Teleology and Realism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Science

This paper argues for an interpretation of Leibniz’s claim that physics requires both mechanical and teleological principles as a view regarding the interpretation of physical theories. Granting that Leibniz’s fundamental ontology remains non-physical, or mentalistic, it argues that teleological principles nevertheless ground a realist commitment about mechanical descriptions of phenomena. The empirical results of the new sciences, according to Leibniz, have genuine truth conditions: there is a fact of the matter about the regularities observed in experience. Taking this stance, however, requires bringing non-empirical reasons to bear upon mechanical causal claims. This paper first evaluates extant interpretations of Leibniz’s thesis that there are two realms in physics as describing parallel, self-sufficient sets of laws. It then examines Leibniz’s use of teleological principles to interpret scientific results in the context of his interventions in debates in seventeenth-century kinematic theory, and in the teaching of Copernicanism. Leibniz’s use of the principle of continuity and the principle of simplicity, for instance, reveal an underlying commitment to the truth-aptness, or approximate truth-aptness, of the new natural sciences. The paper concludes with a brief remark on the relation between metaphysics, theology, and physics in Leibniz

Kant's conception of proper science

Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant's infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status. © 2009 The Author(s)

Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection

Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century

High-risk political participation: demonstrations and riots under dictatorial regimes

Dans cet article, on contrôle de façon empirique, tout en utilisant un large échantillon de pays, les différentes théories sur dissension et protestation au coeur des régimes autoritaires, où ces activités sont souvent traquées et forcément périlleuses. Les résultats empiriques de l'analyse comparative longitudinale confirment les prévisions de l'approche économique rationnelle à propos de la protestation politique, ainsi que le pouvoir d'explication des facteurs structuraux, de la théorie de la privation relative, des processus de diffusion politique au niveau des régions, le rôle des institutions dictatoriales et, en partie, la théorie de la mobilisation des ressources. On voit aussi que la participation non violente est l'un des principaux déterminants des émeutes et que la protestation précédente détermine de façon décisive la protestation actuelle, quelle qu'elle soit.This article draws on a broad sample of countries to empirically test the different theories on dissent and protest in the context of authoritarian regimes, where such activities are generally repressed and are therefore risky. The empirical results of the longitudinal comparative analysis basically confirm the predictions of the rational economic approach to political protest as well as the explanatory power of structural factors, the relative deprivation theory, the political diffusion processes (at the regional level), the role of dictatorial institutions, and in part the resource mobilization theory. The empirical analysis also shows that non-violent participation is one of the main determinants of riots and that past protest is important in determining present protest (whatever its type)