Forces to migrate from Angola to the Netherlands

In this paper I will focus on the group of asylum seekers who entered the Netherlands since 1998 and explain why they left Angola and ended up in the Netherlands; a country without any historical or linguistic linkages to Angola. What specific reasons made Angolans leave their country and what rationale was behind their choice to come to the Netherlands? Different empirical studies on push- and pull-factors of asylum seekers have already been carried out (see for instance Barsky 1995, Doornhein & Dijkhoff 1995, Koser 1997, Böcker & Havinga 1997, Doornbos a.o. 2001). It is interesting to note that on the basis of interviews with keyinformants Böcker and Havinga (1997, p. 88) conclude that when it comes to choosing a country of asylum “Africans are often said to rely on networks of kinship, friends, political sympathism, tribe and village. This in contrast to asylum seekers from Asia who are said to more frequently use commercial organisations specialised in smuggling people in and out”. Most of the above mentioned empirical studies do not focus on asylum seekers from African countries, but rather on migration from Asia. Also in the research-field of human smuggling most of the empirical research focuses on Asia rather than Africa (see for instance: Chin 1999, Staring 2001, Salt 2000, Zhang and Chin 2002). Siegel & Bijleveld (2002) and Liempt (2004) point out that in general the influence of commercial human smuggling organisations on migration should not be overestimated. Because of this it is particularly interesting to elaborate on how Angolans gained entry to “Fortress Europe”. Did they indeed rely on networks of friends and kinship, rather than the services of human smugglers? What routes did they use? By thoroughly studying the specific case of one African country - Angola -, I hope new insights can be gained about push- and pull factors and the relation with human smuggling. To complete the picture of the migration-process of Angolans to the Netherlands, I also briefly focus on the unique way the Dutch government tried to counter the increase of asylum applicants from Angola by sponsoring the building of an orphanage in Angola

Sensitivity to Experiencing Alcohol Hangovers: Reconsideration of the 0.11% Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) Threshold for Having a Hangover

The 2010 Alcohol Hangover Research Group consensus paper defined a cutoff blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.11% as a toxicological threshold indicating that sufficient alcohol had been consumed to develop a hangover. The cutoff was based on previous research and applied mostly in studies comprising student samples. Previously, we showed that sensitivity to hangovers depends on (estimated) BAC during acute intoxication, with a greater percentage of drinkers reporting hangovers at higher BAC levels. However, a substantial number of participants also reported hangovers at comparatively lower BAC levels. This calls the suitability of the 0.11% threshold into question. Recent research has shown that subjective intoxication, i.e., the level of severity of reported drunkenness, and not BAC, is the most important determinant of hangover severity. Non-student samples often have a much lower alcohol intake compared to student samples, and overall BACs often remain below 0.11%. Despite these lower BACs, many non-student participants report having a hangover, especially when their subjective intoxication levels are high. This may be the case when alcohol consumption on the drinking occasion that results in a hangover significantly exceeds their “normal” drinking level, irrespective of whether they meet the 0.11% threshold in any of these conditions. Whereas consumers may have relative tolerance to the adverse effects at their “regular” drinking level, considerably higher alcohol intake—irrespective of the absolute amount—may consequentially result in a next-day hangover. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 0.11% threshold value as a criterion for having a hangover should be abandoned

The aftermath of Dutch international crimes cases: Post-prosecution scenarios for nationals and non-nationals

This article describes the scale and nature of international crimes prosecutions in the Netherlands and maps the different scenarios that (may) unfold when criminal proceedings against a migrant suspect of international crimes conclude after acquittal or completion of a sentence. The article is based on an analysis of academic literature, Dutch legislation and case law, policy documents, and media reports. Since 1997, 20 individuals have been prosecuted for international crimes in the Netherlands, 16 of whom were naturalized or dual Dutch citizens, or non-citizens. The article concludes that while the Dutch ‘No Safe Haven’ policy — which we propose consists of a four-pillar model covering criminal law, extradition law, immigration/refugee law, and nationality law — has the potential to reduce impunity for international crimes, it likely results in undesirable, unremovable, and unaccounted for individuals

The aftermath of Dutch international crimes cases: Post-prosecution scenarios for nationals and non-nationals

This article describes the scale and nature of international crimes prosecutions in the Netherlands and maps the different scenarios that (may) unfold when criminal proceedings against a migrant suspect of international crimes conclude after acquittal or completion of a sentence. The article is based on an analysis of academic literature, Dutch legislation and case law, policy documents, and media reports. Since 1997, 20 individuals have been prosecuted for international crimes in the Netherlands, 16 of whom were naturalized or dual Dutch citizens, or non-citizens. The article concludes that while the Dutch ‘No Safe Haven’ policy — which we propose consists of a four-pillar model covering criminal law, extradition law, immigration/refugee law, and nationality law — has the potential to reduce impunity for international crimes, it likely results in undesirable, unremovable, and unaccounted for individuals

Islamic Law and the Balancing of Justice and Peace in Iraq’s Post-IS Landscape

Balancing justice and long-term peace and security in a postconflict context is highly complex. This article discusses the challenges in Iraq’s post-IS (Islamic State) landscape. Based on a review of relevant Arabic, English and Persian academic scholarship on Islamic law and Islamic political science on accountability and transitional justice, it discusses what Islamic law dictates state authorities to do with detained suspects of atrocity crimes and terrorism and explores possibilities in Islamic law to balance justice and long-term peace and security. The article concludes that crimes against the state should, according to Islamic law, in principle lead to harsh punishments. However, that same body of law also provides for opportunities to adopt non-retributive alternatives, if this allows government to more swiftly handle the security crisis, re-establish public harmony and prevent further bloodshed in the future. The popular perception of the Iraqi people supporting retributive approaches could however pose an important barrier that could block any changes to Iraq’s current transitional justice approach