Spacial Equilibrium in a State Space Approach to Demand Uncertainty

Firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer preferences when launching products. The existing literature models preference uncertainty as an additive shock to the consumer distribution in a characteristic space model. The additive shock only shifts the mean of the consumers' ideal points. We generalize this approach to a state space model in which a vector of parameters can give rise to dierent distributions of consumer tastes in dierent states, allowing other moments of the consumer density to be uncertain. An equilibrium existence result is given. In the case of symmetric distributions, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium can be described by a simple closed-form solution.Location; Product Dierentiation; Uncertainty; Hotelling

Apollo extension system lsv studies. mission command and control

Steering system and control circuit for Lunar Surface Vehicle /LSV/ - Apollo projec

Uncertainty in Spatial Duopoly with Possibly Asymmetric Distributions: a State Space Approach

In spatial competition firms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when launching products either because of shifting demograph- ics or of asymmetric information about preferences. Realistically distri- butions of consumer locations should be allowed to vary over states and need not be uniform. However, the existing literature models location uncertainty as an additive shock to a uniform consumer distribution. The additive shock restricts uncertainty to the mean of the consumers loca- tions. We generalize this approach to a state space model in which a vector of parameters gives rise to different distributions of consumer tastes in dif- ferent states, allowing other moments (besides the mean) of the consumer distribution to be uncertain. We illustrate our model with an asymmetric consumer distribution and obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an explicit, closed-form solution. An equilibrium existence result is then given for the general case. For symmetric distributions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the general case can be described by a simple closed-form solution.Location, Product Differentiation, Uncertainty, Hotelling

Who decides about change and restructuring in organizations?

The authors of this paper model the determinants of who makes decisions, the principal or an agent, when there are multiple decisions. Decision making takes effort and time; and, once implemented, the expected loss from a particular decision (or project) increases with the length of time since the last decision was made. The model shows delegation is more likely as: (i) controllable uncertainty increases; (ii) uncontrollable uncertainty decreases; (iii) the number of plants in the firm decreases; (iv) the complexity of the decision increases; and (v) the importance of the decision increases. The theoretical predictions are consistent with the authors\u27 novel empirical results on the delegation of major organizational change decisions using workplace data. Their unique data allows them to identify who made a decision to implement a significant change, as well as key internal and external factors highlighted as potentially important in their theory. Empirically, delegation is more likely in organizations that: face a competitive product market; export; have predictable product demand; have a larger workplace; and that have fewer other workplaces in the same organization producing a similar output. The authors find business strategy is not related to the allocation of decision making authority; delegation, however, is associated with the use of human resource techniques such as the provision of bonuses to employees

Improving Health Outcomes for Children (IHOC): Summary of Pediatric Quality Measures for Children Enrolled in MaineCare FFY 2009 - FFY 2012

his report, authored by USM Muskie School research staff, presents the results of the 16 CHIPRA Core Measures that were collected using MaineCare claims or Vital Statistics data and reported in the State of Maine’s FFY 2012 CHIP Annual Report to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Also included in this report are an additional three measures from the Improving Health Outcomes for Children (IHOC) project’s Master List of Pediatric Measures. In addition to presenting results in graphs and narrative, this report also provides measure definitions and background information about each measure topic. The goal of this document is to present the claims- and vital statistics-based CHIPRA and IHOC measure results in a user-friendly format for IHOC project stakeholders. Measures are grouped by topic. For each topic, a Background section provides a brief description and rationale for collection. (The background discussion for CHIPRA Core Measures is drawn from the Background Report for the Initial, Recommended Core Set of Children’s Healthcare Quality Measures for Voluntary Use by Medicaid and CHIP Programs

Apollo logistic support systems nolab studies- mission command and control interim report

Vehicle stability, steering, and control system characteristics for Apollo logistic support of lunar mobile laboratory /Molab