The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas).Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household.Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption.The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.Rosca;Gender;Household

The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas).Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household.Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption.The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya

A Computational Approach for Designing Tiger Corridors in India

Wildlife corridors are components of landscapes, which facilitate the movement of organisms and processes between intact habitat areas, and thus provide connectivity between the habitats within the landscapes. Corridors are thus regions within a given landscape that connect fragmented habitat patches within the landscape. The major concern of designing corridors as a conservation strategy is primarily to counter, and to the extent possible, mitigate the effects of habitat fragmentation and loss on the biodiversity of the landscape, as well as support continuance of land use for essential local and global economic activities in the region of reference. In this paper, we use game theory, graph theory, membership functions and chain code algorithm to model and design a set of wildlife corridors with tiger (Panthera tigris tigris) as the focal species. We identify the parameters which would affect the tiger population in a landscape complex and using the presence of these identified parameters construct a graph using the habitat patches supporting tiger presence in the landscape complex as vertices and the possible paths between them as edges. The passage of tigers through the possible paths have been modelled as an Assurance game, with tigers as an individual player. The game is played recursively as the tiger passes through each grid considered for the model. The iteration causes the tiger to choose the most suitable path signifying the emergence of adaptability. As a formal explanation of the game, we model this interaction of tiger with the parameters as deterministic finite automata, whose transition function is obtained by the game payoff.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures, 6 tables, NGCT conference 201

Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation, based on local interaction or locally available information. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (American Economic Review 86(4):766–789, 1996)

Encounters with the moral economy of water: convergent evolution in Valencia

[EN] This article presents the results of comparative fieldwork on the huerta of Valencia in Spain, a successful community-managed irrigation system of medium scale, one governed collectively by thousands of small farmers organized into 10 autonomous but highly interdependent irrigator groups. The study tested a model identified previously in research on successful systems of much smaller scale in Peru, a set of principles of operation that, when affirmed by farmers and obeyed as collective-choice rules, interact to create equity among water rights and transparency in water use in an unusual way. The authors show that a nearly identical set are at work in all 10 communities of Valencia, revealing the unique manner in which these work together to promote successful and sustainable cooperation, both within and between the user groups, and arguing that their presence in Spain and the Andes is indicative, not of diffusion from one continent to another, but of independent invention. These principles together laid the foundations for separate Andean and Islamic hydraulic traditions, which were often manifested locally in robust and equitable systems of the same general type, here called the moral economy of water. This kind of communal system appears to have emerged repeatedly, and often independently, in a great many other locales and settings throughout the world; its adaptive dynamics are shown to be of great relevance to small farmers today as they face the growing scarcity of water being induced by population growth and by climate change.Trawick, P.; Ortega Reig, MV.; Palau-Salvador, G. (2014). Encounters with the moral economy of water: convergent evolution in Valencia. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water. 1(1):87-110. doi:10.1002/wat2.1008S871101