Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments

The equilibrium of a two-stage conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding stage-one offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 98% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 49% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 51% from reduced conflict expenditures.contest, conflict resolution, side payments, experiments

Gifted and talented education in Aotearoa New Zealand : a primary school perspective : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand

This research explores the state of gifted and talented education in New Zealand following the 2008 change in government and consequent shift in educational priorities. This case study examines the provision of gifted and talented education in a full, co-educational primary school in a provincial area. Data gathered from a variety of stakeholders indicate that, in its recent history, the school’s provision varied considerably – from applying a structured, whole-school approach to lacking official policies and practices, to re-establishing school-wide provision. Provision was dependent on management priorities that often echoed national priorities that took the focus off of gifted and talented learners. These findings suggest that if national priorities do not explicitly include gifted and talented learners along with learners with special educational needs, then these students may be left vulnerable as schools shift their focus elsewhere. Recommendations for further research and effective provision of gifted and talented education are included

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures.contests, conflict resolution, side-payments, experiments

Can Markets Save Lives? An Experimental Investigation of a Market for Organ Donations

Many people die while waiting for organ transplants even though the number of usable organs is far larger than the number needed for transplant. Governments have devised many policies aimed at increasing available transplant organs with variable success. However, with few exceptions, policy makers are reluctant to establish markets for organs despite the potential for mutually beneficial exchanges. We ask whether organ markets could save lives. Controlled laboratory methods are ideal for this inquiry because human lives would be involved when implementing field trials. Our results suggest that markets can increase the supply of organs available for transplant, but that the specific institutional design of such markets must be carefully considered. However, the increased supply of transplantable organs derives disproportionately from the poor. We also find that exogenously reducing incentives to keep one’s organs has a similar effect to creating a market, but with equitable donation rates across income levels.Organ Donations, Wealth Effects, Market Design, Experimental Economics