First and second order optimality conditions for optimal control problems of state constrained integral equations

This paper deals with optimal control problems of integral equations, with initial-final and running state constraints. The order of a running state constraint is defined in the setting of integral dynamics, and we work here with constraints of arbitrary high orders. First and second-order necessary conditions of optimality are obtained, as well as second-order sufficient conditions

Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result

Stackelberg game, Cournot game, Limit result, Marginal-cost advantage, Arrow effect, L11, L12, L13,

Selling Licences for a Process Innovation: The Impact of the Product Market on the Selling Mechanism

This article considers the sale by a research lab of licences for a cost-reducing innovation. The marginal cost of a firm that wins a licence is private information and the acquisition of a licence imposes a negative externality on the other firms. The lab\u27s optimal revenue is determined from a class of mechanisms in which the lab selects the number of licences and the reserve price before the sale. The role of the downstream product market in the determination of the number of licences is analyzed. Furthermore, it is also shown that the optimal reserve price may be zero

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

Licensing contracts, Exclusive territory clause, Fixed fee, D45,

Networks of Knowledge among Unionized Firms

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa