Electrical conduction in dielectric liquids

Conduction current measurements have been carried out in a variety of highly degassed hydrocarbon liquids using plane and spherical electrodes, at field strengths between 50kV/cm and breakdown. These liquids have been analysed by means of a high resolution chromatography apparatus and a marked dependence of the reproducibility of the results and the purity of the liquid was found. Steady currents in the region of 10 -6 A have been recorded, these being greater by several orders of magnitude than those found by other investigators under similar conditions. This high value of current has been established to be due to the high degree of degassing of the liquids used in this project. Measurements were made on the instability of the current, fast pulses in the microsecond region, particle movement and breakdown. No relationship was found between any of the electrical properties of the gap and the state of the electrode surfaces or the material used, although there was a marked change in the maximum value of the conduction current and some variation in the pattern of the instability when different liquids were tested. When using 3mm diameter, stainless steel, parallel plane electrodes the breakdown strength was found to be approximately 400kV/cm and independent of the liquid used. A mechanism has been proposed, based on realignment of the liquid molecules under the influence of the high electric field, and appears to be well able to explain the majority of the experimental observations

The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?

Recent regulatory changes increasing shareholder voting authority have focused attention on the role of proxy advisors. In particular, greater shareholder empowerment raises the question of how much proxy advisors influence voting outcomes. This Article analyzes the significance of voting recommendations issued by four proxy advisory firms in connection with uncontested director elections. We find, consistent with press reports, that Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is the most powerful proxy advisor and that, of the others, only Glass, Lewis & Co. seems to have a meaningful impact on shareholder voting. This Article also attempts to measure the impact of voting recommendations on voting outcomes. Unlike prior literature, it distinguishes correlation from causality by examining both the recommendation itself and the underlying factors that may influence a shareholder’s vote. Using several different tests, we conclude that popular accounts substantially overstate the influence of ISS. Our findings reveal that the impact of an ISS recommendation is reduced greatly once company- and firm-specific factors important to investors are taken into consideration. Overall, we estimate that an ISS recommendation shifts 6%–10% of shareholder votes. We also determine that a major component of ISS’s influence stems from its role as an information agent, aggregating factors that its subscribers consider important

Allograft and Xenograft Acceptance under FK‐506 and Other Immunosuppressant Treatment

We will focus on two issues, both involving, but not confined to FK-506: first, the meaning of the graft acceptance, which is, after all, the objective of immunosuppression for the transplant surgeon; and second, how to take the next great step of xenotransplantation

Nifedipine in Scleroderma Ulcerations

Cutaneous ulcerations may be due to a variety of causes, including vasculitis. infections, arterial insufficiency, and microvascular damage. The net effect is diminished blood flow to the skin. Nifedipine, a calcium antagonist, has been shown to improve cutaneous blood How and to alleviate reactive vasospastic ischemia (Raynaud's phenomenon). The authors report an ischemic ulcer of scleroderma showing visible improvement with nifedipine therapy.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/65515/1/j.1365-4362.1984.tb01233.x.pd

Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections

Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of shareholder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power, however, is poorly understood. In particular, because neither mutual funds nor their advisors are beneficial owners of their portfolio holdings, there is concern that mutual fund voting may be uninformed or tainted by conflicts of interest. These concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such as proxy access and say on pay. This article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director elections. We find that mutual funds use a variety of strategies to economize on the costs of making voting decisions, including having funds in the same fund family vote in lockstep, voting virtually always in accordance with management recommendations, and voting virtually always in accordance with recommendations of ISS. Smaller fund families employ these strategies to a greater extent than larger families. We further adduce evidence on how ISS recommendations affect fund voting. Funds that account for less than 10% of the assets in our sample exhibit a strong tendency to follow ISS recommendations, a much smaller percentage than funds that virtually always follow management recommendations (approximately 25% of assets). A much larger percentage (36% of the assets) votes in accordance with ISS withhold recommendations in approximately 50% of the cases. We conclude that the influence of ISS is due more to funds’ measured evaluation of the ISS recommendations rather than to funds blindly following these recommendations. We find no evidence that funds in families that are affiliated with commercial banks, investment banks, or insurance companies have a stronger proclivity than independent funds to vote in accordance with management recommendations or to shield their votes from criticism in order to maintain good business relations or generate new business for their affiliates. The largest fund families – Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds, each of which individually accounts for roughly 11% of total mutual fund assets – vote substantially differently both from each other and from ISS recommendations. This is strong evidence of heterogeneity in the voting behavior of mutual funds in director elections. Finally, we examine the factors associated with high (in excess of 30%) withhold votes in director elections. An ISS withhold recommendation, in conjunction with at least one of four factors – a withhold vote by Fidelity, the director missing 25% of board meetings, the company having ignored a shareholder resolution that received majority support, and a Vanguard withhold vote on outside directors with business ties to the company – is associated with a 49% probability of receiving a high withhold vote. Directors in these groups account for 48% of all directors who received high withhold votes. By contrast, an ISS withhold recommendation that is not combined with one of these factors is associated with only a 21% probability of a high withhold vote, and the general probability of a high withhold vote is a mere 2%. These findings suggest steps that companies and directors should take to try to avoid high withhold votes. They are also evidence that not all ISS recommendations have the same impact on voting outcomes

Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections

Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of shareholder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power, however, is poorly understood. In particular, because neither mutual funds nor their advisors are beneficial owners of their portfolio holdings, there is concern that mutual fund voting may be uninformed or tainted by conflicts of interest. These concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such as proxy access and say on pay. This article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director elections. We find that mutual funds use a variety of strategies to economize on the costs of making voting decisions, including having funds in the same fund family vote in lockstep, voting virtually always in accordance with management recommendations, and voting virtually always in accordance with recommendations of ISS. Smaller fund families employ these strategies to a greater extent than larger families. We further adduce evidence on how ISS recommendations affect fund voting. Funds that account for less than 10% of the assets in our sample exhibit a strong tendency to follow ISS recommendations, a much smaller percentage than funds that virtually always follow management recommendations (approximately 25% of assets). A much larger percentage (36% of the assets) votes in accordance with ISS withhold recommendations in approximately 50% of the cases. We conclude that the influence of ISS is due more to funds’ measured evaluation of the ISS recommendations rather than to funds blindly following these recommendations. We find no evidence that funds in families that are affiliated with commercial banks, investment banks, or insurance companies have a stronger proclivity than independent funds to vote in accordance with management recommendations or to shield their votes from criticism in order to maintain good business relations or generate new business for their affiliates. The largest fund families – Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds, each of which individually accounts for roughly 11% of total mutual fund assets – vote substantially differently both from each other and from ISS recommendations. This is strong evidence of heterogeneity in the voting behavior of mutual funds in director elections. Finally, we examine the factors associated with high (in excess of 30%) withhold votes in director elections. An ISS withhold recommendation, in conjunction with at least one of four factors – a withhold vote by Fidelity, the director missing 25% of board meetings, the company having ignored a shareholder resolution that received majority support, and a Vanguard withhold vote on outside directors with business ties to the company – is associated with a 49% probability of receiving a high withhold vote. Directors in these groups account for 48% of all directors who received high withhold votes. By contrast, an ISS withhold recommendation that is not combined with one of these factors is associated with only a 21% probability of a high withhold vote, and the general probability of a high withhold vote is a mere 2%. These findings suggest steps that companies and directors should take to try to avoid high withhold votes. They are also evidence that not all ISS recommendations have the same impact on voting outcomes

Integrable and superintegrable systems associated with multi-sums of products

We construct and study certain Liouville integrable, superintegrable, and non-commutative integrable systems, which are associated with multi-sums of products.Comment: 26 pages, submitted to Proceedings of the royal society

Risk of selection bias in randomised trials

Background: Selection bias occurs when recruiters selectively enrol patients into the trial based on what the next treatment allocation is likely to be. This can occur even if appropriate allocation concealment is used if recruiters can guess the next treatment assignment with some degree of accuracy. This typically occurs in unblinded trials when restricted randomisation is implemented to force the number of patients in each arm or within each centre to be the same. Several methods to reduce the risk of selection bias have been suggested; however, it is unclear how often these techniques are used in practice. Methods: We performed a review of published trials which were not blinded to assess whether they utilised methods for reducing the risk of selection bias. We assessed the following techniques: (a) blinding of recruiters; (b) use of simple randomisation; (c) avoidance of stratification by site when restricted randomisation is used; (d) avoidance of permuted blocks if stratification by site is used; and (e) incorporation of prognostic covariates into the randomisation procedure when restricted randomisation is used. We included parallel group, individually randomised phase III trials published in four general medical journals (BMJ, Journal of the American Medical Association, The Lancet, and New England Journal of Medicine) in 2010. Results: We identified 152 eligible trials. Most trials (98%) provided no information on whether recruiters were blind to previous treatment allocations. Only 3% of trials used simple randomisation; 63% used some form of restricted randomisation, and 35% did not state the method of randomisation. Overall, 44% of trials were stratified by site of recruitment; 27% were not, and 29% did not report this information. Most trials that did stratify by site of recruitment used permuted blocks (58%), and only 15% reported using random block sizes. Many trials that used restricted randomisation also included prognostic covariates in the randomisation procedure (56%). Conclusions: The risk of selection bias could not be ascertained for most trials due to poor reporting. Many trials which did provide details on the randomisation procedure were at risk of selection bias due to a poorly chosen randomisation methods. Techniques to reduce the risk of selection bias should be more widely implemented