"The silent revolution": how the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending

his paper examines how the staff exercise informal governance over lending decisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). The essential component of designing any IMF program, assessing the extent to which a borrowing country is likely to fulfill its policy commitments, is based partly on informal staff judgments subject to informal incentives and normative orientations not dictated by formal rules and procedures. Moreover, when country officials are unable to commit to policy goals of the IMF, the IMF staff may bypass the formal channel of policy dialogue through informal contacts and negotiations with more like-minded actors outside the policymaking process. Exercising informal governance in these ways, the staff are motived by informal career advancement incentives and normative orientations associated with the organization’s culture to provide favorable treatment to borrowers composed of policy teams sympathetic toward their policy goals. The presence of these sympathetic interlocutors provides the staff both with greater confidence a lending program will achieve success and an opportunity to support officials who share their policy beliefs. I assess these arguments using a new dataset that proxies shared policy beliefs based on the professional characteristics of IMF staff and developing country officials. The evidence supports these arguments: larger loan commitments are extended to countries where government officials and the Fund staff share similar professional training. The analysis implies informal governance operates in IOs not just via state influence but also through the evolving makeup, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs

Professional ties that bind: how normative orientations shape IMF conditionality

Staff play a key part in designing IMF conditionality, and yet the literature provides a narrow view of their motivations. This article shows how the design of IMF conditionality is linked to the normative orientations of the staff and their common professional training. Professional ties from similar training help to bind the staff together around a shared set of normative orientations that inform the IMF's policy goals. When borrowing-country officials do not share these orientations, the staff are motivated to tighten conditionality. This behaviour also fits with staff concerns about time-inconsistency and moral hazard. I find robust statistical support for this argument using a dataset based on the professional ties that exist between the IMF staff and borrowing-country officials. Yet conditionality is not found to be more lenient when country officials share the normative orientations of the IMF staff. Staff concerns about time-inconsistent preferences and moral hazard likely weigh against more lenient treatment where normative adherence is stronger

Fashions and Fads in Finance: Contingent Emulation and the Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Fund Creation

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-owned or managed investment vehicles, have proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as political controversy has surrounded them. Why? The extant literature depicts the process of SWF creation as driven by functional imperatives associated with “excess” revenue and reserves accumulated from commodity booms and large current account surpluses. I argue that SWF creation also reflects in large part a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been constructed as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries took on these characteristics, they followed their peers. Put simply, fashions and fads in finance matter for policy diffusion. I assess this argument using a new dataset on SWF creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results suggest peer-based contingent emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to create a SWF, especially among fuel exporters

Great expectations, veto players, and the changing politics of banking crises

How have the politics of banking crises changed over the long run? Unlike existing static accounts, we offer a dynamic theory emphasizing how the emergence of voters’ “great expectations” after the 1930s concerning crisis prevention and mitigation reshaped the politics of banking crises in many democratic countries. We argue that both variations over time, centred on the emergence of these expectations, and variations within democratic countries, based on how veto players constrain policy change, exerted an important influence on the propensity of voters to punish incumbent political parties in the aftermath of banking crises. We find strong support for our argument using a new dataset of 100 democratic countries from 1831 – 2011. Political punishment in the aftermath of a banking crisis is mainly a modern phenomenon and is most evident in systems with polarized veto players

Neoliberalism and banking crisis bailouts: distant enemies or warring neighbors?

How should we understand proliferating government bailouts of financial firms in successive crises since the 1970s and the rise of neoliberal norms opposing such discretionary public assistance? We argue that the relationship between bailouts and neoliberalism is one of mutually reinforcing coexistence. First, a new “bailout coalition” including much of the middle class has emerged in many countries over the past century, pushing governments to deliver extensive bailouts in crises. Second, many actors, including some within the bailout coalition, view neoliberal policy norms as a useful constraint on public assistance to other groups. This is especially visible during foreign crises. Third, governments often manage these conflicting pressures via a strategy of institutional “conversion,” adapting institutions and rules associated with neoliberalism to new purposes. This has generated rising costs, including declining policy coherence, increasing financial fragility, and rising distributional and identity conflict

Networked default: public debt, trade embeddedness, and partisan survival in democracies since 1870

Sovereign default is often associated with the downfall of incumbent governments in democratic polities. Existing scholarship directs attention to the relationship between default and domestic politics and institutions rather than the broader international environment wherein repayment and default take place. We explore the possibility that the impact of a country’s decision to default on partisan survival will also be shaped by the prevalence of default amongst its peers in its local network. Illustrating this line of reasoning with international trade, our results support the argument that given networked default, voters see national default as a lost strategic opportunity to elevate a country’s reputation and are more inclined to punish incumbent regimes who fail to repay. These results are inconsistent with an alternative possibility — that networked default might contribute to the decay of a repayment norm and thus provide a justifiable “excuse” for default at home. Furthermore, our results are robust to alternative measures of regime governance and entropy balancing in light of systematic differences between defaulting and non-defaulting regimes. Overall, our findings point to the political interdependence of default and repayment and the need for political scientists to take greater account of network effects in analyzing the consequences of economic misbehavior

Do international non-governmental organizations inhibit globalization? the case of capital account liberalization in developing countries

Why do countries liberalize capital controls? The literature identifies a range of possible reasons. Yet despite considerable advances, the impact of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) has yet to be considered. In fact, surprisingly, systematic analysis of the role of INGOs in the diffusion of economic openness, financial or otherwise, has not been pursued previously. We offer the first such analysis by advancing the idea of “climatic mimesis,” which refers to the cultural climate for policymaking that results from country ties to INGO. INGOs shape capital account regulation by altering the cultural climate in a country such that liberalization becomes a more problematic policy choice. Our statistical analysis of data from developing countries reveals that INGO-ties inhibited liberalization as did relatively high public debt and concentrated domestic banking sectors. The presence of an IMF program and liberalization by economic competitors encouraged it. We suggest these findings have important implications for understanding the potential for convergence and divergence in an era of globalization

Great expectations, financialization and bank bailouts in democracies

Accelerating financialization and rising societal wealth have meant that democratic governments increasingly provide bailouts following banking crises. Using a new long-run data set, we show that despite frequent and virulent crises before World War II, bank bailouts to protect wealth were then exceptionally rare. In recent decades, by contrast, governments have increasingly opted for extensive bailouts—well before the major interventions of 2007–2009. We argue that this policy shift is the consequence of the “great expectations” of middle-class voters overlooked in existing accounts. Associated with the growing financialization of wealth, rising leverage, and accumulating ex ante financial stabilization commitments by governments, these expectations are suggestive of substantially altered policy preferences and political cleavages. Since the 1970s, when severe banking crises returned as an important threat to middle-class wealth, this “pressure from below” has led elected governments to provide increasingly costly bailouts with no historical precedent

Banking crises and politics: a long run perspective

Are the policy responses to the financial crises of 2007-9 and the political events that followed them exceptional? We show that over the course of nearly 150 years, severe banking crises have become increasingly consequential for policy and politics in democracies. First, governments have come much more likely over time to opt for extensive bailouts and other policies aimed at wealth protection during crises. Second, the inclination of voters to punish governments that are in office when crises occur has also increased sharply over time. We argue that the main cause of these developments is the rise of ‘great expectations’ among large segments of society in modern democracies regarding the protection of wealth in the post-1945 era, especially since the 1970s. From this time, severe banking crises returned as an important threat to this wealth, resulting in rising ‘mass pressure from below’ on governments to provide costly bailouts and with increasingly powerful political effects