Eurocacy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities

Protection of individual rights has been a central feature of much of the judicial review by supreme courts in Western countries in the postwar era. Concepts such as individual dignity and privacy, as well as more classical notions of liberty and equality before the law, have been the standard repositories of constitutional interpretation by courts reviewing governmental legislation and administrative action. The concept and practice of judicial review have penetrated, albeit in a limited way, even legal cultures which for long have resisted, such as Britain and France. I Indeed, judicial review in general and the protection of individual rights in particular, are widely considered as a conditio sine qua non of democracy and the rule of law. But it is no exaggeration to say that all jurisdictions where this judicial power is exercised—even the oldest, the United States—have seen in the last forty years fierce controversies concerning the limits within which, and the principles upon which, judges should exercise their power to overturn majoritarian legislation

European Democracy and its Critique - Five Uneasy Pieces

democracy; European Court of Justice; fundamental/human rights; Germany; institutions; integration theory; interest intermediation; multilevel governance; national interest; supranationalism

Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (AB-2003-4): One Bad Apple? (DS245/AB/R): A Comment

This chapter reviews the decision by the Appellate Body (AB) regarding measures affecting the importation of apples in Japan. Section 2 of the chapter presents some background facts. Section 3 considers the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and emphasizes the fact that it imposes a discipline on risk-reducing measures even in the absence of discrimination or protectionism. Section 4 discusses how the evaluation of risk-reducing measures can be undertaken in the context of the SPS agreement. Our discussion focuses on two issues: the scope of the mandate given to the adjudicators and the standard of review that they should apply. We emphasize the difficulty of the task faced by the adjudicators, namely to distinguish between determining the level of risk that a country will find optimal to support (which cannot be challenged) and determining whether risk-reducing measures are necessary to achieve the chosen level of risk. We further observe that the common methodology used by Panels, namely to evaluate the existence of risk in the absence of risk-reducing measures, has limited applicabilit

Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity

In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent traditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the European Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of “non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.Um gleichzeitig effektiv und liberal sein zu können, ist staatliche Herrschaft auf freiwillige Folgebereitschaft angewiesen – die ihrerseits der Unterstützung durch sozial geteilte Legitimitätsüberzeugungen bedarf. In den demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten des Westens werden solche Überzeugungen aus den unterschiedlichen, aber komplementär zusammenwirkenden Traditionen der „republikanischen“ und der „liberalen“ politischen Philosophie hergeleitet. An diesen Kriterien gemessen erscheint die Europäische Union – wenn man sie für sich betrachtet – als eine „liberale“ politische Ordnung, der jedoch alle „republikanischen“ Legitimitätsmerkmale fehlen. Aber eine solche Sichtweise, die auch die derzeitige Diskussion über ein „europäisches Demokratiedefizit“ bestimmt, verkennt den Mehrebenencharakter des europäischen Gemeinwesens. In ihm sind es die Mitgliedstaaten, die Entscheidungen der Union gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern durchsetzen und auch legitimieren müssen, während es für die Union ihrerseits auf die freiwillige Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten ankommt. Dabei werden diese jedoch durch die normativen Grundlagen ihrer eigenen Legitimität begrenzt. Politische Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene setzen breiten Konsens voraus, und die Regierungen sollten sie deshalb auch gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern in „kommunikativen Diskursen“ vertreten und dafür die politische Verantwortung übernehmen können. Dies gilt jedoch nicht notwendigerweise auch für Entscheidungen der europäischen Politik, die im nichtpolitischen Modus ohne Beteiligung des Rates und des Parlaments vom Europäischen Gerichtshof bestimmt werden. Mit der gegenwärtigen Radikalisierung seines „liberalen“ Programms der Liberalisierung und Deregulierung des nationalen Rechts könnte der Gerichtshof in der Tat die „republikanischen“ Grundlagen der mitgliedstaatlichen Legitimität unterminieren. In diesem Falle könnte die Union sich nicht länger auf die Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten verlassen. Um diese Gefahr für die europäische Integration zu vermeiden, sollte eine stärkere politische Kontrolle der richterlichen Rechtsetzung erwogen werden.1 Legitimacy Republican and liberal legitimating discourses Constitutional democracies – and the EU? 2 Legitimacy in multilevel polities 3 Legitimating member state compliance Political modes of policy making Non-political policy making 4 The need for justification 5 The Court is pushing against the limits of justifiability 6 The liberal undermining of republican legitimacy 7 Needed: A political balance of community and autonomy Reference

Eric Stein -- A Tribute

A tribute to Eric Stei

State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue. The debate that won’t go away

Church and State – although within a couple of decades this concept seemed to be out of date and pushed somewhere in between typology and taxonomy – it came back suddenly to the current discourse in numerous publications, articles and books clarifying with due weight various models of the co-existence of Church and State. The debate relates to the Christian culture, being on the way out in the secular Europe, and its place in self-reflection and self-understanding by nations and countries of the Old Continent. The subject of an animated discussion was a possible reference to „the Christian roots” as a part of the cultural heritage of the EU in the preamble of its the would-have-been constitution. At present, similar issues such as displaying crucifixes in public schools are debated in individual countries – it was decided i.a. by the German Federal Constitutional Court, and is discussed by lawyers in other countries. The above issue was also the subject of the decision held by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights after the judgment as of November 2009 in case Lautsi v. Italy regarding the complaint of Soile Lautsi

Der Staat 'über alles' Demos, Telos und die Maastricht-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts

comitology; democracy; European citizenship; European Parliament; federalism; Germany; German Constitutional Court; integration theory; legislative procedure; Treaty on European Union; national interest; Nation-state; opting out; participation; polity building; supranationalism

Backstop Alternatives: Examining the “We Cannot Trust the Brits” Excuse

Last week, together with two colleagues, Daniel Sarmiento and Sir Jonathan Faull, we published a plan which could avoid a no-deal Brexit. It is to one reaction, attributed in the Press to anonymous Commission sources that I wish to react. And I do not do this solely or even mainly in order to defend the viability of our particular Proposal. I do so because I fear that this same reaction of these anonymous EU officials will meet any proposal for &#8222;alternative arrangements&#8220; to be put on the table by the UK government.</p

The Comeback of the Mixed Chamber

Three years ago, in the wake of the Weiss judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, we proposed the creation of a “Mixed Chamber” in the Court of Justice of the European Union, to rule in last instance on judicial disputes on points of Union competence. The rationale of a Chamber so composed is not obvious. After all, in a Union in which EU Law has primacy over national law, in which the autonomy of EU law is all-pervasive and where the Court of Justice is the ultimate interpreter of EU law, why should a Mixed Chamber be needed? We believe there are at least three good reasons that make a Mixed Chamber as salient as ever. </p