Set Matching: An Enhancement of the Hales-Jewett Pairing Strategy

When solving k-in-a-Row games, the Hales-Jewett pairing strategy [4] is a well-known strategy to prove that specific positions are (at most) a draw. It requires two empty squares per possible winning line (group) to be marked, i.e., with a coverage ratio of 2.0. In this paper we present a new strategy, called Set Matching. A matching set consists of a set of nodes (the markers), a set of possible winning lines (the groups), and a coverage set indicating how all groups are covered after every first initial move. This strategy needs less than two markers per group. As such it is able to prove positions in k-in-a-Row games to be draws, which cannot be proven using the Hales-Jewett pairing strategy. We show several efficient configurations with their matching sets. These include Cycle Configurations, BiCycle Configurations, and PolyCycle Configurations involving more than two cycles. Depending on configuration, the coverage ratio can be reduced to 1.14. Many examples in the domain of solving k-in-a-Row games are given, including the direct proof (without further investigation) that the empty 4 x 4 board is a draw for 4-in-a-Row

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation

The EU Strategy for Central Asia says 'security'. Does this include Security Sector Reform? EUCAM Policy Brief No. 10, 12 November 2009

Central Asia faces a broad range of security challenges. Due to the region's position at the crossroads between Russia, China and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Caspian Sea it is confronted with a range of trans-national issues such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. Central Asia also encounters specific regional threats including scarcity of water resources for generating power and irrigation purposes, which is currently causing tension. On a national level the five Central Asian republics face the threat of instability due to bad governance and the harsh impact of the economic crisis. The European Union regards itself as a security actor and takes a keen interest in working with Central Asian states on the basis of joint security interests. This EUCAM policy brief assesses in what aspects of Security Sector Reform the EU is engaged in with Central Asia and in what context these possible activities should be viewed

Study of Fish Weight Loss in Solar Dryer Across Different Agro-Ecological Zones of Nigeria

Drying sessions were conducted across Nigeria to study the interaction between fish weight loss and the meteorological parameters. Correlation analyses using weight loss values show that latitude is strongly related (r =+0.96) to weight loss of fish inside the dryer while altitude had a weak relationship (r = +0.24) with weight loss. The results show that New Bussa recorded more weight loss of fish than Jos, despite their uniform latitude. Weight loss records in Jos, was however better than those of Warri and Ibadan

The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative Firms: Common Values

Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealinginformation on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect theirincentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria undervoluntary disclosure with those under mandatory disclosure in a model where the firms’cost of investment are identically independently distributed. Under voluntary disclosurefirms conceal bad news, and disclose good news only if little knowledge spills over toheir rival. Under mandatory disclosure firms expect higher profits for giveninformation acquisition investments, but they acquire less information. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Wirkung von Offenlegungsvorschriften auf innovative Firmen: Perfekt korrelierte Werte) Unternehmen, welche an einem F&E -Wettbewerb teilnehmen, managen aktiv die Erwartungen ihrer Konkurrenten, indem sie gezielt entscheiden, ob sie Informationen über ihre Investitionskosten veröffentlichen oder geheim halten. Durch ihre Offenlegungsstrategien beeinflussen sie sowohl die Anreize Ihrer Konkurrenten, Informationen zu sammeln, wie auch deren Anreize, F&E zu betreiben. Anhand eines Modells mit vollständig positiver Korrelation zwischen den Investitionskosten der Unternehmen vergleicht der Beitrag Gleichgewichte in denen die Unternehmen freiwillig wählen, ob sie ihre Informationen offen legen wollen, mit den Gleichgewichten, bei denen Unternehmen ihre Information offen legen müssen. Bei freiwilliger Offenlegung veröffentlichen Unternehmen schlechte Nachrichten und behalten gute für sich, um Mitbewerber zu entmutigen. Bei Offenlegungspflicht erwarten Unternehmen typischerweise höhere Gewinne für vorgegebene Investitionen in Informationskosten, aber sie beschaffen sich weniger Information.R&D Competition, Information Acquisition, Disclosure Regulation

EU emissions trading in a crowded national climate policy space – some findings from the INTERACT project

Climate policy in EU Member States is becoming increasingly crowded. Multiple instruments have been introduced at both the Member State and EU levels and new instruments are regularly being proposed. As the number of instruments grows, so does the potential for interaction between them. This interaction can be complementary and mutually reinforcing, but there is also the risk that different policy instruments will interfere with one another and undermine the objectives and credibility of each. The central aim of the EU-funded research project “Interaction in EU Climate Policy” (INTERACT) has been to develop a systematic approach to analysing policy interaction and to use this approach to explore the potential interactions between the proposed EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and other instruments within both EU and Member State climate policy

The World Bank's Unified Survey projections : how accurate are they? an ex-post evaluation of US91-US97

Since 1984, the Unified Survey has been the World Bank's principle mechanism for gathering quantitative macroeconomic information from country teams on Bank member countries. After gathering annual data those teams also do most-likely-scenario projections. The author examines the numerical projections of macroeconomic indicators carried out by World Bank country teams for Unified Surveys for fiscal years 1991-97. He studies the accuracy of short-term projects (for the current year, first year, and three years ahead) for 23 countries in the different World Bank regions. He also compares the Unified Survey projections with the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) projections for its fall World Economic Outlook (WEO). He finds that: 1) The Unified Survey projections are inaccurate when evaluated over the whole period investigated (1990-96). However, their accuracy has improved over time. 2) Improvements are notable in projections for investment, GDP inflation, and government deficit. Projections of external indicators - such as import and export growth - are still substantially inaccurate and should be greatly improved. 3) The Unified Survey projections are as accurate as - or more accurate than - the WEO projections. 4) One cannot characterize the United Survey projections as optimistic. This is the first systematic attempt to evaluate the accuracy of country team macroeconomic projections over time and the first to compare these with the IMF's WEO projections.Poverty Impact Evaluation,Economic Theory&Research,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Public Health Promotion,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Governance Indicators

New Results for Domineering from Combinatorial Game Theory Endgame Databases

We have constructed endgame databases for all single-component positions up to 15 squares for Domineering, filled with exact Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT) values in canonical form. The most important findings are as follows. First, as an extension of Conway's [8] famous Bridge Splitting Theorem for Domineering, we state and prove another theorem, dubbed the Bridge Destroying Theorem for Domineering. Together these two theorems prove very powerful in determining the CGT values of large positions as the sum of the values of smaller fragments, but also to compose larger positions with specified values from smaller fragments. Using the theorems, we then prove that for any dyadic rational number there exist Domineering positions with that value. Second, we investigate Domineering positions with infinitesimal CGT values, in particular ups and downs, tinies and minies, and nimbers. In the databases we find many positions with single or double up and down values, but no ups and downs with higher multitudes. However, we prove that such single-component ups and downs easily can be constructed. Further, we find Domineering positions with 11 different tinies and minies values. For each we give an example. Next, for nimbers we find many Domineering positions with values up to *3. This is surprising, since Drummond-Cole [10] suspected that no *2 and *3 positions in standard Domineering would exist. We show and characterize many *2 and *3 positions. Finally, we give some Domineering positions with values interesting for other reasons. Third, we have investigated the temperature of all positions in our databases. There appears to be exactly one position with temperature 2 (as already found before) and no positions with temperature larger than 2. This supports Berlekamp's conjecture that 2 is the highest possible temperature in Domineering