Fallback Bargaining

Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over all alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives - starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on - until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree. This common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a decision rule other than unanimity is used.BARGAINING ; SOCIAL CHOICE ; NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Intermediate coherent-incoherent charge transport: DNA as a case study

We study an intermediate quantum coherent-incoherent charge transport mechanism in metal-molecule-metal junctions using B\"uttiker's probe technique. This tool allows us to include incoherent effects in a controlled manner, and thus to study situations in which partial decoherence affects charge transfer dynamics. Motivated by recent experiments on intermediate coherent-incoherent charge conduction in DNA molecules [L. Xiang {\it et al.}, Nature Chem. 7, 221-226 (2015)], we focus on two representative structures: alternating (GC)$_n$ and stacked G$_n$C$_n$ sequences; the latter structure is argued to support charge delocalization within G segments, and thus an intermediate coherent-incoherent conduction. We begin our analysis with a highly simplified 1-dimensional tight-binding model, while introducing environmental effects through B\"uttiker's probes. This minimal model allows us to gain fundamental understanding of transport mechanisms and derive analytic results for molecular resistance in different limits. We then use a more detailed ladder-model Hamiltonian to represent double-stranded DNA structures---with environmental effects captured by B\"uttiker's probes. We find that hopping conduction dominates in alternating sequences, while in stacked sequences charge delocalization (visualized directly through the electronic density matrix) supports significant resonant-ballistic charge dynamics reflected by an even-odd effect and a weak distance dependence for resistance. Our analysis illustrates that lessons learned from minimal models are helpful for interpreting charge dynamics in DNA.Comment: 16 pages, 14 figure

Distribution of red deepsea crab (Chaceon quinquedens) by size and sex in the Gulf of Mexico

The red deepsea crab (Chaceon quinquedens (Smith, 1879)) has supported a commercial fishery off the coast of New England since the 1970s (Wigley et al., 1975) and has had annual harvests from 400 metric tons (t) (1996) to 4000 t (2001) (NEFMC, 2002). In 2002, a fishery management plan for the northeast fishery on the Atlantic coast was implemented and total allowable catch was reduced to approximately 2500 t (NEFMC, 2002). Although there are management plans for the golden crab (C. fenneri) and the red deep sea crab for Atlantic coast regions, there is no fishery management plan for red deepsea crabs in the Gulf of Mexico. Successful management for sustainable harvests should be based on a knowledge of the life history of the species, but C. quinquedens has been a difficult species for which to obtain life history and abundance information because of its deep distribution

The Impact of Conventional Force Reductions on Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Many game-theoretic analyses of deterrence confirm the commonsense view that what determines whether a defender can effectively deter a challenger from an unwanted action is (1) the challenger’s perception of the level of punishment that the defender will be able to impose on the challenger should it take the action, and (2) the challenger’s level of belief about the likelihood of the defender actually carrying out this punishment. Reduction of the defender’s forces may affect both the defender’s ability to retaliate and its perceived willingness to do so. Game-theoretic methods are used to assess how the limits on both of these parameters are related, subject to the condition that deterrence remains effective. The results indicate that the defending side can often make do with smaller forces, provided its (apparent) resolve is high. But force structure is important—the models suggest that implementation of an “all-or-nothing” deployment (as called for by a doctrine of massive retaliation, for example) may reduce not only costs, but also deterrence effectiveness

Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them.Coalition, Fallback Process, Kingmaker Leader, Cardinally Single-peaked, Ordinally Single-peaked

Water Supply Planning under Interdependence of Actions: Theory and Application

An ongoing water supply planning problem in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, is studied to select the best water supply combination, within a multiple-objective framework, when actions are interdependent. The interdependencies in the problem are described and shown to be essential features. The problem is formulated as a multiple-criteria integer program with interdependent actions. Because of the large number of potential actions and the nonconvexity of the decision space, it is quite difficult to find nondominated subsets of actions. Instead, a modified goal programming technique is suggested to identify promising subsets. The appropriateness of this technique is explained, and the lessons learned in applying it to the Waterloo water supply planning problem are described

Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?

International river and lake basins constitute about 47 percent of the world's continental land area, a proportion that increases to about 60 percent in Africa, Asia, and South America. Because water is a scarce and increasingly valuable resource, disputes about water allocation within these basins often contribute to regional tensions and conflicts. May principles of international law have been developed to allocate water within a water basin and to prevent or resolve international water disputes. Unfortunately, they rarely are easy to apply and often are contradictory. Sharing river water is particularly difficult because the effects are one-way, with upstream-downstream supply disputes have been among the most common. Agreements about the allocation of river water often last only until the first drought, when reduced flow denies some their full shares. The authors develop a simple formal model of water allocation among states within a river basin. They analyze the model in the context of variable flow rates, to project the behavior of riparian states during periods of above-normal and below-normal flow. Their objective: to understand when, where, and how much the economic interests of the states conflict, to develop principles guaranteeing efficient allocations of scarce water supplies, and to identify when stable (self-enforcing) allocation agreements are possible. They also consider the possibility of using alternative sources of supply and of accommodating growth in demand. Satellite technology will soon dramatically improve the ability of riparian states to predict annual flow volumes. In addition, water basin authorities will have real-time data on riparians'water use. These developments will have important implications for the enforceability and the flexibility of river water allocation systems. This model shows how flexibility can be used to construct more durable systems for sharing water among riparian states. The new allocation methods proposed here should contribute to the better management of scarce water supplies, a crucial issue in an increasingly thirsty world.Water and Industry,Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Systems,Decentralization,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water Conservation,Water and Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies