Morphological and physiological profile of elite basketball players in Belgium

PURPOSE: The present study aimed to gain insight into the physiological profile of elite basketball players in Belgium in relation to their position on the field. METHODS: The group consisted of 144 players, divided into 5 groups according to position (point guards [PG], shooting guards [SG], small forwards [SF], power forwards [PF] and centers [C]). The anthropometrics were measured and the subjects underwent fitness tests (incremental running test, 10m-sprint,5x10m,Squat and Counter Movement Jump, isokinetic test) to obtain insight into endurance, speed, agility and power. The parameters of these tests were compared among the different positions by means of one-way variance analysis (MANOVA). Tukey post hoc-tests where performed in case of a significant MANOVA. RESULTS: It was observed that C were taller, heavier and had a higher body fat percentage compared to PG and SG. For the anaerobic sprint test C were slower compared to the other positions. For the 5x10m the PG and SG were faster than SF and PF. For the jump test C displayed a significantly lower absolute performance compared to the other positions. PG and SG had a higher VO2peak and speed at the anaerobic threshold compared to PF and C. The isokinetic strength test showed that the quadriceps muscle group of C could exert a higher torque during the knee extension compared to the other positions. CONCLUSIONS: The present study showed that the physiological profile of elite players in the Belgian first division differs among the position on the field. More specific, guards were characterized by a high endurance, speed and agility, whereas centers and power forwards showed a higher muscular strength compared to the other positions

’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy

This paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game where firms can react to each others’ price changes before the customers arrive. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome features the following comparative static properties. The more similar firms are, the higher the equilibrium price. Further, a new firm that enters the industry or an existing firm that becomes more efficient can raise the equilibrium price. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (‘Sei nett, außer es zahlt sich aus zu kämpfen’: Eine neue Theorie der Preisbestimmung und ihre Bedeutung für die Wettbewerbspolitik) In diesem Beitrag wird die extensive Form eines einfachen Preisspiels vorgestellt, in dem jedes Unternehmen auf Preisänderungen des anderen reagieren kann, bevor die Kunden eintreffen. Das Bertrand-Ergebnis dieses Spiels ist ein Nash-Gleichgewicht, aber es ist nicht notwendigerweise Teilspielperfekt. Das teilspielperfekte Gleichgewicht hat die folgenden komparativ-statischen Eigenschaften. Je ähnlicher die Firmen sind, desto höher ist der Gleichgewichtspreis. Darüber hinaus kann, wenn eine neue Firma in den Markt eintritt oder eine bestehende effizienter wird, der Gleichgewichtspreis steigen.Intermediation; Bertrand paradox, price leadership, mergers, joint dominance, balance of power

Why Is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a "spike" in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.unemployment benefits, spikes

Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.

Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a “spike” in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers’ behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.unemployment benefits, spikes

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers’ preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist’s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer’s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can’t observe a consumer’s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted. For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.Endogenous types, experience goods, addictive goods, price discrimination

Welfare Improving Employment Protection

This paper presents a theoretical model to show that in sectors where workers invest in firm specific knowledge employment protection legislation can raise employment, productivity and welfare. The model also predicts a U-shaped relation between firing costs and unemployment. Finally, it gives a rationale for the observation that more educated workers tend to have better protected jobs.employment protection, human capital, hold-up, reforms, welfare

Tax Policy in a Model of Search with Training

This paper develops a model of search on the labour market with training. The model reveals how the tax system can restore the social optimum if the Hosio s condition is not satisfied in the private equilibrium. Furthermore, the effects are explored of a second-best reform from average to marginal taxes when a given amount of public revenue has to be raised. We find that (i) a marginal wage tax is less distortionary to raise revenue than is an average tax per job, provided that training is not distorted initially; (ii) this conclusion may reverse in the presence of training distortions; (iii) marginal wage taxes are less distortionary in economies characterized by commitment in wage bargaining, such as the European labour market. Hence, tax reforms that reduce the average tax per job and raise the marginal wage tax, such as an EITC or a negative income tax, are more attractive in Europe than in the US.

Competition for traders and risk

The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks' remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank's top executives, and why direct intervention in trader compensation is called for. We present a model with both trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities. We demonstrate that as competition on the labour market for traders intensifies, banks optimally offer top traders contracts inducing them to take more risk, even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative outcomes. In this way, banks can reduce the surplus they have to offer to lower ability traders. In addition, we find that increasing banks' capital requirements does not unambiguously lead to reduced risk-taking by their top traders.