Review of The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics

The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, edited by Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett, contains 35 chapters over 8 sections. Many of these chapters are directly relevant to animal ethicists. Even many of those that do not initially appear to be, however, should be of interest. I thoroughly recommend The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics to all animal ethicists interested in addressing food-related questions in their research or teaching

Plant sentience and the case for ethical veganism

Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively “valenced” feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm

The demandingness of Nozick’s ‘Lockean’ proviso

Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While I argue that the former reading is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of nonhuman animals; if such beings are right bearers, as more and more academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso

Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson

A Review of Dan C. Shahar’s Why It\u27s OK to Eat Meat and Per Bauhn’s Animal Suffering, Human Rights, and the Virtue of Justice

It’s tricky to find decent defences of meat-eating of the kind practiced by most westerners. I was thus intrigued to pick up two short books defending meat-eating. Dan Shahar’s Why It’s Ok to Eat Meat (2022) is in Routledge’s series of short books called Why It\u27s OK: The Ethics and Aesthetics of How We Live. Per Bauhn’s Animal Suffering, Human Rights, and the Virtue of Justice (2023) is from Palgrave Pivot, which publishes books falling somewhere between journal articles and monographs. Shahar’s book is worth reading: it’s well-written, raising interesting questions, and offering a coherent defence of meat. Bauhn’s book is not recommended. It’s tricky to find decent defences of meat-eating. I don’t mean defences of eating (say) roadkill or cultivated meat. I mean defences of the meat-eating practiced by most westerners. This is jarring when putting together reading lists. I was thus intrigued to pick up two short books defending meat-eating. Dan Shahar’s Why It’s Ok to Eat Meat (2022) is in Routledge’s series of short books called Why It\u27s OK: The Ethics and Aesthetics of How We Live. Per Bauhn’s Animal Suffering, Human Rights, and the Virtue of Justice (2023) is from Palgrave Pivot, which publishes books falling somewhere between journal articles and monographs. Shahar’s book is worth reading: it’s well-written, raising interesting questions, and offering a coherent defence of meat. Bauhn’s book is not recommended

Review: When Animals Speak: Toward an Interspecies Democracy, by Eva Meijer

Book review of: Full Title: When Animals Speak: Toward an Interspecies Democracy Author / Editor: Eva Meijer Publisher: Routledge, 2019 </p

Animal sovereignty theory

Animals “are not brethren, they are not underlings, they are other Nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the splendour and travail of the earth.” So writes Henry Beston in his 1928 book The Outermost House (2003, 25). The idea was one echoed in the defining works of twentieth-century animal ethics, which tended to defend the idea that, when it came to wild animals, we should simply “[let] them be” (Regan 2004, 357). In one sense, animal sovereignty theory – the claim that wild animals should be conceived of as sovereign communities, entitled to be recognized as the sovereign controllers of their own spaces – offers a theoretical grounding of this view.  </p