How do children value animals? A developmental review

From a young age, children are deeply curious about animals. Stable patterns exist in the types of attitudes children display towards different kinds of animals: they love pets, value animals that are beautiful, and fear snakes and spiders (Borgi & Cirulli, 2015, https://doi.org/10.2752/089279315X14129350721939). Until recently, we’ve known little about what children think about the moral standing of animals, particularly relative to other entities, including humans. In this review, we synthesize the literature examining children’s perceptions of the moral worth of animals. We present factors about the animal, and factors about the judge (the child), shown to impact children’s evaluations of animal moral worth. Based on current evidence, we make the claim that children grant animals a high moral standing early on in childhood, but that this decreases during late childhood, throughout adolescence, and into adulthood. We provide some suggestions for the cognitive and cultural mechanisms that might drive these differences, and make recommendations for the field going forward

Young children's tool innovation across culture: Affordance visibility matters

Young children typically demonstrate low rates of tool innovation. However, previous studies have limited children’s performance by presenting tools with opaque affordances. In an attempt to scaffold children’s understanding of what constitutes an appropriate tool within an innovation task we compared tools in which the focal affordance was visible to those in which it was opaque. To evaluate possible cultural specificity, data collection was undertaken in a Western urban population and a remote Indigenous community. As expected affordance visibility altered innovation rates: young children were more likely to innovate on a tool that had visible affordances than one with concealed affordances. Furthermore, innovation rates were higher than those reported in previous innovation studies. Cultural background did not affect children’s rates of tool innovation. It is suggested that new methods for testing tool innovation in children must be developed in order to broaden our knowledge of young children’s tool innovation capabilities

Creation across culture: children’s tool innovation is influenced by cultural and developmental factors

Prior research suggests that human children lack an aptitude for tool innovation. However, children's tool making must be explored across a broader range of tasks and across diverse cultural contexts before we can conclude that they are genuinely poor tool innovators. To this end, we investigated children's ability to independently construct 3 new tools using distinct actions: adding, subtracting, and reshaping. We tested 422 children across a broad age range from 5 geographic locations across South Africa (N = 126), Vanuatu (N = 190), and Australia (N = 106), which varied in their levels of exposure to Westernized culture. Children were shown a horizontal, transparent tube that had a sticker in its middle. Children were sequentially given each incomplete tool, which when accurately constructed could be used to push the sticker out of the tube. As predicted, older children were better at performing the innovation tasks than younger children across all cultures and innovation actions. We also found evidence for cultural variation: While all non-Western groups performed similarly, the Western group of children innovated at higher rates. However, children who did not innovate often adopted alternate methods when using the tools that also led to success. This suggests that children's innovation levels are influenced by the cultural environment, and highlights the flexibility inherent in human children's tool use

The mind knows what the eyes cannot see: Metacognition in children and chimpanzees

The beneficial ability to access one’s own knowledge is commonly termed “metacognition” (Terrace & Metcalfe, 2005). Previous research has suggested that this ability may not be unique to humans, and may also exist in our close relatives. However, to date, the differential paradigms employed in examining this ability and the alternate explanations proposed, have made comparative inference difficult. The current study therefore investigated the performance of forty-four 3.5 and 5.5 year-old children, and two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), on a naturalistic search paradigm designed to assess metacognition. The task involved hiding a large reward within one of four red cups. In half the trials baiting of the cup was visible to the subject, and in the other half it was concealed by a barrier. In a key manipulation, subjects were presented with an additional cup on half the trials that contained a smaller reward. This cup allowed subjects the opportunity to “escape” from choosing a red cup. If children and chimpanzees are able to assess a personal lack of knowledge, then they should select the escape option more on trials in which the baiting of the red cup was concealed. The findings of this study suggest that 3.5- and 5.5 year-old children, and two chimpanzees, possess the capacity to know what they do not know. They selectively chose an escape cup to receive a small reward when they did not know the location of the large reward. These findings pose important phylogenetic and ontogenetic questions, such as whether secondary or metarepresentational understanding is involved in this ability

Development of Moral Concern

Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concern for a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past. Moreover, adults show stable patterns in the degrees of concern they afford certain entities over others, yet it remains unknown when and how these patterns of moral decision-making manifest in development. Children aged 4 to 10 years (N = 151) placed 24 pictures of human, animal, and environmental entities on a stratified circle representing three levels of moral concern. Although younger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older children demonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within the outer reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as a simple in vs. out binary decision). With age children extended greater concern to humans than other forms of life, and more concern to vulnerable groups, such as the sick and disabled. Notably, children’s level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocial behavior. The current research provides novel insights into the development of our moral reasoning and its structure within childhood

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) know when they are ignorant about the location of food

Over the last decade, the metacognitive abilities of nonhuman primates and the developmental emergence of metacognition in children have become topics of increasing research interest. In the current study, the performance of three adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Experiment 1) and forty-four 3.5- and 5.5-year-old human children (Experiment 2) was assessed on a behavioral search paradigm designed to assess metacognition. Subjects either directly observed the baiting of a large reward into one cup among an array of four, or had the baiting occluded from their view. In half of the trials, subjects were also presented with an additional distinctive cup that was always visibly baited with a small reward. This cup allowed subjects the opportunity to escape from making a guess about the location of the bigger reward. All three chimpanzees and both age groups of children selected the escape cup more often when the baiting of the large reward was concealed, compared to when it was visible. This demonstrates that both species can selectively choose a guaranteed smaller reward when they do not know the location of a larger reward and provides insight into the development of metacognition

Circles study: Caring, Liking, Knowing

Study examining children's ratings of 24 entities according to how much they care, know about or like them