Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments

A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs

Growth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populations

Microbes providing public goods are widespread in nature despite running the risk of being exploited by free-riders. However, the precise ecological factors supporting cooperation are still puzzling. Following recent experiments, we consider the role of population growth and the repetitive fragmentation of populations into new colonies mimicking simple microbial life-cycles. Individual-based modeling reveals that demographic fluctuations, which lead to a large variance in the composition of colonies, promote cooperation. Biased by population dynamics these fluctuations result in two qualitatively distinct regimes of robust cooperation under repetitive fragmentation into groups. First, if the level of cooperation exceeds a threshold, cooperators will take over the whole population. Second, cooperators can also emerge from a single mutant leading to a robust coexistence between cooperators and free-riders. We find frequency and size of population bottlenecks, and growth dynamics to be the major ecological factors determining the regimes and thereby the evolutionary pathway towards cooperation.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure

Fracturing ranked surfaces

Discretized landscapes can be mapped onto ranked surfaces, where every element (site or bond) has a unique rank associated with its corresponding relative height. By sequentially allocating these elements according to their ranks and systematically preventing the occupation of bridges, namely elements that, if occupied, would provide global connectivity, we disclose that bridges hide a new tricritical point at an occupation fraction $p=p_{c}$, where $p_{c}$ is the percolation threshold of random percolation. For any value of $p$ in the interval $p_{c}< p \leq 1$, our results show that the set of bridges has a fractal dimension $d_{BB} \approx 1.22$ in two dimensions. In the limit $p \rightarrow 1$, a self-similar fracture is revealed as a singly connected line that divides the system in two domains. We then unveil how several seemingly unrelated physical models tumble into the same universality class and also present results for higher dimensions

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Stated and revealed inequality aversion in three subject pools

This paper reports data from three subject pools (n=717 subjects) using techniques based on those of Loewenstein, et al. (1989) and Blanco, et al. (2011) to obtain parameters, respectively, of stated and revealed inequality aversion. We provide a replication opportunity for those papers, with two innovations: (i) a design which allows stated and revealed preferences to be compared at the individual level; (ii) assessment of robustness of findings across subjects from a UK university, a Turkish university and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our findings on stated aversion to inequality are qualitatively similar to those of Loewenstein, et al. in each of our subject pools, whereas there are notable differences between some of our findings on revealed preference and those of Blanco, et al. We find that revealed advantageous inequality aversion is often stronger than revealed dis-advantageous inequality aversion. In most subject pools, we find some (weak) correlation between corresponding parameters of stated and revealed inequality aversion

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density

Reciprocity as a foundation of financial economics

This paper argues that the subsistence of the fundamental theorem of contemporary financial mathematics is the ethical concept ‘reciprocity’. The argument is based on identifying an equivalence between the contemporary, and ostensibly ‘value neutral’, Fundamental Theory of Asset Pricing with theories of mathematical probability that emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of the ethical assessment of commercial contracts in a framework of Aristotelian ethics. This observation, the main claim of the paper, is justified on the basis of results from the Ultimatum Game and is analysed within a framework of Pragmatic philosophy. The analysis leads to the explanatory hypothesis that markets are centres of communicative action with reciprocity as a rule of discourse. The purpose of the paper is to reorientate financial economics to emphasise the objectives of cooperation and social cohesion and to this end, we offer specific policy advice

Surgical site infections in Italian Hospitals: a prospective multicenter study

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Surgical site infections (SSI) remain a major clinical problem in terms of morbidity, mortality, and hospital costs. Nearly 60% of SSI diagnosis occur in the postdischarge period. However, literature provides little information on risk factors associated to in-hospital and postdischarge SSI occurrence. A national prospective multicenter study was conducted with the aim of assessing the incidence of both in-hospital and postdisharge SSI, and the associated risk factors.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>In 2002, a one-month, prospective national multicenter surveillance study was conducted in General and Gynecological units of 48 Italian hospitals. Case ascertainment of SSI was carried out using standardized surveillance methodology. To assess potential risk factors for SSI we used a conditional logistic regression model. We also reported the odds ratios of in-hospital and postdischarge SSI.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>SSI occurred in 241 (5.2%) of 4,665 patients, of which 148 (61.4%) during in-hospital, and 93 (38.6%) during postdischarge period. Of 93 postdischarge SSI, sixty-two (66.7%) and 31 (33.3%) were detected through telephone interview and questionnaire survey, respectively. Higher SSI incidence rates were observed in colon surgery (18.9%), gastric surgery (13.6%), and appendectomy (8.6%). If considering risk factors for SSI, at multivariate analysis we found that emergency interventions, NNIS risk score, pre-operative hospital stay, and use of drains were significantly associated with SSI occurrence. Moreover, risk factors for total SSI were also associated to in-hospital SSI. Additionally, only NNIS, pre-operative hospital stay, use of drains, and antibiotic prophylaxis were associated with postdischarge SSI.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Our study provided information on risk factors for SSI in a large population in general surgery setting in Italy. Standardized postdischarge surveillance detected 38.6% of all SSI. We also compared risk factors for in-hospital and postdischarge SSI, thus providing additional information to that of the current available literature. Finally, a large amount of postdischarge SSI were detected through telephone interview. The evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the telephone interview as a postdischarge surveillance method could be an issue for further research.</p