The Factors of Interest Group Networks and Success: Organization, Issues and Resources

While interest groups use a variety of techniques to exert influence, coalition strategies are the dominant lobbying technique. However, many questions remain about such coalitions. This paper is the second in a series of social network analyses of purposive and coordinated interest group relationships. We utilize a network measure based on cosigner status to United States Supreme Court amicus curiae, or friend of the court briefs. The illuminated structures lend insight into the central players and overall formation of the network over the first several years of the 21st century. The factions are tied together by various central players, who act as hubs, leaving a disparate collection of organizations that work alone. Using an exponential-family random graph model (ERGM), we find that graph-theorectic and organizational characteristics, such as size and budget, as well as policy interests explain interest group network formation

Invaluable Involvement: Purposive Interest Group Networks in the 21st Century

We present the first social network analysis of purposive and coordinated interest group relationships. We utilize a network measure based on cosigner status to United States Supreme Court amicus curiae, or friend of the court briefs. The illuminated structures lend insight into the central players and overall formation of the network over the first seven years of the 21st century. We find that the majority of interest groups primarily partake in coalition strategies with other groups of similar policy interest and ideological character. This is in contrast to previous literature that focused only on one or the other. The factions are tied together by various central players, who act as hubs, leaving a disparate collection of organizations that work alone. Network analysis provides evidence, for example, that the National Wildlife Foundation, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union are all particularly strong groups, but exploit different central roles. Ultimately, our work and data suggest several subsequent questions and opportunities pertaining to the coalition strategies of interest groups

Event dependence in U.S. executions

Since 1976, the United States has seen over 1,400 judicial executions, and these have been highly concentrated in only a few states and counties. The number of executions across counties appears to fit a stretched distribution. These distributions are typically reflective of self-reinforcing processes where the probability of observing an event increases for each previous event. To examine these processes, we employ two-pronged empirical strategy. First, we utilize bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to determine whether the pattern of executions reflect a stretched distribution, and confirm that they do. Second, we test for event-dependence using the Conditional Frailty Model. Our tests estimate the monthly hazard of an execution in a given county, accounting for the number of previous executions, homicides, poverty, and population demographics. Controlling for other factors, we find that the number of prior executions in a county increases the probability of the next execution and accelerates its timing. Once a jurisdiction goes down a given path, the path becomes self-reinforcing, causing the counties to separate out into those never executing (the vast majority of counties) and those which use the punishment frequently. This finding is of great legal and normative concern, and ultimately, may not be consistent with the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution

Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A Proposal

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/63363/1/elj.2007.6202.lowlink.pdf_v03.pd

It Takes Two

Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures. </jats:p

The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas

Who is watching the financial services industry? Since 1980, there have been multiple waves of thought about whether the ministry of finance, the central bank, a specialized regulator or some combination of these should have supervisory authority. These waves have been associated with the convergence of actual practices. How much and through what channels did internationally promoted ideas about supervisory 'best practice' influence institutional design choices? I use a new dataset of 83 countries and jurisdictions between the 1980s and 2007 to examine the diffusion of supervisory ideas. With this data, I employ Cox Proportional Hazard and Competing Risks Event History Analyses to evaluate the possible causal roles best practice policy ideas might have played. I find that banking crises and certain peer groups can encourage policy convergence on heavily promoted ideas