Rigid and flexible quantification in plural predicate logic

Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as \u3ci\u3esome apples\u3c/i\u3e or \u3ci\u3ea quantity of milk\u3c/i\u3e, differ from bare noun phrases like \u3ci\u3eapples\u3c/i\u3e or \u3ci\u3emilk\u3c/i\u3e in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal \u3ci\u3efor\u3c/i\u3e-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial \u3ci\u3efor\u3c/i\u3e-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier \u3ci\u3eall\u3c/i\u3e

Epistemic Resistance Moves

This paper introduces and analyzes a new kind of non-acceptance, non-disagreeing move: resistance. We focus in particular on attention-targeted resistance facilitated by epistemic possibility claims. In this response type, we suggest, an agent draws attention to some subsidiary issue that they think might cause an interlocutor to withdraw a previous commitment. We develop a granularity model of attention where drawing attention in discourse can refine the space of possibilities under consideration and consequently lead to changes in view

Spinozian Model Theory

his paper is an excerpt from a larger project that aims to open a new pathway into Spinoza's Ethics by formally reconstructing an initial fragment of this text. The semantic backbone of the project is a custom-made Spinozian model theory that lays out some of the formal prerequisites for more ne-grained investigations into Spinoza's fundamental ontology and modal metaphysics. We implement Spinoza's theory of attributes using many-sorted models with a rich system of identity that allows us to clarify the puzzling status of such logical principles as the Substitution of Identicals and Transitivity of Identity in Spinoza's thought. The intensional structure of our Spinozian models also captures his proposal that states of aairs can be necessitated or excluded by the essences of particular things, an essence-relative modality that should be of interest to philosophers who have sought to rehabilitate the concept of essence in contemporary analytic metaphysics

Rigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic

Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as some apples or a quantity of milk, differ from bare noun phrases like apples or milk in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal for-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier all

Epistemic Lessons from Computer Science: Interactive Proofs and Zero Knowledge

This paper is situated at the junction of two youthful academic currents. The first current is a philosophical one, with a pioneering group of philosophers of science recently turning their attention to computer science in earnest, recognizing the Philosophy of Computer Science (PCS) as a new branch of philosophical inquiry. Current work in this field has included discussions on the nature of computers and computational processes, the relationship between mathematics and computer science and the position of computer science among the empirical sciences (Eden (2007) and Colburn (2000) are good examples). The second current is a computational one, with an ‘extroverted complexity theory ’ (to use C. Papadimitriou’s term) continuing to disseminate its thirty-years worth of ideas and inventions across other disciplines. Here it suffices to mention the now widespread use of NP-completeness, work on biological algorithms and the price of anarchy, and the testing of theoretical physics furnished by scientists ’ attempts to build a quantum computer. As part of the first current, I am a philosopher interested in computer science. As part of the second, I am interested in what recent work in theoretical computer science has to contribute to philosophy, rather than, say, economics or quantum physics. In particular, this paper will look at two related gems of computer science, the interactive proofs and zero knowledge protocols of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff (1985), and explore what these concepts have to teach philosophers about proofs and knowledge. Unlike classical mathematical proofs, interactive proofs are dynamic communications between a prover and verifier where a sequence of messages is exchanged in the prover’s hope of convincing the verifier of this or that mathematical fact. In the limiting case where the prover provides the verifier with no additional knowledge beyond the truth of the assertion to be proved, such a proof is considered zero knowledge. For readers unfamiliar with these concepts, I begin with an intuitive example of an interactive zero-knowledge protocol in section 1. After then presenting formal definitions in section 2, the sections 3 and 4 move on to our epistemic lessons

Logic Informed

I develop an informational conception of logic as a science fundamentally concerned not with truth but with information. Facts about logical validity, on this conception, tell us about the structure of the bodies of information that we generate, encounter, absorb, and exchange as we interact with one another and learn about our world. I also investigate the normative role of logic in our epistemic practices. In particular, I argue against the widespread idea that there are rational requirements to have logically coherent beliefs that are not merely epiphenomenal on evidential norms

Research programs, model-building and actor-network-theory: Reassessing the case of the Leontief Paradox

Methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP), model-building and actor-network-theory (ANT) are woven together to provide a layered study of the Leontief paradox. Neil De Marchi's Lakatosian account examined the paradox within an Ohlin-Samuelson research program. A model-building approach rather highlights the ability of Leontief's input-output model to mediate between international trade theory and the world by facilitating an empirical application of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. The epistemological implications of this model-building approach provide an alternative explanation of why Samuelson and other prominent economists ignored the paradox. By focusing on the network in which input-output analysis evolved, Bruno Latour's ANT further explains the response of international trade theorists.Leontief paradox, Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, research programs, models as mediators, actor-network-theory,