Grand Strategic Folly

Streaming video requires Flash Player, RealPlayer, or Windows Media Player to view.Mearsheimer discussed how when the Cold War ended in 1989, there was much optimism about the future of international politics, and especially America's ability to lead the world toward the millennium. Two decades later, pessimism has replaced optimism, as the United States finds itself in losing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and unable to get Israel, Iran and North Korea to change their behavior on matters of critical importance to Washington. Mearsheimer will attempt to explain what went wrong and what can be done to fix the problems plaguing U.S. foreign policy.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent Web page, streaming video, event photo

Major Powers and Militarized Conflict

This article attempts to answer the question of why major powers engage in more active foreign policy behaviors than minor powers. It does so by comparing two explanations for the increased conflict propensity of major powers. The first explanation focuses on major powers’ observable capabilities, while the second stresses their different behavior. We incorporate both into an ultimatum model of conflict in which a state’s cost of conflict consists of both observable and behavioral components. Using data from the period from 1870 to 2001, we empirically illustrate the observable and behavioral differences between major and minor powers. We then utilize a decomposition model to assess the relative significance of the two explanations. The results suggest that most of the difference in conflict propensity between major and minor powers can be attributed to observable differences

Comparing the Anglo-American and Israeli-American special relationships in the Obama era: an alliance persistence perspective

The Anglo-American and Israeli-American security relationships have proved to be unusually close and have confounded expectations that they would wither away with the changing international environment. In order to explain this, the article proposes a theory of ‘alliance persistence’ that is based on reciprocity over shared geostrategic interests, sentimental attachments and institutionalized security relations. The article employs this theoretical framework to explore how Anglo-American and Israeli-American relations have developed during the Obama administration. It argues that the Anglo-American relationship has been closer because of the two countries’ shared strategic interests, whilst the Israeli-American relationship has experienced divergences in how the security interests of the two sides have been pursued. The article concludes by assessing how the two relationships will fair in the post-Obama era and argues that there are numerous areas of tension in the US-Israeli relationship that risk future tensions. Keywords: Alliance, US-UK, US-Israel, Special Relationship, Obam