Sustainable Reindeer Husbandry

The goal of the project is to assess circumpolar reindeer herding and husbandry in relation to ecological, economic and social/cultural sustainability. This will be done by carrying out a thematic survey and assessment of reindeer husbandry in the region, with reference to management of pasture land, internal organization and socio-economic conditions in reindeer husbandry

Community-Based Management: Under What Conditions Do Sámi Pastoralists Manage Pastures Sustainably?

Abstract Community-based management (CBM) has been implemented in socio-ecological systems (SES) worldwide. CBM has also been the prevailing policy in Sa´mi pastoral SES in Norway, but the outcomes tend to vary extensively among resource groups (‘‘siidas’’). We asked why do some siidas self-organize to manage common pool resources sustainably and others do not? To answer this question we used a mixed methods approach. First, in the statistical analyses we analyzed the relationship between sustainability indicators and structural variables. We found that small winter pastures that are shared by few siidas were managed more sustainably than larger pastures. Seasonal siida stability, i.e., a low turnover of pastoralists working together throughout the year, and equality among herders, also contributed to more sustainable outcomes. Second, interviews were conducted in the five largest pastures to explain the relationships between the structural variables and sustainability. The pastoralists expressed a high level of agreement with respect to sustainable policies, but reported a low level of trust and cooperation among the siidas. The pastoralists requested siida tenures or clear rules and sanctioning mechanisms by an impartial authority rather than flexible organization or more autonomy for the siidas. The lack of nestedness in self-organization for managing pastures on larger scales, combined with the past economic policies, could explain why CBM is less sustainable on the largest winter pastures. We conclude that the scale mis-match between selforganization and the formal governance is a key condition for sustainability

Relationships between structural variables and sustainability indicators selected by AIC.

<p>Partial residual plots between (A) winter pasture area and proportion of calf slaughter, (B) winter pasture area and slaughter weights of calves, (C) winter pasture area and livelihood income, (D) seasonal siida stability and proportion of calf slaughter, and (E) inequality in herd size on the summer pasture (Gini coefficient) and slaughter weight of calves. Each point is the average value of a herding unit from 1998 to 2007. The partial residuals were computed from the initial mixed effect model, relating the sustainability indicators to six structural predictor variables (see <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0051187#pone-0051187-t001" target="_blank">Table 1</a>). To allow comparisons of effect sizes, all variables were standardized to mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one.</p

Study area.

<p>Green areas indicate the delineation of summer pasture areas and blue indicate winter pasture areas in 2003/04. Most of the summer pastures (39 of the 44) are managed by one siida. In winter many of the summer siidas are split into smaller winter siidas that share winter pastures.</p

Trust among pastoralists.

<p>Percentages of the pastoralists who expressed no, weak and strong degrees of trust for other pastoralists sharing winter and summer pastures.</p

Institutional arrangements.

<p>The pastoralists’ perceptions of institutional arrangements. A) Percentages of the pastoralists who reported no, negotiated and formalized conflict resolution mechanisms. B) Percentages of the pastoralists who responded negatively to the idea of dividing the pastures into customary tenures or responded positively to the idea of establishing customary tenures, either by voluntary agreements or court formalization. C) Percentages of the pastoralists who expressed no, weak and strong degrees of trust in the current governance regime. D) Percentages of the pastoralists who disagreed, partly agreed and agreed that more autonomy is needed to achieve sustainability.</p

Mixed-effect models of sustainability outcomes.

<p>(A) proportion of calf slaughter (B) slaughter weights of calves, and (C) livelihood income. The response variables were modeled with respect to (fixed factors): herd size, seasonal siida stability, pasture size (summer and winter size) and the inequality in herd size (summer and winter Gini). Summer pasture nested within winter pasture were modeled as random factors. To allow comparisons of effect sizes, all variables were standardized to mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one prior to the analyses.</p><p>−/Fixed effects removed by model simplification based on AIC.</p

The ghost of development past : the impact of economic security policies on Saami pastoral ecosystems

To ensure economic viability over time, any efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals need to reconcile conservation with development interventions. Particularly, in marginal and risk prone areas erosion of resilience could make production systems more susceptible to environmental risks that compromise the economic security. By longitudinal analyses of long-term data records we investigated the impacts of big push policies on Saami pastoral ecosystems in Arctic Norway. The big push was accompanied by reindeer herd accumulation and a corresponding degradation of resilience, increasing the susceptibility to herd losses to predators and adverse winters. For the last 20 years the Norwegian government has worked to halt degradation of pasture ecosystems and reduce susceptibility to environmental risks. These intended win-win policies have mainly been based on economic incentives, which have been developed together with Saami pastoralists through negotiated agreements. We argue that the continued degradation of the Saami pastoral ecosystems is a “ghost of the development past”, as the big push policies have resulted in an economic security trap (EST). The gradual reduction of resilience has persisted as the ex post payments of disaster relief and predator compensation have impeded the long-term actions to reduce susceptibility to environmental risks, i.e., ex ante policies, thereby increasing dependency on elevated economic inputs to manage the risks. The transfer of liability for managing risks to the benefactor, both through ex ante and ex post policies, has further discouraged and constrained opportunities for adaptation by the pastoralists