Audition in vampire bats, Desmodus rotundus

1. Within the tonotopic organization of the inferior colliculus two frequency ranges are well represented: a frequency range within that of the echolocation signals from 50 to 100 kHz, and a frequency band below that of the echolocation sounds, from 10 to 35 kHz. The frequency range between these two bands, from about 40 to 50 kHz is distinctly underrepresented (Fig. 3B). 2. Units with BFs in the lower frequency range (10–25 kHz) were most sensitive with thresholds of -5 to -11 dB SPL, and units with BFs within the frequency range of the echolocation signals had minimal thresholds around 0 dB SPL (Fig. 1). 3. In the medial part of the rostral inferior colliculus units were encountered which preferentially or exclusively responded to noise stimuli. — Seven neurons were found which were only excited by human breathing noises and not by pure tones, frequency modulated signals or various noise bands. These neurons were considered as a subspeciality of the larger sample of noise-sensitive neurons. — The maximal auditory sensitivity in the frequency range below that of echolocation, and the conspicuous existence of noise and breathing-noise sensitive units in the inferior colliculus are discussed in context with the foraging behavior of vampire bats

Size constancy in bat biosonar?

Perception and encoding of object size is an important feature of sensory systems. In the visual system object size is encoded by the visual angle (visual aperture) on the retina, but the aperture depends on the distance of the object. As object distance is not unambiguously encoded in the visual system, higher computational mechanisms are needed. This phenomenon is termed "size constancy". It is assumed to reflect an automatic re-scaling of visual aperture with perceived object distance. Recently, it was found that in echolocating bats, the 'sonar aperture', i.e., the range of angles from which sound is reflected from an object back to the bat, is unambiguously perceived and neurally encoded. Moreover, it is well known that object distance is accurately perceived and explicitly encoded in bat sonar. Here, we addressed size constancy in bat biosonar, recruiting virtual-object techniques. Bats of the species Phyllostomus discolor learned to discriminate two simple virtual objects that only differed in sonar aperture. Upon successful discrimination, test trials were randomly interspersed using virtual objects that differed in both aperture and distance. It was tested whether the bats spontaneously assigned absolute width information to these objects by combining distance and aperture. The results showed that while the isolated perceptual cues encoding object width, aperture, and distance were all perceptually well resolved by the bats, the animals did not assign absolute width information to the test objects. This lack of sonar size constancy may result from the bats relying on different modalities to extract size information at different distances. Alternatively, it is conceivable that familiarity with a behaviorally relevant, conspicuous object is required for sonar size constancy, as it has been argued for visual size constancy. Based on the current data, it appears that size constancy is not necessarily an essential feature of sonar perception in bats

Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A case study

In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input-output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness