In Honor of Julius Stone

The late Julius Stone, Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law at Hastings College of the Law, and Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, was a brilliant scholar, beloved to faculty and students alike. He was a prolific writer, whose career spanned several continents and whose work made a profound contribution to the literature of the law. This dedication reviews Professor Stone\u27s background, education, and many achievements. Quoting from moving tributes, and from a recent Australian magazine interview, it then describes Professor Stone\u27s passion and commitment to legal scholarship for which we honor him by dedicating this issue

The Place of Sanctions in Professor H.L.A. Hart\u27s Concept of Law

In his 1958 Harvard Law Review exchange with Lon Fuller, Professor H.L.A. Hart of Oxford University wrote: It is surely not arguable (without some desperate extension of the word sanction or artificial meaning of the word law ) that every law in a municipal system must have a sanction, yet it is at least plausible to argue that a legal system must, to be a legal system, provide sanctions for certain of its rules. Three years later Professor Hart published his book, The Concept of Law. Widely acclaimed as a significant and important contribution to twentieth-century jurisprudential thought, the book in large part represents an elaboration of the simple idea expressed above. For Hart makes clear that, though he shares with John Austin, Hans Kelsen and legal positivism in general an insistence upon the separation of is and ought and a high regard for linguistic analysis of legal terms, he rejects their basically common view that no part of law can be understood without reference to the monopolization of coercive power in the hands of an overriding political authority. Whether formulated in Austin\u27s terms that law is essentially and exclusively a system of habitually obeyed commands of the sovereign addressed to his subjects, violation of which will lead to the imposition of sanctions; or in Kelsen\u27s, that law is to be understood as a system of depersonalized directions to officials to impose given sanctions upon the occurrence of certain events (conditions), Hart spurns the imperative analysis as being inadequate to describe the essential features of a developed legal system. For Hart, law without sanctions is perfectly conceivable

Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law

American law, whether in the shape of legislation, court decisions, or administrative action, continues in many instances to accord men and women different treatment solely because of sex. Such differences in treatment have often been challenged in the courts as alleged violations of state or federal constitutional provisions. But, for the most part, these constitutional attacks have met with failure, leading to, among other things, persistent pressure for a federal constitutional amendment that would specifically prohibit legal discrimination based on sex (the so-called equal rights amendment). In recent years—no doubt partly due to a general rekindling of interest in the status of women in society and the emergence of positive corrective legislation in the field—constitutional challenges of laws that discriminate on grounds of sex have increased. There are many indications in fact that reliance upon existing constitutional provisions as a basis for attacking many expressions of sex-based legal discrimination is no longer as fruitless an approach as it may have been in the past. The purposes of the present article are, therefore, three: (1) To describe and analyze leading decisions that have disposed of constitutional attacks upon laws that discriminate on the basis of sex; (2) To discern the current developments in this area, including a forecast of the shape of things to come; and (3) To consider the desirability vel non of the proposed equal rights amendment