2,311 research outputs found
Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley-Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms
Decidability Results for Multi-objective Stochastic Games
We study stochastic two-player turn-based games in which the objective of one
player is to ensure several infinite-horizon total reward objectives, while the
other player attempts to spoil at least one of the objectives. The games have
previously been shown not to be determined, and an approximation algorithm for
computing a Pareto curve has been given. The major drawback of the existing
algorithm is that it needs to compute Pareto curves for finite horizon
objectives (for increasing length of the horizon), and the size of these Pareto
curves can grow unboundedly, even when the infinite-horizon Pareto curve is
small. By adapting existing results, we first give an algorithm that computes
the Pareto curve for determined games. Then, as the main result of the paper,
we show that for the natural class of stopping games and when there are two
reward objectives, the problem of deciding whether a player can ensure
satisfaction of the objectives with given thresholds is decidable. The result
relies on intricate and novel proof which shows that the Pareto curves contain
only finitely many points. As a consequence, we get that the two-objective
discounted-reward problem for unrestricted class of stochastic games is
decidable.Comment: 35 page
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation
of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the
question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to
determine an allocation of funds to projects. This problem is different from
standard fair resource allocation because of public goods: The allocated goods
benefit all users simultaneously. Fairness is crucial in participatory decision
making, since generating equitable outcomes is an important goal of these
processes. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures
fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel
characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl
equilibrium, which is always a core solution. We then provide the first (to our
knowledge) polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a
broad set of utility functions; our algorithm also generalizes (in a
non-trivial way) the well-known concept of proportional fairness. We use our
theoretical insights to perform experiments on real participatory budgeting
voting data. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for
utility functions that naturally model our practical setting, and examine the
relation of the core with the familiar welfare objective. Finally, we address
concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized
approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the exponential
mechanism from differential privacy
Reduced Normal Forms Are Not Extensive Forms
Fundamental results in the theory of extensive form games have singled out the reduced normal form as the key representation of a game in terms of strategic equivalence. In a precise sense, the reduced normal form contains all strategically relevant information. This note shows that a difficulty with the concept has been overlooked so far: given a reduced normal form alone, it may be impossible to reconstruct the game’s extensive form representation
Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued
Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring
based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for
those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic
epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the
knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of
Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use
the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice
In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study
of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in
instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for
ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical.
How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple,
scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to
reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to
this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over
the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative.
We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the
space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential
deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such
graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of
agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler
classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that
sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting
as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for
general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost
of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded
Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by
analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching
pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and
compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In
finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be
greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial
games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely
supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from
ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium
distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on
finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set
of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many
moments
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