Design, building, and testing of the postlanding systems for the assured crew return vehicle

The design, building, and testing of the postlanding support systems for a water-landing Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) are presented. One ACRV will be permanently docked to Space Station Freedom, fulfilling NASA's commitment to Assured Crew Return Capability in the event of an accident or illness. The configuration of the ACRV is based on an Apollo Command Module (ACM) derivative. The 1990-1991 effort concentrated on the design, building, and testing of a one-fifth scale model of the egress and stabilization systems. The objective was to determine the feasibility of (1) stabilizing the ACM out of the range of motions that cause seasickness and (2) the safe and rapid removal of a sick or injured crew member from the ACRV. The development of the ACRV postlanding systems model was performed at the University of Central Florida with guidance from the Kennedy Space Center ACRV program managers. Emphasis was placed on four major areas. First was design and construction of a one-fifth scale model of the ACM derivative to accommodate the egress and stabilization systems for testing. Second was the identification of a water test facility suitable for testing the model in all possible configurations. Third was the construction of the rapid egress mechanism designed in the previous academic year for incorporation into the ACRV model. The fourth area was construction and motion response testing of the attitude ring and underwater parachute systems

Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won\u27t Work and How the Laws of War Can

Public debate is heating up over the future development of autonomous weapon systems. Some concerned critics portray that future, often invoking science-fiction imagery, as a plain choice between a world in which those systems are banned outright and a world of legal void and ethical collapse on the battlefield. Yet an outright ban on autonomous weapon systems, even if it could be made effective, trades whatever risks autonomous weapon systems might pose in war for the real, if less visible, risk of failing to develop forms of automation that might make the use of force more precise and less harmful for civilians caught near it. Grounded in a more realistic assessment of technology – acknowledging what is known and what is yet unknown – as well as the interests of the many international and domestic actors involved, this paper outlines a practical alternative: the gradual evolution of codes of conduct based on traditional legal and ethical principles governing weapons and warfare

Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers

Lethal autonomous machines will inevitably enter the future battlefield – but they will do so incrementally, one small step at a time. The combination of inevitable and incremental development raises not only complex strategic and operational questions but also profound legal and ethical ones. The inevitability of these technologies comes from both supply-side and demand-side factors. Advances in sensor and computational technologies will supply “smarter” machines that can be programmed to kill or destroy, while the increasing tempo of military operations and political pressures to protect one’s own personnel and civilian persons and property will demand continuing research, development, and deployment. The process will be incremental because non-lethal robotic systems (already proliferating on the battlefield) can be fitted in their successive generations with both self-defensive and offensive technologies. As lethal systems are initially deployed, they may include humans in the decision-making loop, at least as a fail-safe – but as both the decision-making power of machines and the tempo of operations potentially increase, that human role will likely but slowly diminish. Recognizing the inevitable but incremental evolution of these technologies is key to addressing the legal and ethical dilemmas associated with them – U.S. policy for resolving those dilemmas should be built on these assumptions. The certain yet gradual development and deployment of these systems, as well as the humanitarian advantages created by the precision of some systems, make some proposed responses – such as prohibitory treaties – unworkable as well as ethically questionable. Those features also make it imperative, though, that the United States resist its own impulses toward secrecy and reticence with respect to military technologies, recognizing that the interests those tendencies serve are counterbalanced here by interests in shaping the normative terrain – the contours of international law as well as international expectations about appropriate conduct – on which it and others will operate militarily as technology evolves. Just as development of autonomous weapon systems will be incremental, so too will development of norms about acceptable systems and uses be incremental. The United States must act, however, before international expectations about these technologies harden around the views of those who would impose unrealistic, ineffective or dangerous prohibitions – or those who would prefer few or no constraints at all

Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law

An international public debate over the law and ethics of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) has been underway since 2012, with those urging legal regulation of AWS under existing principles and requirements of the international law of armed conflict, on the one side, in argument with opponents who favor, instead, a preemptive international treaty ban on all such weapons, on the other. This Chapter provides an introduction to this international debate, offering the main arguments on each side. These include disputes over defining an AWS, the morality and law of automated targeting and target selection by machine, and the interaction of humans and machines in the context of lethal weapons of war. Although the Chapter concludes that a categorical ban on AWS is unjustified morally and legally – favoring the law of armed conflict’s existing case-by-case legal evaluation – it offers an exposition of arguments on each side of the AWS issue

Antibody-Based Therapies in Multiple Myeloma

The unmet need for improved multiple myeloma (MM) therapy has stimulated clinical development of monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) targeting either MM cells or cells of the bone marrow (BM) microenvironment. In contrast to small-molecule inhibitors, therapeutic mAbs present the potential to specifically target tumor cells and directly induce an immune response to lyse tumor cells. Unique immune-effector mechanisms are only triggered by therapeutic mAbs but not by small molecule targeting agents. Although therapeutic murine mAbs or chimeric mAbs can cause immunogenicity, the advancement of genetic recombination for humanizing rodent mAbs has allowed large-scale production and designation of mAbs with better affinities, efficient selection, decreasing immunogenicity, and improved effector functions. These advancements of antibody engineering technologies have largely overcome the critical obstacle of antibody immunogenicity and enabled the development and subsequent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of therapeutic Abs for cancer and other diseases

Targeting the UPS as therapy in multiple myeloma

The coordinated regulation of cellular protein synthesis and degradation is essential for normal cellular functioning. The ubiquitin proteasome system mediates the intracellular protein degradation that is required for normal cellular homeostasis. The 26S proteasome is a multi-enzyme protease that degrades redundant proteins; conversely, inhibition of proteasomal degradation results in intracellular aggregation of unwanted proteins and cell death. This observation led to the development of proteasome inhibitors as therapeutics for use in cancer. The clinical applicability of targeting proteasomes is exemplified by the recent FDA approval of the first proteasome inhibitor, bortezomib, for the treatment of relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma. Although bortezomib represents a major advance in the treatment of this disease, it can be associated with toxicity and the development of drug resistance. Importantly, extensive preclinical studies suggest that combination therapies can both circumvent drug resistance and reduce toxicity. In addition, promising novel proteasome inhibitors, which are distinct from bortezomib, and exhibit equipotent anti-multiple myeloma activities, are undergoing clinical evaluation in order to improve patient outcome in multiple myeloma

Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems

Weapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have generated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries, and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully autonomous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an extensive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain point in the future. It is important that normative development regarding autonomous weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical. By autonomous weapon systems, we mean systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems. This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different, can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appropriate? We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the existing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is misguided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the development, deployment and use of autonomous systems

Size, shape and flow of powders for use in Selective Laser Sintering (SLS)

6th International Conference on Advanced Research in Virtual and Rapid Prototyping, Leiria, Portugal, 1-5 October 2013This paper investigates the effects of particles size and morphology on flowability of a range of polymeric powders (SLS and non-SLS grades). The effect of additives incorporation, as well as drying or sieving, on the flowability characteristics of the powders is also analyzed. The results show that the particle morphology has a stronger influence on the flowability than the particle size distribution. Moreover, the incorporation of additives has to be carefully considered in order to have positive effects on the powder flowability