Using Insights from Psychology and Language to Improve How People Reason with Description Logics

Inspired by insights from theories of human reasoning and language, we propose additions to the Manchester OWL Syntax to improve comprehensibility. These additions cover: functional and inverse functional properties, negated conjunction, the definition of exceptions, and existential and universal restrictions. By means of an empirical study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of a number of these additions, in particular: the use of solely to clarify the uniqueness of the object in a functional property; the replacement of and with intersection in conjunction, which was particularly beneficial in negated conjunction; the use of except as a substitute for and not; and the replacement of some with including and only with noneOrOnly, which helped in certain situations to clarify the nature of these restrictions

The Anatomy of the Internet Meets the Body of the Law

Symposium: Copyright Owners\u27 Rights and Users\u27 Privileges on the Interne

Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World

Symposium: Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Softwar

Inhibition of gap junction and adherens junction assembly by connexin and A-CAM antibodies

We examined the roles of the extracellular domains of a gap junction protein and a cell adhesion molecule in gap junction and adherens junction formation by altering cell interactions with antibody Fab fragments. Using immunoblotting and immunocytochemistry we demonstrated that Novikoff cells contained the gap junction protein, connexin43 (Cx43), and the cell adhesion molecule, A-CAM (N-cadherin). Cells were dissociated in EDTA, allowed to recover, and reaggregated for 60 min in media containing Fab fragments prepared from a number of antibodies. We observed no cell-cell dye transfer 4 min after microinjection in 90% of the cell pairs treated with Fab fragments of antibodies for the first or second extracellular domain of Cx43, the second extracellular domain of connexin32 (Cx32) or A-CAM. Cell-cell dye transfer was detected within 30 s in cell pairs treated with control Fab fragments (pre-immune serum, antibodies to the rat major histocompatibility complex or the amino or carboxyl termii of Cx43). We observed no gap junctions by freeze-fracture EM and no adherens junctions by thin section EM between cells treated with the Fab fragments that blocked cell-cell dye transfer. Gap junctions were found on approximately 50% of the cells in control samples using freeze-fracture EM. We demonstrated with reaggregated Novikoff cells that: (a) functional interactions of the extracellular domains of the connexins were necessary for the formation of gap junction channels; (b) cell interactions mediated by A-CAM were required for gap junction assembly; and (c) Fab fragments of antibodies for A-CAM or connexin extracellular domains blocked adherens junction formation

Illusions in reasoning with quantifiers

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally make explicit only what is true. A computer program revealed an unexpected consequence of the theory: it predicts that certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the existence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible given quantified assertions, such as 'At least some of the plastic beads are not red.' Experiment 1 showed that, as predicted, participants erroneously inferred that impossible assertions were possible, and that possible situations were impossible, but they performed well with control problems. Experiment 2 demonstrated the existence of similar illusions in inferences from dyadic assertions, e.g. 'All the boys played with the girls'

How People Reason about Temporal Relations

The paper describes a theory of temporal reasoning and its implementation in a computer program. The theory postulates that individuals construct mental models, and it predicts that inferences that call for only one model to be constructed, such as: a happens before b. b happens before c. d happens while b. e happens while c. What is the temporal relation between d and e? will be easier than those that call for multiple models, such as a problem identical to the previous one except for its first premise: a happens before c. Experiment 1 showed that subjects were faster and more accurate with one-model problems than with multiple-model problems. They look more time to read a premise leading to multiple models than the corresponding premise in a one-model problem. Experiment 2 showed that if the question came first and was presented with all the premises, then subjects can ignore an irrelevant premise. As predicted, the difference between one-model and multiple-model problems with valid conclusions then disappeared. Experiment 3 showed that the size of a model, i.e., the number of events in it, and the distance apart of the critical events, also affected performance

How to Make the Impossible Seem Probable

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises. A conclusion is possible if it occurs in at least one model; it is probable if occurs in most models; and it is necessary if it occurs in all models. The theory also postulates that reasoners represent as much information as possible in implicit models. Experiment 1 showed that, as predicted, conclusions about possible situations tend to correspond to explicit models rather than to implicit models. Experiment 2 yielded a discovery: there are illusory inferences with conclusions that seem plausible but that are in reality gross errors. In such cases, as the model theory predicts, subjects judge as the more probable of two events one that is impossible. For example, given that only one of the following two assertions is true: There is a king or an ace in the hand, or both. There is a queen or an ace in the hand, or both. subjects judge that the ace is more likely to be in the hand than the king. In fact, it is impossible for an ace to be in the hand

Problem representations and illusions in reasoning

The mental model theory of reasoning postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally make explicit only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence: it predicts the occurrence of inferences that are systematically invalid. These inferences should arise from reasoners failing to take into account what is false. We report an experiment that corroborated the occurrence of these illusory inferences, and that eliminated a number of altemative explanations for them. Results illuminate the controversy among various current theories of reasoning