Kripkenstein semanttista realismia vastaan

Saul Kripken (1982) Ludwig Wittgensteinin Filosofisten tutkimusten (1953) pohjalta muotoilema kielellisen merkityksen paradoksi on viime vuosikymmenien kuuluisimpia filosofisia ongelmia. Vaikka ”Kripkensteinin” (eli siis Wittgenstein Kripken lukemana) paradoksi on moniulotteinen ja sen tarkka muoto kirjallisuudessa kiistelty, yleisesti sen katsotaan jakautuvan kolmeen keskeiseen alaongelmaan. Nämä tunnetaan nimillä normatiivisuuden, virheen ja äärettömyyden ongelmat. Tässä lyhyessä artikkelissa keskityn viimeisimpään eli (ekstensionaalisen) äärettömyyden ongelmaan. Pääväitteeni on, että useista ratkaisuyrityksistä huolimatta ongelma on edelleen ajankohtainen ja tarjoaa haasteen tietyntyyppiselle semanttiselle realismille.acceptedVersionPeer reviewe

Kripkenstein semanttista realismia vastaan

Artikkeli käsittelee Saul Kripken Ludwig Wittgensteinin myöhemmistä töistä koostamaa merkityskeptistä haastetta, erityisesti niin kutsuttua äärellisyyden ongelmaa. Pääargumentti on, että skeptisen haasteen pääasiallinen vastaaja, semanttinen dispositionalismi, ei uusimmistakaan yrityksistä huolimatta ole kyennyt ratkaisemaan äärellisyyden ongelmaa. Ratkaistakseen ongelman dispositionalistin tulisi selittää, kuinka on mahdollista, että äärellinen puhuja voisi omata disposition käyttää jotain termiä äärettömässä määrässä tapauksia määrätyllä tavalla. Monet dispositionalistit esittävät, että ratkaisu löytyy niin kutsutuista ceteris paribus -ehdoista, joita vastaan Martin Kusch on argumentoinut. Jatkan Kuschin kritiikkiä ja osoitan ceteris paribus -strategian keskeiset ongelmat, minkä lisäksi vastaan myös kahteen näistä ehdoista riippumattomaan dispositionalistiseen strategiaan

Structuralism revisited : a comparison between Robert Brandom and Jacques Lacan on the nature of meaning

In this work I compare select aspects of two philosophical systems of thinking in an effort to disclose unexpected and theoretically fruitful connections, resemblances and ideas. The systems in question belong to the authors Robert Brandom and Jacques Lacan. The tradition I believe them to share could be called semantic structuralism. Roughly speaking this could be defined as the idea that in order to explain the phenomenon of linguistic meaning, our main recourse should be to the structures inherent in language, and not only or in the first place to relations transcending language. The task ahead is built on the three substantial middle chapters. Chapter 1 begins by providing initial motivation for the work's major aims, as well as specifying those aims. In Chapter 2 I lay the groundwork for the comparison between Brandom and Lacan, which involves explicating two fundamental approaches possible for semantic theory. In Chapter 3 I expound on Brandom's side of the matter, especially on his inferentialist theory of meaning, which could be rightly called structuralist in orientation. In Chapter 4 I switch over to Lacan, arguing first how his general views on language share decisive similarities with Brandom s, second what those similarities in closer inspection consists of. Lastly, Chapter 5 offers conclusions and possible routes for further study on the subject

Making Meaning: A study in foundational semantics

This is a work in the philosophy of language and metasemantics. Its purpose is to help answer the question about how words acquire their meanings. The work is divided into two parts. The purpose of Part One is to defend the claim that, despite numerous attempts, the so-called Kripkenstein’s sceptical challenge, and especially the problem of finitude, has not been offered a successful straight solution. The purpose of Part Two is to critically examine Robert Brandom’s philosophy, which can be treated as an answer to the sceptical challenge in my interpretation. My main claim is that although Brandom’s so-called normativist approach does provide a principled solution to the sceptical challenge, the proposal faces a host of other problems in the light of which I reject it. What is Kripkenstein’s sceptical challenge? The name 'Kripkenstein' is an abbreviation used in the literature for Saul Kripke’s reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later works, published in 1982. In the long essay, Kripke presents (that Wittgenstein presented) a sceptical challenge that demands an explanation of how any word can have a determinate meaning. The challenge is usually thought to consist of three interrelated problems: (1) the problem of finitude, (2) the problem of error, and (3) the problem of normativity. Following Martin Kusch, I view the problem of finitude as the most important one. According to the problem, briefly, since any actual subject is a finite being, i.e. capable of exhibiting only finite expressions of linguistic signs, it will always be possible to ask whether, in a given context, she is following a rule S1 or rule S2 that corresponds to the meaning of the sign. For example, supposing that the sign in question is '+', it can be asked whether the subject in a given context has followed the addition rule or an alternative quaddition rule, according to which any addition problem exceeding certain arbitrary cardinality results in five. According to the hypothesis, the actual use of '+' by any speaker is compatible with both rules. Since any speaker has only finite dispositions to the mathematical conduct, there will always be some limit after which there is no fact of the matter, according to the sceptic, which rule the subject will have turned out to have followed. Hence, it is indeterminate whether any actual subject has ever calculated according to the addition rule or the quaddition rule. From my view, despite the work of Kripke and Kusch, the problem of finitude has not been taken as seriously as it ought to have been. This in turn has significant consequences for the metasemantic theory concerning the origin and nature of meaning. In particular, I claim that the way how the meaning of words is determined must be understood as temporal in nature. Moreover, I claim that Kripke’s causal-historical account of reference can work as a non-straight solution to the challenge that explains how at least the meanings of some words can be temporally determined. One central aim of Brandom’s philosophy is to give a straight answer to the problem of finitude by providing an answer to the problem of normativity. However, I claim that Brandom’s version of the 'normativity of meaning' hypothesis cannot work as he intends. The key issues are difficult to summarise, but to put it succinctly, the crucial problem concerns Brandom’s ambition to give an answer to a version of Agrippa’s trilemma, or how a chain of justifications can end in anything else than (i) premises that have already been used, (ii) a primitive premise, or an (iii) infinitude of premises. My claim is that Brandom’s resolution to the trilemma is not sound

Brandom and the Pragmatist Quest for Semantic Objectivity

The aim of this paper is to critically examine the concept of semantic objectivity inherent in Robert Brandom`s works, most importantly Making It Explicit. Concerning Brandom`s theoretical aims, I shall argue that there is some discrepancy between his formal and informal characterisations of the criteria by which his account is to be judged as adequate. After expounding on the discrepancy, I shall propose to reconstruct a mostly implicit line of argument in MIE, highlighted by the more recent developments of Brandom`s work, which I think suffices to smooth it over

Constitutive Rules and Internal Criticism of Assertion

Timothy Williamson famously argued that assertion is constituted either by the knowledge rule or some similar epistemic rule. If true, the proposal has important implications for criticism of assertions. If assertions are analogical to other rule-constituted kinds like games, we can criticize assertions either on external or internal grounds, depending on whether the criticism draws from the necessary norms of assertion or some contingent ones. More recently, authors like Goldberg and MacFarlane have argued against other theories of assertion on the grounds that they cannot explain the possibility of internal criticism for assertions. This paper raises methodological problems with these arguments. The main idea is to show that alternative, non-normative accounts of assertion can also explain the apparent differences in grounds of criticism without assuming that assertion is necessarily governed by some epistemic norm