The Economics of Free and Open Source Software: Contributions to a Government Policy on Open Source Software

This document seeks to lay the groundwork for a government policy on free and open source software. We briefly characterize the extent of the open source software phenomenon. We analyse its pros and cons for the government, in its role as both an engine of economic development and a large user of information and communications technologies. We conclude with a series of recommendations for the government, as both “economic and industrial policy maker” and “large user.”free software, intellectual property rights, free source code, open source code, free operating system, GPL licence, BSD licence, innovation, forking,

Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility

Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and flexibility in contexts of asymmetric information and to characterize the general features of an appropriate response to this challenge. We show that procedures and institutions in organizations which reduce the capacity to implement change may be necessary to generate the optimal level of inertia. We show that more flexibility in adapting to changing conditions or new information, typically known or observed by either the agent or the principal but not both, may come at the expense of efforts exerted up front by the agent to make the organization more successful. There is a trade-off in this context between ex ante efforts and ex post flexibility of adaptation. Nous développons dans cet article un modèle principal-agent permettant de mieux cerner l'arbitrage inéluctable entre incitations et flexibilité en situation d'information asymétrique. Nous caractérisons la meilleure réponse de l'organisation face à ce défi en termes d'un niveau optimal d'inertie. Une plus grande flexibilité d'adaptation aux changements dans l'environnement ou l'information, que ces changements soient observés par le principal ou l'agent, peut réduire les efforts non-observables consentis par l'agent pour assurer le succès de l'organisation.Incentives, Flexibility, Adaptation, Asymmetric Information, Incitations, Flexibilité, Adaptation, Information asymétrique

Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability

The present paper deals with some legal issues surrounding environmental protection, namely those issues concerning the liability of the different firms and individuals directly or indirectly involved in the generation of environment damaging accidents. We consider in particular the potential effects of extending a firm's liability in case of an environmental disaster to its lenders and financiers when the cost of this liability is too large in relation to the firm's assets. Such extended liability regimes exist or are considered in many countries. The most important case is the 1980/85 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the USA that led to an extensive jurisprudence over the last fifteen years. Nous traitons ici du cadre légal de la responsabilité directe des entreprises lors de désastres environnementaux et de l'extension de cette responsabilité aux prêteurs en cas de faillite de l'entreprise. De tels régimes existent ou sont à l'étude dans plusieurs pays. Le cas le plus connu est le Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) de 1980/85 aux États-Unis et nous analysons les principaux cas de jurisprudence auxquels cette loi a donné lieu depuis 15 ans.Environment, Extended Lender Liability, CERCLA, Environnement, responsabilité, CERCLA

The Pharmaceutical Industry of France

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Cutting Metals with Oxygen

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