The sense of agency as tracking control

Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent.We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone

Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A case study

In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input-output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness

An Imperfect Dopaminergic Error Signal Can Drive Temporal-Difference Learning

An open problem in the field of computational neuroscience is how to link synaptic plasticity to system-level learning. A promising framework in this context is temporal-difference (TD) learning. Experimental evidence that supports the hypothesis that the mammalian brain performs temporal-difference learning includes the resemblance of the phasic activity of the midbrain dopaminergic neurons to the TD error and the discovery that cortico-striatal synaptic plasticity is modulated by dopamine. However, as the phasic dopaminergic signal does not reproduce all the properties of the theoretical TD error, it is unclear whether it is capable of driving behavior adaptation in complex tasks. Here, we present a spiking temporal-difference learning model based on the actor-critic architecture. The model dynamically generates a dopaminergic signal with realistic firing rates and exploits this signal to modulate the plasticity of synapses as a third factor. The predictions of our proposed plasticity dynamics are in good agreement with experimental results with respect to dopamine, pre- and post-synaptic activity. An analytical mapping from the parameters of our proposed plasticity dynamics to those of the classical discrete-time TD algorithm reveals that the biological constraints of the dopaminergic signal entail a modified TD algorithm with self-adapting learning parameters and an adapting offset. We show that the neuronal network is able to learn a task with sparse positive rewards as fast as the corresponding classical discrete-time TD algorithm. However, the performance of the neuronal network is impaired with respect to the traditional algorithm on a task with both positive and negative rewards and breaks down entirely on a task with purely negative rewards. Our model demonstrates that the asymmetry of a realistic dopaminergic signal enables TD learning when learning is driven by positive rewards but not when driven by negative rewards

Putting ourselves in another’s skin: using the plasticity of self-perception to enhance empathy and decrease prejudice

The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays a crucial role in determining questions such as which social groups we view ourselves as belonging to and how we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has also become an important topic within cognitive neuroscience with an explosion in the number of studies seeking to understand how different aspects of the self are represented within the brain. In this paper, we first outline the recent research on the neurocognitive basis of the self and highlight a key distinction between two forms of self-representation. The first is the “bodily” self, which is thought to be the basis of subjective experience and is grounded in the processing of sensorimotor signals. The second is the “conceptual” self, which develops through our interactions of other and is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic information. We then investigate how both the bodily and conceptual self are related to social cognition with an emphasis on how self-representations are involved in the processing and creation of prejudice. We then highlight new research demonstrating that the bodily and conceptual self are both malleable and that this malleability can be harnessed in order to achieve a reduction in social prejudice. In particular, we will outline strong evidence that modulating people’s perceptions of the bodily self can lead to changes in attitudes at the conceptual level. We will highlight a series of studies demonstrating that social attitudes towards various social out-groups (e.g. racial groups) can lead to a reduction in prejudice towards that group. Finally, we seek to place these findings in a broader social context by considering how innovations in virtual reality technology can allow experiences of taking on another’s identity are likely to become both more commonplace and more convincing in the future and the various opportunities and risks associated with using such technology to reduce prejudice