2,590 research outputs found
Kill the messenger: why the living arts reflect the true state of a democracy (a play in one short act)
How \u3ci\u3eDaubert\u3c/i\u3e and its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistics Evidence and a Few Things the Judiciary Could Do About It.
Part I documents how courts have failed to faithfully apply Daubert’s criteria for scientific validity to this type of evidence. It describes how ambiguities and flaws in the terminology adopted in Daubert combinedwith the opaqueness of forensic-science publications and standards have been exploited to shield some test methods from critical judicial analysis. Simply desisting from these avoidance strategies would be an improvement. Part II notes how part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael has enabled courts to lower the bar for what is presented as scientific evidence by mistakenly maintaining that there is no difference between that evidence and other expert testimony that need not be scientifically validated. It suggests that a version of Rule 702 that explicitly insists on more rigorous validation of evidence that is promoted or understood as being “scientific” would be workable and more clearly compatible with the rule’s common law roots. Part III sketches various meanings of the terms “reliability” and “validity” in science and statistics, on the one hand, and in the rules and opinions on the admissibility of expert evidence, on the other. It discusses the two-part definition of “validity” in the PCAST report and the proposed criteria for demonstrating scientific validity of subjective pattern-matching testimony. It contends that if “validity” means that a procedure (even a highly subjective one) for making measurements and drawing inferences is fit for its intended use, then whether test results that have higher error rates than the ones selected in the report might nevertheless assist fact finders who are also appropriately informed of the evidence’s probative value must be evaluated. Finally, Part IV articulates two distinct approaches to informing judges or jurors of the import of similarities in features: the traditional one in which examiners opine on the truth and falsity of source hypotheses and a more finely grained one in which criminalists report only on the strength of the evidence. It suggests that the rules for admitting scientific evidence need to be flexible enough to accommodate the latter, likelihood-based testimony when it has a satisfactory empirically established basis
Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur
This Article uses probability theory normatively in an effort to clarify one aspect of the famous tort doctrine known as res ipsa loquitur. It does not urge that jurors be instructed in probability theory or be equipped with microprocessors. Rather, it seeks an accurate statement of the res ipsa doctrine in ordinary language. In particular, this Article will show that the conventional formulation of the doctrine is misleading at best, and should be replaced with a more careful statement of the conditions warranting the res ipsa inference. To this end, Section I briefly surveys the legal doctrine, or, more precisely, the aspect of the doctrine that will be criticized. Section II develops a mathematical apparatus and uses it to expose the weakness in the current version of res ipsa loquitur. Finally, Section ID summarizes and elaborates the conclusions reached-in Section II - conclusions that suggest which cases should reach a jury and what instructions the jury should receive
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