Lattice dynamics and correlated atomic motion from the atomic pair distribution function

The mean-square relative displacements (MSRD) of atomic pair motions in crystals are studied as a function of pair distance and temperature using the atomic pair distribution function (PDF). The effects of the lattice vibrations on the PDF peak widths are modelled using both a multi-parameter Born von-Karman (BvK) force model and a single-parameter Debye model. These results are compared to experimentally determined PDFs. We find that the near-neighbor atomic motions are strongly correlated, and that the extent of this correlation depends both on the interatomic interactions and crystal structure. These results suggest that proper account of the lattice vibrational effects on the PDF peak width is important in extracting information on static disorder in a disordered system such as an alloy. Good agreement is obtained between the BvK model calculations of PDF peak widths and the experimentally determined peak widths. The Debye model successfully explains the average, though not detailed, natures of the MSRD of atomic pair motion with just one parameter. Also the temperature dependence of the Debye model largely agrees with the BvK model predictions. Therefore, the Debye model provides a simple description of the effects of lattice vibrations on the PDF peak widths.Comment: 9 pages, 11 figure

Peak positions and shapes in neutron pair correlation functions from powders of highly anisotropic crystals

The effect of the powder average on the peak shapes and positions in neutron pair distribution functions of polycrystalline materials is examined. It is shown that for highly anisotropic crystals, the powder average leads to shifts in peak positions and to non-Gaussian peak shapes. The peak shifts can be as large as several percent of the lattice spacing

Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: building equity considerations into agency theory

In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory

Priority for the Worse Off and the Social Cost of Carbon

The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a monetary measure of the harms from carbon emission. Specifically, it is the reduction in current consumption that produces a loss in social welfare equivalent to that caused by the emission of a ton of CO2. The standard approach is to calculate the SCC using a discounted-utilitarian social welfare function (SWF)—one that simply adds up the well-being numbers (utilities) of individuals, as discounted by a weighting factor that decreases with time. The discounted-utilitarian SWF has been criticized both for ignoring the distribution of well-being, and for including an arbitrary preference for earlier generations. Here, we use a prioritarian SWF, with no time-discount factor, to calculate the SCC in the integrated assessment model RICE. Prioritarianism is a well-developed concept in ethics and theoretical welfare economics, but has been, thus far, little used in climate scholarship. The core idea is to give greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse off individuals. We find substantial differences between the discounted-utilitarian and non-discounted prioritarian SCC

European integration assessed in the light of the 'rules vs. standards debate'

The interplay of various legal systems in the European Union (EU) has long triggered a debate on the tension between uniformity and diversity of Member States' (MS) laws. This debate takes place among European legal scholars and is also paralleled by economic scholars, e.g. in the ambit of the 'theory of federalism'. This paper takes an innovative perspective on the discrepancy between 'centralized' and 'decentralized' law-making in the EU by assessing it with the help of the rules versus standards debate. When should the EU legislator grant the national legislator leeway in the formulation of new laws and when should all be fixed ex ante at European level? The literature on the 'optimal shape of legal norms' shall be revisited in the light of law-making in the EU, centrally dealing with the question how much discretion shall be given to the national legislator; and under which circumstances. This paper enhances the established decisive factors for the choice of a rule or a standard in a national setting (complexity, volatility, judges' specialization and frequency of application) by two new crucial factors (switching costs and the benefit of uniformity in terms of information costs) in order to assess law-making policies at EU level

Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive v. Optional Remedies

Law and economics scholars have always had a strong interest in contract remedies. Perhaps the most explored issue in contract law has been the desirability of various contract remedies, such as expectation damages, specific performance, or liquidated damages, to name the most common. Scholars have been debating for years, from various perspectives, the comparative advantage of these remedies. Yet, most scholars have assumed that each of these remedies is exclusive, and their work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. Interestingly, an analysis that assumes these remedies are optional (or cumulative) has not yet been explored, in spite of the fact that contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and in spite of the fact that parties themselves write contracts which provide such an option. In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying the relationship between these remedies. Specifically, we study the conditions at which a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose from optional remedies is superior to an exclusive remedy contract. We show that under conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches) the interaction of the parties\u27 distributions should determine whether a contract provides for exclusive or optional remedies. Specifically, if the buyer\u27s conditional expected valuation is larger than the seller\u27s conditional expected valuation (in both cases - conditional that their expected valuation is above the buyer\u27s mean valuation), then a contract which provides the buyer an option to choose between liquidated damages or specific performance (or actual damages) is superior. Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic factors they should consider when deciding the optimal composition of remedies in a given context. Moreover, our analysis is relevant for courts that interpret contracts because it will help them to better understand whether rational parties would have agreed that a particular remedy would be an exclusive remedy or an optional remedy when the language of the contract is ambiguous. Lastly, our analysis provides yet another economic rationale for why courts should enforce parties\u27 liquidated damages clauses even if it seems ex-post over, or under, compensatory. We present a model which shows when parties will agree on a non-exclusive liquidated damages clause. Under such a contract the parties stipulate ex-ante that the buyer will have the option to choose upon breach whether she prefers an optional remedy, such as actual damages or specific performance, to the pre-determined liquidated damages. We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of the new information that the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. Therefore, we assume that no renegotiation or investments are involved. We demonstrate the optimal way to design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time of the actual breach. We further suggest that parties indeed use such clauses and that courts honor them. After laying out the basic model we provide some extensions to it. As is well known, an exclusive liquidated damages contract is equivalent to granting the seller a call option to breach and pay, where the exercise price is equal to the amount of the agreed liquidated damages. What is perhaps less known is that a non-exclusive, or optional, contract, where the buyer can choose performance, is equivalent to giving the buyer a consecutive call option with the same exercise price. Yet, the consecutive call option to the buyer does not have to have the same exercise price but can rather have a higher one. We call this new contract a two-price contract and show that it is even more efficient than the basic contract we have explored before. Next, we introduce more rounds of sequential options and show that while the regular ex-ante contract can achieve on average about 4 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high. More on this below. 90% of the first-best allocative efficiency, an n-rounds contract approaches the first best, as n goes to infinity. We show numerically that within just 4 rounds, 96% of the allocative efficiency can be achieved. Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our model. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies from an economic perspective. Section four presents a simple model with two-sided incomplete information and with a liquidated damages clause. In section four we compare the performance of a regime with optional remedies with a regime of exclusive remedy and then determine the conditions at which each regime should be applied. Section five discusses some interesting extensions meant to approach the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix provides a more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the model

Use of Data-Biased Random Walks on Graphs for the Retrieval of Context-Specific Networks from Genomic Data

Extracting network-based functional relationships within genomic datasets is an important challenge in the computational analysis of large-scale data. Although many methods, both public and commercial, have been developed, the problem of identifying networks of interactions that are most relevant to the given input data still remains an open issue. Here, we have leveraged the method of random walks on graphs as a powerful platform for scoring network components based on simultaneous assessment of the experimental data as well as local network connectivity. Using this method, NetWalk, we can calculate distribution of Edge Flux values associated with each interaction in the network, which reflects the relevance of interactions based on the experimental data. We show that network-based analyses of genomic data are simpler and more accurate using NetWalk than with some of the currently employed methods. We also present NetWalk analysis of microarray gene expression data from MCF7 cells exposed to different doses of doxorubicin, which reveals a switch-like pattern in the p53 regulated network in cell cycle arrest and apoptosis. Our analyses demonstrate the use of NetWalk as a valuable tool in generating high-confidence hypotheses from high-content genomic data

Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm (justice at firm’s level) with the general theory of justice (justice at society’s level). Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are (constitutionally) granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes

False negative rates in Drosophila cell-based RNAi screens: a case study

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>High-throughput screening using RNAi is a powerful gene discovery method but is often complicated by false positive and false negative results. Whereas false positive results associated with RNAi reagents has been a matter of extensive study, the issue of false negatives has received less attention.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We performed a meta-analysis of several genome-wide, cell-based <it>Drosophila </it>RNAi screens, together with a more focused RNAi screen, and conclude that the rate of false negative results is at least 8%. Further, we demonstrate how knowledge of the cell transcriptome can be used to resolve ambiguous results and how the number of false negative results can be reduced by using multiple, independently-tested RNAi reagents per gene.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>RNAi reagents that target the same gene do not always yield consistent results due to false positives and weak or ineffective reagents. False positive results can be partially minimized by filtering with transcriptome data. RNAi libraries with multiple reagents per gene also reduce false positive and false negative outcomes when inconsistent results are disambiguated carefully.</p