23 research outputs found

    Evolutionary modelling in economics: a survey of methods and building blocks

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    In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic models employing evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques of evolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms and evolutionary game theory; (2) building blocks or components of formal models classified into core processes and features of evolutionary systems - diversity, innovation and selection - and additional elements, such as bounded rationality, diffusion, path dependency and lock-in, co-evolutionary dynamics, multilevel and group selection, and evolutionary growth. We focus our attention on the characteristics of models and techniques and their underlying assumptions

    2008,06: Evolutionary modelling in economics : a survey of methods and building blocks

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    In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic models employing evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques of evolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms and evolutionary game theory; (2) building blocks or components of formal models classified into core processes and features of evolutionary systems - diversity, innovation and selection - and additional elements, such as bounded rationality, diffusion, path dependency and lock-in, co-evolutionary dynamics, multilevel and group selection, and evolutionary growth. We focus our attention on the characteristics of models and techniques and their underlying assumptions. -- bounded rationality ; evolutionary algorithms ; evolutionary game theory ; evolutionary growth ; innovation ; multilevel evolution ; neo-Schumpeterian models

    Intergroup cooperation prevents resource exhaustion but undermines intra-group cooperation in the common-pool resource experiment

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    Can intergroup cooperation over resources help prevent resource exhaustion and mitigate effects of climate change? How does resource uncertainty affect inter- and intra- group cooperation over resources in the common-pool resource dilemmas? I present experimental evidence from a mixed design experiment with two-between-groups factors: (1) the availability of intergroup sharing in which subjects can decide whether to give up some of their harvests to augment the resource stock of another group; (2) the presence (or absence) of shocks that can destroy a part of resources; and with one within-groups factor (41 replications). We present the evidence that random shocks encourage resource conservation. In addition, we find that intergroup cooperation is frequent. Many groups establish reciprocal exchanges of resources, which reduces the probability of resource exhaustion. The possible explanation of the high frequency of intergroup sharing in my sample is inequality aversion and reciprocity. Such reciprocal exchanges turned out to be successful in preventing resource collapse in the absence of shocks. However, the data I present show the dark sides of intergroup sharing. Subjects, who shared resources with the outgroup, harvested more for themselves following the donation. Moreover, under uncertainty, a combination of shocks and sharing made subjects overharvest resources

    Agent-based climate-economy model

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    Intergroup cooperation in common pool resource dilemmas

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    Social bonding and bridging: experimental evidence

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