Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Legitimacy of Merits-Review

The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed—the use of the proportionality principle, for example—or the context of the administrative decision under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights. The author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without limit—a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above

Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Limits of Intervention by the Courts

When exercising judicial review, the courts, on occasions, have intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions were not irrational. However, these low standards of judicial intervention are arguably constitutional, especially since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). To this end, this article seeks to establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are clearly excluded. But it is unable to do so. Does this mean, therefore, that judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality exists without limit? Assuming this to be the case, it is suggested that the courts should show greater respect to the administrative branch of the state where it has genuinely sought to engage with the legal process in arriving at its decisions

La acotación al Estado: La política, el principio constitucional y la revisión jurisdiccional

In this document, the author explains how in the British constitutional system the 20th. century shows an increa-sing performance of judges in the balance of public powers, diminishing the Executive's traditional immunity and demanding jurisdictional authority regarding the sovereign acts of the Parliament. The author empha-sizes the importance of human rights adjudication under the European Commu-nity Law that incorporates British Law through the Human Rights Act of 1998. The author also criticizes the way most coun-tries are looking for alternatives between unrestrictive majority rule and a limited government, take too much of a risk think-ing that the solution is an unwritten Cons-titution. It could get worst facing the public administration's practice as well as the decisions of the courts that had jointly crea-ted a democratic model that reflects the power of the State but limiting its necessary boundaries.El autor en este ensayo explica cómo en el sistema constitucional británico del siglo XX muestra con vaivenes una expansión del papel de los jueces en el equilibrio de los poderes públicos, disminuyendo la tradicional inmunidad del Ejecutivo, y reivindicando la potestad jurisdiccional respecto de los actos inclusive soberanos del Parlamento. Se hace especial mención a los derechos humanos, en aplicación por el derecho comunitario europeo, incorporado al derecho interno inglés a través del Human Rights Act de 1998. También critica la forma en que actualmente los países en búsqueda de una opción entre la regla mayoritaria irrestricta y la práctica de un gobierno limitado arriesgan demasiado al confiar la resolución de dicho problema a una Constitución no escrita. Ello podría empeorar, al consultar tanto la práctica de la administración pública como los fallos de los tribunales que conjuntamente han creado el modelo democrático que retrata el poder necesario del Estado, pero acotando sus necesarios límites