Free will, temptation, and self-control: We must believe in free will, we have no choice (Isaac B. Singer).

Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs (2007) sketch a theory of free will as the humanability to exert self-control. Self-control can produce goal-directed behavior, which free will conceptualized as random behavior cannot. We question whether consumer psychology can shed light on the ontological question of whether free will exists. We suggest that it is more fruitful for consumer psychology to examine consumers' belief in freewill. Specifically, we propose that this belief arises from consumers' phenomenological experience of exercising self-control in the face of moral or intertemporal conflicts of will. Based on extant literature in philosophy, psychology, and economics, we offer both a narrower conceptualization of the nature of self-control problems and a more general conceptualization of self-control strategies, involving not only will power but also precommitment. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of consumers' belief in free will.

More Intense Experiences, Less Intense Forecasts: Why People Overweight Probability Specifications in Affective Forecasts

We propose that affective forecasters overestimate the extent to which experienced hedonic responses to an outcome are influenced by the probability of its occurrence. The experience of an outcome (e.g., winning a gamble) is typically more affectively intense than the simulation of that outcome (e.g., imagining winning a gamble) upon which the affective forecast for it is based. We suggest that, as a result, experiencers allocate a larger share of their attention toward the outcome (e.g., winning the gamble) and less to its probability specifications than do affective forecasters. Consequently, hedonic responses to an outcome are less sensitive to its probability specifications than are affective forecasts for that outcome. The results of 6 experiments provide support for our theory. Affective forecasters overestimated how sensitive experiencers would be to the probability of positive and negative outcomes (Experiments 1 and 2). Consistent with our attentional account, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications disappeared when the attention of forecasters was diverted from probability specifications (Experiment 3) or when the attention of experiencers was drawn toward probability specifications (Experiment 4). Finally, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications between forecasters and experiencers were diminished when the forecasted outcome was more affectively intense (Experiments 5 and 6)

You call it ‘Self-Exuberance,’ I call it ‘Bragging.’ Miscalibrated Predictions of Emotional Responses to Self-Promotion

People engage in self-promotional behavior because they want others to hold favorable images of them. Self-promotion, however, entails a tradeoff between conveying one’s positive attributes and being seen as bragging. We propose that people get this tradeoff wrong because they erroneously project their own feelings onto their interaction partners. As a consequence, people overestimate the extent to which recipients of their self-promotion will feel proud of and happy for them, and underestimate the extent to which recipients will feel annoyed (Experiment 1 and 2). Because people tend to self-promote excessively when trying to make a favorable impression on others, such efforts often backfire, causing targets of the self-promotion to view the self-promoter as less likeable and as a braggart (Experiment 3)

Tightwads and spendthrifts.

Consumers often behave differently than they would ideally like to behave. We propose that an anticipatory pain of paying drives "tightwads" to spend less than they would ideally like to spend. "Spendthrifts," by contrast, experience too little pain of paying and typically spend more than they would ideally like to spend. This article introduces and validates the "spendthrift-tightwad" scale, a measure of individual differences in the pain of paying. Spending differences between tightwads and spendthrifts are greatest in situations that amplify the pain of paying and smallest in situations that diminish the pain of paying. They were so skewed and squint-eyed in their minds, their misering or extravagance mocked all reason. (Dante's Inferno, "Canto VII: The Hoarders and the Wasters") E conomic models of decision making are consequentialist in nature. They assume that decision makers choose between alternative courses of action based on a cognitive evaluation of the desirability (i.e., "utility") and likelihood of their consequences. This does not, however, imply that consequentialist decision makers are devoid of *Scott I. Rick ([email protected]) is a visiting professor of operations and information management at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Tightwads and spendthrifts.

Consumers often behave differently than they would ideally like to behave. We propose that an anticipatory pain of paying drives "tightwads" to spend less than they would ideally like to spend. "Spendthrifts," by contrast, experience too little pain of paying and typically spend more than they would ideally like to spend. This article introduces and validates the "spendthrift-tightwad" scale, a measure of individual differences in the pain of paying. Spending differences between tightwads and spendthrifts are greatest in situations that amplify the pain of paying and smallest in situations that diminish the pain of paying. They were so skewed and squint-eyed in their minds, their misering or extravagance mocked all reason. (Dante's Inferno, "Canto VII: The Hoarders and the Wasters") E conomic models of decision making are consequentialist in nature. They assume that decision makers choose between alternative courses of action based on a cognitive evaluation of the desirability (i.e., "utility") and likelihood of their consequences. This does not, however, imply that consequentialist decision makers are devoid of *Scott I. Rick ([email protected]) is a visiting professor of operations and information management at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribution of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective probabilities

People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities

Order effects in the IAT

We demonstrate that the IAT is crucially influenced by the order in which the two IAT-blocks are administered. In three studies the IAT-effect is shown to change in magnitude and sign when the order of the ‘compatible’ and the ‘incompatible’ block is reversed. Order effects are caused by cognitive inertia, the difficulty to switch from one categorization rule to another categorization rule. Cognitive inertia distorts correlations between IAT-scores and other variables. While the common practice of counterbalancing block-order between-subjects does not cancel out these distortions, we show in study 4 that counterbalancing block-order repeatedly within-subjects can eliminate order effects

Extreme malleability of preferences: absolute preference sign changes under uncertainty

Malleability of preferences is a central tenet of behavioral decision theory. How malleable preferences really are, however, is a topic of debate. Do preference reversals imply preference construction? We argue that to claim preferences are construed, a demonstration of more extreme preference malleability than simple preference reversals is required: absolute preference sign changes within participants. If respondents value a prospect positively in 1 condition but negatively in a different condition, preferences cannot be considered stable. Such absolute preference sign changes are possible under uncertainty. In 2 incentive‐compatible experiments, we found participants were willing to pay to take part in a gamble and also demanded to be compensated to take part in a subsequent gamble with identical outcomes and probabilities. Such absolute preference sign changes within participants led to simultaneous risk aversion and risk seeking for the same risky prospect, suggesting that, at least in the domain of risky decisions, consumers' preferences are indeed malleable and construed

Cognitive inertia and the implicit association test

The authors review the implicit association test (IAT), its use in marketing, and the methodology and validity issues that surround it. They focus on a validity problem that has not been investigated previously, namely, the impact of cognitive inertia on IAT effects. Cognitive inertia refers to the difficulty in switching from one categorization rule to another, which causes IAT effects to depend on the order of administration of the two IAT blocks. In Study 1, the authors observe an IAT effect when the compatible block precedes the incompatible block but not when it follows the incompatible block. In Studies 2 and 3, the IAT effect changes its sign when the order of the blocks reverses. Cognitive inertia distorts individual IAT scores and diminishes the correlations between IAT scores and predictor variables when the block order is counterbalanced between subjects. Study 4 shows that counterbalancing the block order repeatedly within subjects can eliminate cognitive inertia effects on the individual level. The authors conclude that researchers should either interpret IAT scores at the aggregate level or, if individual IAT scores are of interest, counterbalance the block order repeatedly within subjects