Concreteness and abstraction in everyday explanation

A number of philosophers argue for the value of abstraction in explanation. According to these prescriptive theories, an explanation becomes superior when it leaves out details that make no difference to the occurrence of the event one is trying to explain (the explanandum). Abstract explanations are not frugal placeholders for improved, detailed future explanations but are more valuable than their concrete counterparts because they highlight the factors that do the causal work, the factors in the absence of which the explanandum would not occur. We present several experiments that test whether people follow this prescription (i.e., whether people prefer explanations with abstract difference makers over explanations with concrete details and explanations that omit descriptively accurate but causally irrelevant information). Contrary to the prescription, we found a preference for concreteness and detail. Participants rated explanations with concrete details higher than their abstract counterparts and in many cases they did not penalize the presence of causally irrelevant details. Nevertheless, causality still constrained participants' preferences: They downgraded concrete explanations that did not communicate the critical causal properties

Raising argument strength using negative evidence: A constraint on models of induction

Both intuitively, and according to similarity-based theories of induction, relevant evidence raises argument strength when it is positive and lowers it when it is negative. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that argument strength can actually increase when negative evidence is introduced. Two kinds of argument were compared through forced choice or sequential evaluation: single positive arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”) and double mixed arguments (e.g., “Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain, X’s music DOES NOT; therefore, Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain”). Negative evidence in the second premise lowered credence when it applied to an item X from the same subcategory (e.g., Haydn) and raised it when it applied to a different subcategory (e.g., AC/DC). The results constitute a new constraint on models of induction

Measurement properties of the Inventory of Cognitive Bias in Medicine (ICBM)

© 2008 Sladek et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Background Understanding how doctors think may inform both undergraduate and postgraduate medical education. Developing such an understanding requires valid and reliable measurement tools. We examined the measurement properties of the Inventory of Cognitive Bias in Medicine (ICBM), designed to tap this domain with specific reference to medicine, but with previously questionable measurement properties. Methods First year postgraduate entry medical students at Flinders University, and trainees (postgraduate doctors in any specialty) and consultants (N = 348) based at two teaching hospitals in Adelaide, Australia, completed the ICBM and a questionnaire measuring thinking styles (Rational Experiential Inventory). Results Questions with the lowest item-total correlation were deleted from the original 22 item ICBM, although the resultant 17 item scale only marginally improved internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.61 compared with 0.57). A factor analysis identified two scales, both achieving only α = 0.58. Construct validity was assessed by correlating Rational Experiential Inventory scores with the ICBM, with some positive correlations noted for students only, suggesting that those who are naïve to the knowledge base required to "successfully" respond to the ICBM may profit by a thinking style in tune with logical reasoning. Conclusion The ICBM failed to demonstrate adequate content validity, internal consistency and construct validity. It is unlikely that improvements can be achieved without considered attention to both the audience for which it is designed and its item content. The latter may need to involve both removal of some items deemed to measure multiple biases and the addition of new items in the attempt to survey the range of biases that may compromise medical decision making

How do healthcare consumers process and evaluate comparative healthcare information? A qualitative study using cognitive interviews

Background: To date, online public healthcare reports have not been effectively used by consumers. Therefore, we qualitatively examined how healthcare consumers process and evaluate comparative healthcare information on the Internet. Methods: Using semi-structured cognitive interviews, interviewees (n = 20) were asked to think aloud and answer questions, as they were prompted with three Dutch web pages providing comparative healthcare information. Results: We identified twelve themes from consumers' thoughts and evaluations. These themes were categorized under four important areas of interest: (1) a response to the design; (2) a response to the information content; (3) the use of the information, and (4) the purpose of the information. Conclusion: Several barriers to an effective use of comparative healthcare information were identified, such as too much information and the ambiguity of terms presented on websites. Particularly important for future research is the question of how comparative healthcare information can be integrated with alternative information, such as patient reviews on the Internet. Furthermore, the readability of quality of care concepts is an issue that needs further attention, both from websites and communication experts.

Will the Conscious–Subconscious Pacing Quagmire Help Elucidate the Mechanisms of Self-Paced Exercise? New Opportunities in Dual Process Theory and Process Tracing Methods

The extent to which athletic pacing decisions are made consciously or subconsciously is a prevailing issue. In this article we discuss why the one-dimensional conscious–subconscious debate that has reigned in the pacing literature has suppressed our understanding of the multidimensional processes that occur in pacing decisions. How do we make our decisions in real-life competitive situations? What information do we use and how do we respond to opponents? These are questions that need to be explored and better understood, using smartly designed experiments. The paper provides clarity about key conscious, preconscious, subconscious and unconscious concepts, terms that have previously been used in conflicting and confusing ways. The potential of dual process theory in articulating multidimensional aspects of intuitive and deliberative decision-making processes is discussed in the context of athletic pacing along with associated process-tracing research methods. In attempting to refine pacing models and improve training strategies and psychological skills for athletes, the dual-process framework could be used to gain a clearer understanding of (1) the situational conditions for which either intuitive or deliberative decisions are optimal; (2) how intuitive and deliberative decisions are biased by things such as perception, emotion and experience; and (3) the underlying cognitive mechanisms such as memory, attention allocation, problem solving and hypothetical thought

The neural substrate of positive bias in spontaneous emotional processing

Even in the presence of negative information, healthy human beings display an optimistic tendency when thinking of past success and future chances, giving a positive bias to everyday's cognition. The tendency to actively select positive thoughts suggests the existence of a mechanism to exclude negative content, raising the issue of its dependence on mechanisms like those of effortful control. Using perfusion imaging, we examined how brain activations differed according to whether participants were left to prefer positive thoughts spontaneously, or followed an explicit instruction to the same effect, finding a widespread dissociation of brain perfusion patterns. Under spontaneous processing of emotional material, recruitment of areas associated with effortful attention, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, was reduced relative to instructed avoidance of negative material (F(1,58) = 26.24, p = 0.047, corrected). Under spontaneous avoidance perfusion increments were observed in several areas that were deactivated by the task, including the perigenual medial prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, individual differences in executive capacity were not associated with positive bias. These findings suggest that spontaneous positive cognitive emotion regulation in health may result from processes that, while actively suppressing emotionally salient information, differ from those associated with effortful and directed control