Review of The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics

The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, edited by Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett, contains 35 chapters over 8 sections. Many of these chapters are directly relevant to animal ethicists. Even many of those that do not initially appear to be, however, should be of interest. I thoroughly recommend The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics to all animal ethicists interested in addressing food-related questions in their research or teaching

Plant sentience and the case for ethical veganism

Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively “valenced” feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm

Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson

Freeganism: a (cautious) defense

Ethicists often assume that animal protectionist principles (including animal rights principles) commit us to veganism. But “unusual eaters” and “new omnivores” argue that animal protectionist principles permit or even oblige us to be freegans, here understood as people who, though mostly vegan, eat animal products that would otherwise go to waste. This is a conclusion that animal protectionists may want to resist. In this chapter, Josh Milburn canvasses six sets of critiques of freeganism: 1) That animal products aren’t food; 2) That animal products are unappealing; 3) That championing freeganism makes for bad activism; 4) That it’s wrong to benefit from the wrongdoing of others; 5) That we should donate, rather than eat, waste animal products; and 6) That eating meat disrespects animal corpses. Milburn concludes that though these challenges can speak in favor of veganism, the case for new omnivore freeganism remains compelling in many circumstances. In closing, Milburn turns to the common ground between new omnivores, unusual eaters, and strict vegans, asking what this debate about the ethics of diet might mean for the political question of future food systems.</p

Death-free dairy? The ethics of clean milk

The possibility of “clean milk”—dairy produced without the need for cows—has been championed by several charities, companies, and individuals. One can ask how those critical of the contemporary dairy industry, including especially vegans and others sympathetic to animal rights, should respond to this prospect. In this paper, I explore three kinds of challenges that such people may have to clean milk: first, that producing clean milk fails to respect animals; second, that humans should not consume dairy products; and third, that the creation of clean milk would affirm human superiority over cows. None of these challenges, I argue, gives us reason to reject clean milk. I thus conclude that the prospect is one that animal activists should both welcome and embrace