2,542 research outputs found

    Radio frequency coaxial high pass filter Patent

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    Radio frequency coaxial filter to provide dc isolation and low frequency signal rejection in audio rang

    Bi-polar phase detector and corrector for split phase PCM data signals Patent

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    Bipolar phase detector and corrector for split phase PCM data signal

    Hon. Thomas F. Hargis

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    Article on Hon. Thomas H. Hargis in Kentucky Politicians: Sketches of Representatives, Corn-Crackers and Other Miscellany written by John J. McAfee and published by the Courier-Journal Job Printing Company of Louisville, Kentucky in 1886

    Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization

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    We consider (approximate) revenue maximization in auctions where the distribution on input valuations is given via "black box" access to samples from the distribution. We observe that the number of samples required -- the sample complexity -- is tightly related to the representation complexity of an approximately revenue-maximizing auction. Our main results are upper bounds and an exponential lower bound on these complexities

    A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema

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    For a compact metric space X, consider a linear subspace A of C (X) containing the constant functions. One version of the Stone-Weierstrass theorem states that, if A separates points, then the closure of A under both minima and maxima is dense in C (X). Similarly, by the Hahn-Banach theorem, if A separates probability measures, A is dense in C (X). We show that if A separates points from probability measures, then the closure of A under minima is dense in C (X). This theorem has applications in Economic Theory

    Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets

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    In settings where players have a limited access to liquidity, represented in the form of budget constraints, efficiency maximization has proven to be a challenging goal. In particular, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor then the number of players. Therefore, the literature has mainly resorted to Pareto-efficiency as a way to achieve efficiency in such settings. While successful in some important scenarios, in many settings it is known that either exactly one incentive-compatible auction that always outputs a Pareto-efficient solution, or that no truthful mechanism can always guarantee a Pareto-efficient outcome. Traditionally, impossibility results can be avoided by considering approximations. However, Pareto-efficiency is a binary property (is either satisfied or not), which does not allow for approximations. In this paper we propose a new notion of efficiency, called \emph{liquid welfare}. This is the maximum amount of revenue an omniscient seller would be able to extract from a certain instance. We explain the intuition behind this objective function and show that it can be 2-approximated by two different auctions. Moreover, we show that no truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation factor better than 4/3 with respect to the liquid welfare, and provide a truthful auction that attains this bound in a special case. Importantly, the liquid welfare benchmark also overcomes impossibilities for some settings. While it is impossible to design Pareto-efficient auctions for multi-unit auctions where players have decreasing marginal values, we give a deterministic O(logn)O(\log n)-approximation for the liquid welfare in this setting

    Statistical Arbitrage Mining for Display Advertising

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    We study and formulate arbitrage in display advertising. Real-Time Bidding (RTB) mimics stock spot exchanges and utilises computers to algorithmically buy display ads per impression via a real-time auction. Despite the new automation, the ad markets are still informationally inefficient due to the heavily fragmented marketplaces. Two display impressions with similar or identical effectiveness (e.g., measured by conversion or click-through rates for a targeted audience) may sell for quite different prices at different market segments or pricing schemes. In this paper, we propose a novel data mining paradigm called Statistical Arbitrage Mining (SAM) focusing on mining and exploiting price discrepancies between two pricing schemes. In essence, our SAMer is a meta-bidder that hedges advertisers' risk between CPA (cost per action)-based campaigns and CPM (cost per mille impressions)-based ad inventories; it statistically assesses the potential profit and cost for an incoming CPM bid request against a portfolio of CPA campaigns based on the estimated conversion rate, bid landscape and other statistics learned from historical data. In SAM, (i) functional optimisation is utilised to seek for optimal bidding to maximise the expected arbitrage net profit, and (ii) a portfolio-based risk management solution is leveraged to reallocate bid volume and budget across the set of campaigns to make a risk and return trade-off. We propose to jointly optimise both components in an EM fashion with high efficiency to help the meta-bidder successfully catch the transient statistical arbitrage opportunities in RTB. Both the offline experiments on a real-world large-scale dataset and online A/B tests on a commercial platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solution in exploiting arbitrage in various model settings and market environments.Comment: In the proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD 2015

    A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

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    This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing
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