in the spirit of Coase (1988a). This brings the interaction between governmental units closer to a market structure, and serves to eliminate or reduce many of the coercive elements of government.Territorial units, individual liberty, individual decision making, individual welfare, competitive markets, public choice, governmental units, endogenous determination of borders, constitutional economics, political economy, government, constitution