Market Access

The negotiation of improved market access in agriculture is crucial to the success of the Doha Round. The depth of tariff cuts will be the main indication of the level of ambition of the agricultural talks and hence the Round as a whole. Agricultural tariffs remain five times higher than tariffs in industrial goods, and account for the bulk of the distortions in agricultural trade. Recent analysis indicates that 92 percent of the global gains from trade liberalization in agriculture result from removing market access barriers. The July Framework reaffirmed the objective of substantial improvements in market access. This is to be accomplished by a single approach, a tiered (or banded) formula for tariff cuts, with the higher tariff rates being subject to the highest cuts. Negotiations have centered on how many bands to select, where to place the thresholds, and how progressive to make the band-specific reductions. The issue of whether to impose a tariff cap was left undecided in the Framework Agreement. Tariff caps have the advantage of reducing tariffs that are so high that they are little different from an import ban. If the cap is set at a low enough level, real trade improvements may follow. The Framework Agreement specifies that each Member may identify in the schedule a number of products as "Sensitive Products." However, analysis has shown that even exempting as little as two percent of tariff lines from formula based cuts would substantially reduce the expected gains from market access improvements. This points up the need for significant increases in TRQs for Sensitive Products to achieve significant improvements in market access. All tariff lines subject to TRQs, whether or not they are classified as Sensitive Products, should be subject to quota volume expansion. Improving the administration of TRQs and reducing in-quota tariffs are both important objectives for the Doha Round. There is considerable scope to improve the efficiency and transparency of quota regimes. The continued availability of the Special Safeguard for Agriculture by WTO members "remains under negotiation." But abuse of such a safeguard in order to protect domestic producers thwarts the objective of improved market access. Some limitations will need to be introduced if the safeguard is to be continued under the new agreement. The Framework Agreement emphasizes that Special and Differential Treatment is to be an integral part of the market access outcome. This can be ensured by several provisions. Developing countries can specify a number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. The difficulty is in devising concrete criteria for selecting these products. The Framework Agreement also endorses the creation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for developing countries. Tariff cuts in the Doha Round can erode the value of preferences and can have important consequences for some countries. Preference-granting countries could offset the declining value of those preferences either through financial transfers or additional market access for all products from the current preferred exporters. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) should not be required to undertake any reduction commitments, though they might wish to do so for their own economic advantage. Developed countries should provide duty- and quota-free access to LDCs to encourage full integration into the trade system.International Relations/Trade,

Effect of Ginkgo biloba on the labeling of blood elements with technetium-99m: in vitro study

Ginkgo biloba is the phytoterapic most used in popular medicine in the treatment of cerebral senescence. Red blood cells (RBC) labeled with technetium-99m (Tc-99m) is used for several evaluations in nuclear medicine. This labeling depends on a reducing agent, usually the stannous ion. Any drug, which alters the labeling of the tracer, could be expected to modify the disposition of the radiopharmaceutical. We have evaluated the influence of the Ginkgo biloba extract on the labeling of RBC and plasma proteins with Tc-99m. Blood was withdrawn and incubated with Ginkgo biloba extract (0; 0.004; 0.04; 0.4; 4; 20 and 40 mg/ml). Stannous chloride (1.2 ml/ml) was added and, then, Tc-99m was added. Plasma (P) and blood cells (RBC) were isolated, also precipitated with trichloroacetic acid and soluble (SF) and insoluble fractions (IF) separated. The analysis of the results shows that there is a decrease in the radioactivity (from 97.7 ± 0.7 to 49.5 ± 3.9%) in RBC with the drug (4 mg/ml). In the labeling process of RBC with Tc-99m, the stannous and pertechnetate ions pass though the membrane, so, we suggest that the Ginkgo biloba effect can be explained by (i) an inhibition of the transport of these ions, (ii) damage in membrane, (iii) competition with the cited ions for the same binding sites, or (iv) possible generation of reactive oxygen species that could oxidize the stannous ion

Essays On International Trade: Subsidies, Tariffs And The World Trade Organization

The essays that compose this dissertation investigate the economic distortions caused by subsidies and tariffs under the prism of negotiation and litigation processes at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chapter 1, Potential Impacts of the WTO Doha Round on the Cotton Sector, assesses the price, production and trade effects of reforming cotton subsidies and tariffs under alternative scenarios. While the WTO Doha Round could have a positive impact on world cotton prices and contribute to the expansion of cotton production and exports in developing countries, the likelihood of such an outcome is dependent on the depth of global subsidy reductions. The poor record of internal policy reforms in subsidizing countries and the failure of the US to comply with WTO recommendations in the US Upland Cotton dispute highlight the importance of trade negotiations in addressing the profound distortions that characterize the world cotton market. Chapter 2, International Experience with Agricultural Export Taxes, analyzes the evolution in the use of agricultural export taxes by developing countries, with a primary focus on Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand. Empirical evidence indicates that export taxes are ultimately selfdefeating. While they may generate government revenue and curb domestic prices in the short run, they shift economic incentives, discourage the adoption of improved inputs, and adversely affect yield and output in the long run. Argentina, in particular, turned a blind eye on comparative advantage and eluded development opportunities by heftily taxing agricultural exports for most of the last 100 years. Finally, Chapter 3, Measurement of Ethanol Subsidies and Associated Economic Distortions: An Analysis of Brazilian and US Policies, is the only systematic, detailed and quantified comparative examination of ethanol support in the US and Brazil. US ethanol support reached US$57 billion in 2002-2011 and was vulnerable to litigation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, as it depressed world prices, slashed imports, reduced production overseas, and significantly increased the US share of the world market. By contrast, Brazilian support reached US$ 27 billion in the same period and was not susceptible to WTO litigation, as it did not cause adverse effects to the interests of other countries

