Discounting and efficiency in coalitional bargaining with random proposers

This paper analyzes a random-proposer coalitional bargaining game with different discount factors, which is a generalized version of Okada's (1996) model. We consider limit subgame efficiency which means that when the discount factors are sufficiently close to unity, the full coalition is formed in each subgame. In this paper, a negative result is shown: The limit subgame efficiency is attained if and only if values of the characteristic function are zero for all coalitions but the grand coalition. This result implies that under different discount factors, even under a naturally generalized condition of Okada''s necessary and sufficient condition for the limit subgame efficiency, the limit subgame efficiency is not necessarily achieved. On the other hand, it is shown that under a condition on the region of players'' discount factors, the generalized condition of Okada''s condition is almost necessary and sufficient for the limit subgame efficiency.

Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player''s discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players'' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities and (iv) They do not also depend on q.Baron-Ferejohn model (Legislative bargaining)

Strategies in deterministic totally-ordered-time games

We consider deterministic totally-ordered-time games. We present three axioms for strategies. We show that for any tuple of strategies that satisfy the axioms, there exists a unique complete history that is consistent with the strategy tuple

Extractive contest design

We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that extract contestants' values of the prize. In the case in which the values are observable to the contest designer, in the more-than-two-contestant or common-value subcase, we present a CSF extractive in any equilibrium; in the other subcase, we present a CSF extractive in some equilibrium, but there exists no CSF extractive in any equilibrium. In the case in which the values are not observable, there exists no CSF extractive in some equilibrium. In the case in which the values are observable and common, we present extractive a CSF extractive in any equilibrium; we present a class of CSFs extractive in some equilibrium, and this class can control the number of active contestants

自己励起型状態空間モデルを用いた月経周期解析

Open House, ISM in Tachikawa, 2016.6.17統計数理研究所オープンハウス（立川）、H28.6.17ポスター発

月経周期の二相性を考慮した自己閾値型状態空間モデリング

Open House, ISM in Tachikawa, 2017.6.16統計数理研究所オープンハウス（立川）、H29.6.16ポスター発