Pain Catastrophizing and Fear of Pain predict the Experience of Pain in Body Parts not targeted by a Delayed-Onset Muscle Soreness procedure

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.The present study examined whether pain catastrophizing and pain-related fear predict the experience of pain in body regions that are not targeted by an experimental muscle injury protocol. A delayed-onset muscle soreness (DOMS) protocol was used to induce pain unilaterally in the pectoralis, serratus, trapezius, latissimus dorsi, and deltoid muscles. The day after the DOMS protocol, participants were asked to rate their pain as they lifted weighted canisters with their targeted (ie, injured) arm and their nontargeted arm. The lifting task is a nonnoxious stimulus unless participants are already experiencing musculoskeletal pain. Therefore, reports of pain on the nontargeted arm were operationalized as pain in response to a nonnoxious stimulus. Eighty-two healthy university students (54 men, 28 women) completed questionnaires on pain catastrophizing and fear of pain and went through the DOMS protocol. The analyses revealed that catastrophizing and pain-related fear prospectively predicted pain experience in response to a nonnoxious stimulus. The possible mechanisms underlying this effect and clinical implications are discussed

Mapping the Passions: Toward a High-Dimensional Taxonomy of Emotional Experience and Expression

What would a comprehensive atlas of human emotions include? For 50 years, scientists have sought to map emotion-related experience, expression, physiology, and recognition in terms of the “basic six”—anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Claims about the relationships between these six emotions and prototypical facial configurations have provided the basis for a long-standing debate over the diagnostic value of expression (for review and latest installment in this debate, see Barrett et al., p. 1). Building on recent empirical findings and methodologies, we offer an alternative conceptual and methodological approach that reveals a richer taxonomy of emotion. Dozens of distinct varieties of emotion are reliably distinguished by language, evoked in distinct circumstances, and perceived in distinct expressions of the face, body, and voice. Traditional models—both the basic six and affective-circumplex model (valence and arousal)—capture a fraction of the systematic variability in emotional response. In contrast, emotion-related responses (e.g., the smile of embarrassment, triumphant postures, sympathetic vocalizations, blends of distinct expressions) can be explained by richer models of emotion. Given these developments, we discuss why tests of a basic-six model of emotion are not tests of the diagnostic value of facial expression more generally. Determining the full extent of what facial expressions can tell us, marginally and in conjunction with other behavioral and contextual cues, will require mapping the high-dimensional, continuous space of facial, bodily, and vocal signals onto richly multifaceted experiences using large-scale statistical modeling and machine-learning methods

What Basic Emotion Theory Really Says for the Twenty-First Century Study of Emotion

Basic emotion theory (BET) has been, perhaps, the central narrative in the science of emotion. As Crivelli and Fridlund (J Nonverbal Behav 125:1–34, 2019, this issue) would have it, however, BET is ready to be put to rest, facing “last stands” and “fatal” empirical failures. Nothing could be further from the truth. Crivelli and Fridlund’s outdated treatment of BET, narrow focus on facial expressions of six emotions, inattention to robust empirical literatures, and overreliance on singular “critical tests” of a multifaceted theory, undermine their critique and belie the considerable advances guided by basic emotion theory

How emotions, relationships, and culture constitute each other: Advances in social functionalist theory.

Social Functionalist Theory (SFT) emerged 20 years ago to orient emotion science to the social nature of emotion. Here we expand upon SFT and make the case for how emotions, relationships, and culture constitute one another. First, we posit that emotions enable the individual to meet six “relational needs” within social interactions: security, commitment, status, trust, fairness, and belongingness. Building upon this new theorising, we detail four principles concerning emotional experience, cognition, expression, and the cultural archiving of emotion. We conclude by considering the bidirectional influences between culture, relationships, and emotion, outlining areas of future inquiry