Entry Regulation and the Influence of an Incumbent Special Interest Group

The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other entry deterrence models, we are able to investigate how product market rivalry affects the regulator's equilibrium entry decision, firms' output decisions, entry deterring activities and equilibrium welfare. We find that in equilibrium more collusive industries tend to lobby more but that the regulator attempts to compensate for weak price rivalry by allowing greater entry. The latter effect tends to offset the former, possibly entirely so that the overall welfare effect is ambiguous.entry regulation, entry deterrence, incumbent lobby group, Quasi-Cournot conjectural variation.

Competition between Intermediated and Direct Trade and the Timing of Disintermediation

This paper analyses how intermediation by a middleman who buys from sellers and sells to buyers is affected if direct trade between buyers and sellers becomes possible. Without coordination among sellers and buyers, disintermediation may not occur when it would be welfare-improving. With such coordination, disintermediation may occur too early. If direct trade is active, the supply and demand for intermediation become interdependent: an increase in the bid price thus increases both supply and demand. This process of interdependence by which the two trade mechanisms compete for trade is a feature of competing markets generally

The Role of EZH2 in the Regulation of the Activity of Matrix Metalloproteinases in Prostate Cancer Cells

Degradation of the extracellular matrix (ECM), a critical step in cancer metastasis, is determined by the balance between MMPs (matrix metalloproteinases) and their inhibitors TIMPs (tissue inhibitors of metalloproteinases). In cancer cells, this balance is shifted towards MMPs, promoting ECM degradation. Here, we show that EZH2 plays an active role in this process by repressing the expression of TIMP2 and TIMP3 in prostate cancer cells. The TIMP genes are derepressed by knockdown of EZH2 expression in human prostate cancer cells but repressed by overexpression of EZH2 in benign human prostate epithelial cells. EZH2 catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation and subsequent DNA methylation of the TIMP gene promoters. Overexpression of EZH2 confers an invasive phenotype on benign prostate epithelial cells; however, this phenotype is suppressed by cooverexpression of TIMP3. EZH2 knockdown markedly reduces the proteolytic activity of MMP-9, thereby decreasing the invasive activity of prostate cancer cells. These results suggest that the transcriptional repression of the TIMP genes by EZH2 may be a major mechanism to shift the MMPs/TIMPs balance in favor of MMP activity and thus to promote ECM degradation and subsequent invasion of prostate cancer cells

Standards of competition in the Irish economy

This paper argues that the Irish economy is characterised by high levels of industrial concentration and weak competition. Competition rules introduced in 1991 and strengthened in 1996 have had a significant effect in many markets, but the most extremely anti-competitive markets have remained from these rules. In some instances, political lobbying has resulted in unjustified protection from competition. The paper recommends that further improvements to competition rules are required and, most importantly, that all sectors of the economy should be exposed to these rules in a way that is not susceptible to political interference

Inventory holdings by a monopolist middleman

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020