Livestock trade networks for guiding animal health surveillance

BACKGROUND: Trade in live animals can contribute to the introduction of exotic diseases, the maintenance and spread endemic diseases. Annually millions of animals are moved across Europe for the purposes of breeding, fattening and slaughter. Data on the number of animals moved were obtained from the Directorate General Sanco (DG Sanco) for 2011. These were converted to livestock units to enable direct comparison across species and their movements were mapped, used to calculate the indegrees and outdegrees of 27 European countries and the density and transitivity of movements within Europe. This provided the opportunity to discuss surveillance of European livestock movement taking into account stopping points en-route. RESULTS: High density and transitivity of movement for registered equines, breeding and fattening cattle, breeding poultry and pigs for breeding, fattening and slaughter indicates that hazards have the potential to spread quickly within these populations. This is of concern to highly connected countries particularly those where imported animals constitute a large proportion of their national livestock populations, and have a high indegree. The transport of poultry (older than 72 hours) and unweaned animals would require more rest breaks than the movement of weaned animals, which may provide more opportunities for disease transmission. Transitivity is greatest for animals transported for breeding purposes with cattle, pigs and poultry having values of over 50%. CONCLUSIONS: This paper demonstrated that some species (pigs and poultry) are traded much more frequently and at a larger scale than species such as goats. Some countries are more vulnerable than others due to importing animals from many countries, having imported animals requiring rest-breaks and importing large proportions of their national herd or flock. Such knowledge about the vulnerability of different livestock systems related to trade movements can be used to inform the design of animal health surveillance systems to facilitate the trade in animals between European member states. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12917-015-0354-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users

Enhancing epidemiological surveillance of the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant using spike gene target failure data, England, 15 November to 31 December 2021

When SARS-CoV-2 Omicron emerged in 2021, S gene target failure enabled differentiation between Omicron and the dominant Delta variant. In England, where S gene target surveillance (SGTS) was already established, this led to rapid identification (within ca 3 days of sample collection) of possible Omicron cases, alongside real-time surveillance and modelling of Omicron growth. SGTS was key to public health action (including case identification and incident management), and we share applied insights on how and when to use SGTS

Climate, human behaviour or environment: individual-based modelling of Campylobacter seasonality and strategies to reduce disease burden

Acknowledgements: We thank colleagues within the Modelling, Evidence and Policy Research Group for useful feedback on this manuscript. Competing interests: The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Availability of data and materials: The R code used in this research is available at https://gitlab.com/rasanderson/campylobacter-microsimulation; it is platform independent, R version 3.3.0 and above. Funding: This research was funded by Medical Research Council Grant, Natural Environment Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council, Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, and the Food Standards Agency through the Environmental and Social Ecology of Human Infectious Diseases Initiative (Sources, seasonality, transmission and control: Campylobacter and human behaviour in a changing environment (ENIGMA); Grant Reference G1100799-1). PRH, SJO’B, and IRL are funded in part by the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Gastrointestinal Infection, at the University of Liverpool. PRH and IRL are also funded in part by the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness and Response, at King’s College London. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR, the Department of Health or Public Health England.Peer reviewedPublisher PD