Virtue, Reason, and Principle

A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity, and that the virtues are traits of character which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or well. The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to some independent goal or end which they enable people to attain. Some recent philosophers seem to have hoped that by following this perfectionist strategy, we might attain a more convincing account of our moral practices than rule-based theories of ethics have been able to provide

Raloxifene neutralizes bone brittleness induced by anti-remodeling treatment and increases fatigue life through non-cell mediated mechanisms

Pre-clinical data have shown that tissue level effects stemming from bisphosphonateinduced suppression of bone remodeling can result in bone that is stronger yet more brittle. Raloxifene has been shown to reduce bone brittleness through non-cellular mechanisms. The goal of this work was to test the hypothesis that raloxifene can reverse the bone brittleness resulting from bisphosphonate treatment. Dog and mouse bone from multiple bisphosphonate dosing experiments were soaked in raloxifene and then assessed for mechanical properties. Mice treated with zoledronate in vivo had lower post-yield mechanical properties compared to controls. Raloxifene soaking had significant positive effects on select mechanical properties of bones from both vehicle and zoledronate treated mice. Although the effects were blunted in zoledronate bones relative to vehicle, the soaking was sufficient to normalize properties to control levels. Additional studies showed that raloxifene-soaked bones had a significant positive effect on cycles to failure (+114%) compared to control-soaked mouse bone. Finally, raloxifene soaking significantly improved select properties of ribs from dogs treated for 3 years with alendronate. These data show that ex vivo soaking in raloxifene can act through non-cellular mechanisms to enhance mechanical properties of bone previously treated with bisphosphonate. We also document that the positive effects of raloxifene soaking extend to enhancing fatigue properties of bone

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target’s wrongdoing must some of “one’s business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing.” Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone’s standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer’s action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non-hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our "moral fragility", the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the "equality of persons"

The Revised TESS Input Catalog and Candidate Target List

We describe the catalogs assembled and the algorithms used to populate the revised TESS Input Catalog (TIC), based on the incorporation of the Gaia second data release. We also describe a revised ranking system for prioritizing stars for 2-minute cadence observations, and assemble a revised Candidate Target List (CTL) using that ranking. The TIC is available on the Mikulski Archive for Space Telescopes (MAST) server, and an enhanced CTL is available through the Filtergraph data visualization portal system at the URL http://filtergraph.vanderbilt.edu/tess_ctl.Comment: 30 pages, 16 figures, submitted to AAS Journals; provided to the community in advance of publication in conjunction with public release of the TIC/CTL on 28 May 201

What is epistemic blame?

PostprintPeer reviewe

Cops, Teachers, and the Art of the Impossible: Explaining the lack of diffusion of impossible job innovations

In their now classic Impossible Jobs in Public Management, Hargrove and Glidewell (1990) argue that public agencies with limited legitimacy, high conflict, low professional authority, and weak agency myths have essentially impossible jobs. Leaders of such agencies can do little more than cope, which is also a theme of James Q. Wilson (1989), among others. Yet in the years since publication of Impossible Jobs, one such position, that of police commissioner has proven possible. Over a sustained 17-year period, the New York City Police Department has achieved dramatic reductions in crime with relatively few political repercussions, as described by Kelling and Sousa (2001). A second impossible job discussed by Wilson and also by Frederick Hess (1999), city school superintendent, has also proven possible, with Houston and Edmonton having considerable academic success educating disadvantaged children. In addition, Atlanta and Pittsburgh enjoyed significant success in elementary schooling, though the gains were short-lived for reasons we will describe. More recently, under Michelle Rhee, Washington D.C. schools have made the most dramatic gains among city school systems. These successes in urban crime control and public schooling have not been widely copied. Accordingly, we argue that the real conundrum of impossible jobs is why agency leaders fail to copy successful innovations. Building on the work of Teodoro (2009), we will discuss how the relative illegitimacy of clients and inflexibility of personnel systems combine with the professional norms, job mobility and progressive ambition of agency leaders to limit the diffusion of innovations in law enforcement and schooling. We will conclude with ideas about how to overcome these barriers

The normative source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason

The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility

Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the scientific findings indicate that it is not so obvious that our views of free will and responsibility can be grounded in the ability to act for reasons without introducing metaphysical obscurities. This poses a challenge to philosophers. We draw the conclusion that philosophers are wrong not to address the recent scientific developments and that scientists are mistaken in formulating their challenge in terms of the freedom to do otherwise