Option Exercise with Temptation

This paper analyzes an agent¡¯s option exercise decision under uncertainty. The agent decides whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by immediate gratification and suffers from self-control problems. This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer self- control utility model. Unlike the time inconsistent hyperbolic discounting model, it provides an explanation of procrastination and preproperation based on time consistency. When applied to the investment and exit problems, it is shown that (i) if the project value is immediate, an investor may invest in negative NPV projects; (ii) if the production cost is immediate, a firm may exit even if it makes positive net profits; and (iii) if both rewards and costs are immediate, an agent may simply follow the myopic rule which compares only the current period benefit and cost.self-control, temptation, procrastination, preproperation, option value

Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks

This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of sequential competitive equilibria is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any sequential competitive equilibrium, there exists a payoff equivalent sequential competitive equilibrium that is generated by a suitably defined recursive equilibrium with state variables including continuation value.competitive equilibrium, recursive equilibrium, aggregate distribution, heterogeneity, incomplete markets

Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks

This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks and with a continuum of consumers subject to borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a first period payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive equilibrium with the state space including expected discounted utilities.

Risk, uncertainty and option exercise

Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors utility model. We show that the impact of ambiguity on the option exercise decision depends on the relative degrees of ambiguity about continuation payoffs and termination payoffs. Consequently, ambiguity may accelerate or delay option exercise. We apply our results to firm investment and exit problems, and show that the myopic NPV rule can be optimal for an agent having an extremely high degree of ambiguity aversion.