Ambiguity attitudes, framing, and consistency

We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers

Economic Analysis of Knowledge: The History of Thought and the Central Themes

Following the development of knowledge economies, there has been a rapid expansion of economic analysis of knowledge, both in the context of technological knowledge in particular and the decision theory in general. This paper surveys this literature by identifying the main themes and contributions and outlines the future prospects of the discipline. The wide scope of knowledge related questions in terms of applicability and alternative approaches has led to the fragmentation of research. Nevertheless, one can identify a continuing tradition which analyses various aspects of the generation, dissemination and use of knowledge in the economy

Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets.

This paper examines a matching and bargaining model of a dynamic market for an indivisible good. On entering the market , buyers and sellers wait to be matched with an agent of the opposite type. Once a pair is matched, they bargain. The bargaining continues until agreement is reached or else one or both of the agents is matc hed elsewhere. After reaching agreement, both agents immediately leav e the market. The unique equilibrium is characterized for the case of continuous time and infinite numbers of agents of both types. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.