Ignorance is Bliss: Effects of Real Activities Management by Employees and the Role of Managers

Empirical evidence shows that engaging in real activities management (RAM) to meet performance targets is prevalent in practice. We experimentally investigate how RAM by employees to meet internal targets set by managers affects their performance, and whether this effect depends on managers’ awareness of employees’ opportunity to engage in RAM. We predict and find that when managers’ awareness is low, employees use RAM to restore their effort incentives under suboptimally set targets, resulting in an increase in performance. However, when managers’ awareness of employees’ RAM opportunity is high, managers overattribute observed performance to RAM. This leads to less effective target adjustments and less trusting employee-manager relations, resulting in a decrease in performance. Overall, notwithstanding the direct costs of RAM, our findings suggest that the opportunity to engage in RAM can motivate higher employee performance, but increasing managers’ awareness of this has negative performance and relational effects

Ignorance is Bliss: Effects of Real Activities Management by Employees and the Role of Managers

Empirical evidence shows that engaging in real activities management (RAM) to meet performance targets is prevalent in practice. We experimentally investigate how RAM by employees to meet internal targets set by managers affects their performance, and whether this effect depends on managers’ awareness of employees’ opportunity to engage in RAM. We predict and find that when managers’ awareness is low, employees use RAM to restore their effort incentives under suboptimally set targets, resulting in an increase in performance. However, when managers’ awareness of employees’ RAM opportunity is high, managers overattribute observed performance to RAM. This leads to less effective target adjustments and less trusting employee-manager relations, resulting in a decrease in performance. Overall, notwithstanding the direct costs of RAM, our findings suggest that the opportunity to engage in RAM can motivate higher employee performance, but increasing managers’ awareness of this has negative performance and relational effects

Ignorance is Bliss: Effects of Real Activities Management by Employees and the Role of Managers

Empirical evidence shows that engaging in real activities management (RAM) to meet performance targets is prevalent in practice. We experimentally investigate how RAM by employees to meet internal targets set by managers affects their performance, and whether this effect depends on managers’ awareness of employees’ opportunity to engage in RAM. We predict and find that when managers’ awareness is low, employees use RAM to restore their effort incentives under suboptimally set targets, resulting in an increase in performance. However, when managers’ awareness of employees’ RAM opportunity is high, managers overattribute observed performance to RAM. This leads to less effective target adjustments and less trusting employee-manager relations, resulting in a decrease in performance. Overall, notwithstanding the direct costs of RAM, our findings suggest that the opportunity to engage in RAM can motivate higher employee performance, but increasing managers’ awareness of this has negative performance and relational effects

Ignorance is Bliss: Effects of Real Activities Management by Employees and the Role of Managers

Empirical evidence shows that engaging in real activities management (RAM) to meet performance targets is prevalent in practice. We experimentally investigate how RAM by employees to meet internal targets set by managers affects their performance, and whether this effect depends on managers’ awareness of employees’ opportunity to engage in RAM. We predict and find that when managers’ awareness is low, employees use RAM to restore their effort incentives under suboptimally set targets, resulting in an increase in performance. However, when managers’ awareness of employees’ RAM opportunity is high, managers overattribute observed performance to RAM. This leads to less effective target adjustments and less trusting employee-manager relations, resulting in a decrease in performance. Overall, notwithstanding the direct costs of RAM, our findings suggest that the opportunity to engage in RAM can motivate higher employee performance, but increasing managers’ awareness of this has negative performance and relational effects

Edoxaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation

Contains fulltext : 125374.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)BACKGROUND: Edoxaban is a direct oral factor Xa inhibitor with proven antithrombotic effects. The long-term efficacy and safety of edoxaban as compared with warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation is not known. METHODS: We conducted a randomized, double-blind, double-dummy trial comparing two once-daily regimens of edoxaban with warfarin in 21,105 patients with moderate-to-high-risk atrial fibrillation (median follow-up, 2.8 years). The primary efficacy end point was stroke or systemic embolism. Each edoxaban regimen was tested for noninferiority to warfarin during the treatment period. The principal safety end point was major bleeding. RESULTS: The annualized rate of the primary end point during treatment was 1.50% with warfarin (median time in the therapeutic range, 68.4%), as compared with 1.18% with high-dose edoxaban (hazard ratio, 0.79; 97.5% confidence interval [CI], 0.63 to 0.99; P<0.001 for noninferiority) and 1.61% with low-dose edoxaban (hazard ratio, 1.07; 97.5% CI, 0.87 to 1.31; P=0.005 for noninferiority). In the intention-to-treat analysis, there was a trend favoring high-dose edoxaban versus warfarin (hazard ratio, 0.87; 97.5% CI, 0.73 to 1.04; P=0.08) and an unfavorable trend with low-dose edoxaban versus warfarin (hazard ratio, 1.13; 97.5% CI, 0.96 to 1.34; P=0.10). The annualized rate of major bleeding was 3.43% with warfarin versus 2.75% with high-dose edoxaban (hazard ratio, 0.80; 95% CI, 0.71 to 0.91; P<0.001) and 1.61% with low-dose edoxaban (hazard ratio, 0.47; 95% CI, 0.41 to 0.55; P<0.001). The corresponding annualized rates of death from cardiovascular causes were 3.17% versus 2.74% (hazard ratio, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.77 to 0.97; P=0.01), and 2.71% (hazard ratio, 0.85; 95% CI, 0.76 to 0.96; P=0.008), and the corresponding rates of the key secondary end point (a composite of stroke, systemic embolism, or death from cardiovascular causes) were 4.43% versus 3.85% (hazard ratio, 0.87; 95% CI, 0.78 to 0.96; P=0.005), and 4.23% (hazard ratio, 0.95; 95% CI, 0.86 to 1.05; P=0.32). CONCLUSIONS: Both once-daily regimens of edoxaban were noninferior to warfarin with respect to the prevention of stroke or systemic embolism and were associated with significantly lower rates of bleeding and death from cardiovascular causes. (Funded by Daiichi Sankyo Pharma Development; ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48 ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT00781391.)