Balancing agricultural development and environmental objectives: assessing tradeoffs in the humid tropics.

This volume so far has presented numerous issues, opportunities, and concerns from specific national and thematic perspectives on tropical forests and deforestation. This chapter attempts to pull these together through analysis of tradeoffs across those various perspectives

The economic case for prioritizing governance over financial incentives in REDD+

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of public policies and financial incentives in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). It argues that the subordination of policies to results-based payments for emission reductions causes severe economic inefficiencies affecting the opportunity cost, transaction cost and economic rent of the programme. Such problems can be addressed by establishing sound procedural, land and financial governance at the national level, before REDD+ economic incentives are delivered at scale. Consideration is given to each governance dimension, the entry points for policy intervention and the impact on costs. International support must consider the financial and political cost of governance reforms, and use a pay-for-results ethos based on output and outcome indicators. This can be done in the readiness process but only if the latter’s legal force, scope, magnitude and time horizon are adequately reconsidered. In sum, the paper provides ammunition for the institutionalist argument that UNFCCC Parties must prioritise governance reform between now and the entry into force of the new climate agreement in 2020, and specific recommendations about how this can be done: only by doing so will they create the basis for the programme’s financial sustainability

Pervasive transition of the Brazilian land-use system

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Population, Land Use and Deforestation in the Pan Amazon Basin: a Comparison of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela

This paper discusses the linkages between population change, land use, and deforestation in the Amazon regions of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, and Venezuela. We begin with a brief discussion of theories of population–environment linkages, and then focus on the case of deforestation in the PanAmazon. The core of the paper reviews available data on deforestation, population growth, migration and land use in order to see how well land cover change reflects demographic and agricultural change. The data indicate that population dynamics and net migration exhibit to deforestation in some states of the basin but not others. We then discuss other explanatory factors for deforestation, and find a close correspondence between land use and deforestation, which suggests that land use is loosely tied to demographic dynamics and mediates the influence of population on deforestation. We also consider national political economic contexts of Amazon change in the six countries, and find contrasting contexts, which also helps to explain the limited demographic-deforestation correspondence. The paper closes by noting general conclusions based on the data, topics in need of further research and recent policy proposals.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/42720/1/10668_2003_Article_6977.pd

Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor’s presence may induce institutional change. Deforestation can be legal or illegal in the model: each district decides how much to protect and how much to extract for sale on a common market. If districts are strong, in that they find protection inexpensive, extraction is sales-driven and districts bene.t if neighbors conserve. If districts are weak, they lose when neighbors conserve since the smaller supply increases the price and the pressure on the resource, and thus also the cost of protection. Consequently, decentralizing authority increases conservation if and only if districts are weak. Contracting with the central authority is socially optimal, but, on the one hand, the donor benefits from contracting with districts if they are weak; on the other hand, districts prefer to decentralize if they are strong. The presence of the donor may lead to a regime change that increases extraction by more than it is reduced by the contract itself