Measurement of ethanol subsidies and associated economic distortions: an analysis of Brazilian and U.S. policies

The objectives of this study were to measure the subsidy equivalent value of ethanol policies in the United States and Brazil, and estimate the magnitude of associated economic distortions. For 2002-11, average annual ethanol subsidy levels were US$7.2 billion in the United States and US$2.1 billion in Brazil. Brazilian support measures for ethanol increased the world price by 2.7% on average in this period, which expanded out put in both countries (1.2% in the United States and 5.3% in Brazil), reduced U.S. consumption by 4.7% and increased Brazilian consumption by 16.1%. On the other hand, U.S. ethanol policies depressed world prices by 2.4% on average in the same period, which boosted consumption in both countries (by 2.5% in the United States and 1.3% in Brazil), expanded U.S. production by 8.3%, but reduced Brazilian out put by 4.7%. Although both countries changed their policies in 2012, distortions remain

Measurement of ethanol subsidies and associated economic distortions: an analysis of Brazilian and U.S. policies

The objectives of this study were to measure the subsidy equivalent value of ethanol policies in the United States and Brazil, and estimate the magnitude of associated economic distortions. For 2002-11, average annual ethanol subsidy levels were US$7.2 billion in the United States and US$2.1 billion in Brazil. Brazilian support measures for ethanol increased the world price by 2.7% on average in this period, which expanded out put in both countries (1.2% in the United States and 5.3% in Brazil), reduced U.S. consumption by 4.7% and increased Brazilian consumption by 16.1%. On the other hand, U.S. ethanol policies depressed world prices by 2.4% on average in the same period, which boosted consumption in both countries (by 2.5% in the United States and 1.3% in Brazil), expanded U.S. production by 8.3%, but reduced Brazilian out put by 4.7%. Although both countries changed their policies in 2012, distortions remain

Agriculture in Brazil and China : challenges and opportunities

COMERCIO AGRICOLA, EXPORTACIONES

Market Access

The negotiation of improved market access in agriculture is crucial to the success of the Doha Round. The depth of tariff cuts will be the main indication of the level of ambition of the agricultural talks and hence the Round as a whole. Agricultural tariffs remain five times higher than tariffs in industrial goods, and account for the bulk of the distortions in agricultural trade. Recent analysis indicates that 92 percent of the global gains from trade liberalization in agriculture result from removing market access barriers. The July Framework reaffirmed the objective of substantial improvements in market access. This is to be accomplished by a single approach, a tiered (or banded) formula for tariff cuts, with the higher tariff rates being subject to the highest cuts. Negotiations have centered on how many bands to select, where to place the thresholds, and how progressive to make the band-specific reductions. The issue of whether to impose a tariff cap was left undecided in the Framework Agreement. Tariff caps have the advantage of reducing tariffs that are so high that they are little different from an import ban. If the cap is set at a low enough level, real trade improvements may follow. The Framework Agreement specifies that each Member may identify in the schedule a number of products as "Sensitive Products." However, analysis has shown that even exempting as little as two percent of tariff lines from formula based cuts would substantially reduce the expected gains from market access improvements. This points up the need for significant increases in TRQs for Sensitive Products to achieve significant improvements in market access. All tariff lines subject to TRQs, whether or not they are classified as Sensitive Products, should be subject to quota volume expansion. Improving the administration of TRQs and reducing in-quota tariffs are both important objectives for the Doha Round. There is considerable scope to improve the efficiency and transparency of quota regimes. The continued availability of the Special Safeguard for Agriculture by WTO members "remains under negotiation." But abuse of such a safeguard in order to protect domestic producers thwarts the objective of improved market access. Some limitations will need to be introduced if the safeguard is to be continued under the new agreement. The Framework Agreement emphasizes that Special and Differential Treatment is to be an integral part of the market access outcome. This can be ensured by several provisions. Developing countries can specify a number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. The difficulty is in devising concrete criteria for selecting these products. The Framework Agreement also endorses the creation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for developing countries. Tariff cuts in the Doha Round can erode the value of preferences and can have important consequences for some countries. Preference-granting countries could offset the declining value of those preferences either through financial transfers or additional market access for all products from the current preferred exporters. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) should not be required to undertake any reduction commitments, though they might wish to do so for their own economic advantage. Developed countries should provide duty- and quota-free access to LDCs to encourage full integration into the trade system