Johnson v. M\u27intosh

A title to lands, under grants to private Individuals, made by Indian tribes or Nations northwest of the river Ohio, in 1773 and 1775. The decision of the United States District Court is deemed to be in error. ERROR to the District Court of Illinois. This was an action of ejectment for lands in the State and District of Illinois, claimed by the plaintiffs under a purchase and conveyance from the Piankeshaw Indians, and by the defendant, under a grant from the United States

Alvin Johnson v. M. Eldon Barnes : Reply Brief

KFU 45.9 •S9 ?2oo7SDOCKET- NO. - - - r -r BRIEF IN THE SUPREME COURTOP THE STATE OP UTAH - - ©0000O00000 - - - ALYIN JOHNSON Petitioner - Appellant V. M. ELDON BARNES, Warden Respondent - Appellee f Case No. 920075 - - - - 00000O00000 - - - REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT eooooOooooo REPLY TO RESPONDENT\u27S CONTINUED ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE TRIAL COURT.\u27S UNPRECEDENTED , INCREDIBLE , AND CONSTITUTIONALLY! IMPERMISSIBLY. IMPROVISING ITS VERYi OWN PERSONAL CRITERIA FOR ADJUDICATING THE APPELLANTS GUILT (i.e. DISPENSIIC WITH THE APPELLANT\u27S CONSTITUTIONALLY! GUARANTEED PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ADDITIONALLY! DISPENSING WITH THE PROSECUTION\u27S BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOHD A REASONABLE DOUBI )AND THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTITUTED ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL , INCREDIBLE AND UNPRECEDENTED MERE READING OF THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TRANSCRIPT. BASING ITS ADJUDICATION OF GUILT WHOLLY AND EXCLUSIVELY UPON ITS ADMITTED READING OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT AND THEREFROM UNCONSTITUTIONALLY^ DECLARED THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER AND TWO (2) FIRST DEGREE FELONIES TOTALLY WITHOUT ANY ASCERTAINABLE AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, OR PRECEDENTS OF THE UTAH STATE COURTS OF APPEALS. oooooOooooo ALVIK JOHNSON In Pro Se P. 0. Box 250 Draper, Utah 8^020 R. PAUL SAN DAM Attorney General - State of Utah 236 State Capitol Building Salt Lake City, Utah 8*Hlk Counsel For The Respondent - Appellee

Alvin Johnson v. M. Eldon Barnes : Reply Brief

KFU 45.9 •S9 ?2oo7SDOCKET- NO. - - - r -r BRIEF IN THE SUPREME COURTOP THE STATE OP UTAH - - ©0000O00000 - - - ALYIN JOHNSON Petitioner - Appellant V. M. ELDON BARNES, Warden Respondent - Appellee f Case No. 920075 - - - - 00000O00000 - - - REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT eooooOooooo REPLY TO RESPONDENT\u27S CONTINUED ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE TRIAL COURT.\u27S UNPRECEDENTED , INCREDIBLE , AND CONSTITUTIONALLY! IMPERMISSIBLY. IMPROVISING ITS VERYi OWN PERSONAL CRITERIA FOR ADJUDICATING THE APPELLANTS GUILT (i.e. DISPENSIIC WITH THE APPELLANT\u27S CONSTITUTIONALLY! GUARANTEED PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ADDITIONALLY! DISPENSING WITH THE PROSECUTION\u27S BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOHD A REASONABLE DOUBI )AND THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTITUTED ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL , INCREDIBLE AND UNPRECEDENTED MERE READING OF THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TRANSCRIPT. BASING ITS ADJUDICATION OF GUILT WHOLLY AND EXCLUSIVELY UPON ITS ADMITTED READING OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT AND THEREFROM UNCONSTITUTIONALLY^ DECLARED THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER AND TWO (2) FIRST DEGREE FELONIES TOTALLY WITHOUT ANY ASCERTAINABLE AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, OR PRECEDENTS OF THE UTAH STATE COURTS OF APPEALS. oooooOooooo ALVIK JOHNSON In Pro Se P. 0. Box 250 Draper, Utah 8^020 R. PAUL SAN DAM Attorney General - State of Utah 236 State Capitol Building Salt Lake City, Utah 8*Hlk Counsel For The Respondent - Appellee

Johnson v. M\u27intosh: Christianity, genocide, and the dispossession of indigenous peoples

Using hermeneutical methodology, this paper examines some of the legal fictions that form the foundation of Federal Indian Law. The text of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1823 Johnson v. M’Intosh opinion is evaluated through the lens of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to determine the extent to which the Supreme Court incorporated genocidal principles into United States common law. The genealogy of M’Intosh is examined to identify influences that are not fully apparent on the face of the case. International jurisprudential interpretations of the legal definition of genocide are summarized and used as a basis for constructing an analytical framework. The framework is then applied to the reasoning in the M’Intosh case to evaluate the extent to which principles of Christian Discovery shaped the M’Intosh Court’s reasoning and, by extension, are the basis of dispossessing Native peoples of their lands, autonomy, and lives

Alvin Johnson v. M. Eldon Barnes, and Utah State Prison : Brief of Appellee

APPEAL FROM A DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING

Johnson v. M\u27Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States

In the first four decades of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court handed down five seminal decisions written by Chief Justice John Marshall, forming the political-philosophical-legal basis of tribal-state-federal relations. It is unnecessary to elaborate on the principles derived from these decisions—Fletcher v. Peck, New Jersey v. Wilson, Johnson v. M\u27Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia—because they have been analyzed or at least broached by virtually every scholar wading into the turbid discipline of federal Indian law. This article will focus on (1) the question of the legal status of Indian titles (aboriginal possessory rights) to land; and (2) what, if any, limitations are there on the rights of tribes to convey their title to whomever they wish. This set of questions requires us, first, to recapitulate the principles announced in the M\u27Intosh decision which forcefully addressed the issue of Indian land title and the apparently diminished right to tribes to transmit the same and second, to then move to examine in great detail the little-discussed 1835 Supreme Court decision, Mitchel v. United States

Property and Empire: The Law of Imperialism in Johnson v. M’Intosh

Chief Justice\u27s Marshall\u27s opinion in Johnson v. M\u27Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)543 (1823) has long been a puzzle, both in its doctrinal structure and in long, strange dicta which are both triumphal and elegiac. In this Essay, I show that the opinion becomes newly intelligible when read in the context of the law and theory of colonialism, concerned, like the case itself, with the expropriation of continents and relations between dominant and subject peoples. I examine several instances where the seeming incoherence of the opinion instead shows its debt to imperial jurisprudence, which rested on a distinction between two bodies of law: one governing relations between civilized nations, the other relations between civilized governments and the imperfect sovereigns of other nations. I then show how Marshall\u27s long dicta reflect the then-prevalent view of the hsitorical progress of societies from hunter-gatherer to commercial orders, with each stage corresponding to a particular set of property institutions.This historical theory lent intelligibility to the legal distinctions between civilized and lesser or imperfect sovereigns by claiming that the latter occupied earlier stages of development and that civilized nations were legally permitted to overrride the property institutions of primitive societies in order to induce progress. The dicta, then, provide the frame for the reasoning of this case, just as the theory of historical progress framed the jurisprudence of colonialisn in general