Search for dark mesons decaying to top and bottom quarks in proton-proton collisions at √s = 13 TeV with the ATLAS detector

A search for dark mesons originating from strongly-coupled, SU(2) dark favor symmetry conserving models and decaying gaugephobically to pure Standard Model final states containing top and bottom quarks is presented. The search targets fully hadronic final states and final states with exactly one electron or muon and multiple jets. The analyzed data sample corresponds to an integrated luminosity of 140 fb−1 of proton-proton collisions collected at √s = 13 TeV with the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider. No significant excess over the Standard Model background expectation is observed and the results are used to set the first direct constraints on this type of model. The two-dimensional signal space of dark pion masses mπD and dark rho-meson masses mρD is scanned. For mπD /mρD = 0.45, dark pions with masses mπD < 940 GeV are excluded at the 95% CL, while for mπD /mρD = 0.25 masses mπD < 740 GeV are excluded

Combination of searches for Higgs boson decays into a photon and a massless dark photon using pp collisions at √s = 13 TeV with the ATLAS detector

A combination of searches for Higgs boson decays into a visible photon and a massless dark photon (H → γγd) is presented using 139 fb−1 of proton-proton collision data at a centre-of-mass energy of √s = 13 TeV recorded by the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider. The observed (expected) 95% confidence level upper limit on the Standard Model Higgs boson decay branching ratio is determined to be B(H → γγd) < 1.3% (1.5)%. The search is also sensitive to higher-mass Higgs bosons decaying into the same final state. The observed (expected) 95% confidence level limit on the cross-section times branching ratio ranges from 16 fb (20 fb) for mH = 400 GeV to 1.0 fb (1.5 fb) for mH = 3 TeV. Results are also interpreted in the context of a minimal simplified model

Immunological Response to Peptide Nucleic Acid and its Peptide Conjugate Targeted to Transactivation Response (TAR) Region of HIV-1 RNA Genome

Anti-human immunodeficiency virus-1 (HIV-1) polyamide (peptide) nucleic acids (PNAs) conjugated with cell-penetrating peptides (CPPs) targeted to the viral genome are potent virucidal and antiviral agents. Earlier, we have shown that the anti-HIV-1 PNATAR-penetratin conjugate is rapidly taken up by cells and is nontoxic to mice when administered at repeat doses of as high as 100 mg/kg body weight. In the present studies we demonstrate that naked PNATAR is immunologically inert as judged by the proliferation responses of splenocytes and lymph node cells from PNATAR-immunized mice challenged with the immunizing antigen. In contrast, PNATAR-penetratin conjugate is moderately immunogenic mainly due to its penetratin peptide component. Cytokine secretion profiles of the lymph node cells from the conjugate-immunized mice showed marginally elevated levels of proinflammatory cytokines, which are known to promote proliferation of T lymphocytes. Since the candidate compound, PNATAR-penetratin conjugate displays potent virucidal and antiviral activities against HIV-1, the favorable immunological response together with negligible toxicity suggest a strong therapeutic potential for this class of compounds

On the security of a certified e-mail scheme

As a value-added service for standard e-mail systems, a certified e-mail scheme allows a sender to deliver a message to a receiver in a fair way in the sense that either the sender obtains a receipt from the receiver and the receiver accesses the content of the e-mail simultaneously, or neither party gets the expected item. In 2000, Ferrer-Gomila et al. [11] proposed a novel certified e-mail protocol. Their scheme is both efficient and optimistic, since it has only three steps and a trusted third party is not involved in normal cases. Later, Monteiro and Dahab [16] identified an attack on Ferrer-Gomila et al.’s scheme, and further presented a modified scheme. In this paper, we show that their improvement is still insecure by successfully identifying several weaknesses and security flaws. Our attacks also apply to Ferrer-Gomila et al.’s original scheme

Adapting Helios for provable ballot privacy

Abstract. Recent results show that the current implementation of Helios, a practical e-voting protocol, does not ensure independence of the cast votes, and demonstrate the impact of this lack of independence on vote privacy. Some simple fixes seem to be available and security of the revised scheme has been studied with respect to symbolic models. In this paper we study the security of Helios using computational models. Our first contribution is a model for the property known as ballot privacy that generalizes and extends several existing ones. Using this model, we investigate an abstract voting scheme (of which the revised Helios is an instantiation) built from an arbitrary encryption scheme with certain functional properties. We prove, generically, that whenever this encryption scheme falls in the class of voting-friendly schemes that we define, the resulting voting scheme provably satisfies ballot privacy. We explain how our general result yields cryptographic security guarantees for the revised version of Helios (albeit from non-standard assumptions). Furthermore, we show (by giving two distinct constructions) that it is possible to construct voting-friendly encryption, and therefore voting schemes, using only standard cryptographic tools. We detail an instantiation based on ElGamal encryption and Fiat-Shamir non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that closely resembles Helios and which provably satisfies ballot privacy.